Harry Potter and Divine Foreknowledge

The end of the chapter of Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince entitled "Horcruxes" is probably one of the most intellectually challenging passages in the entire Harry Potter series. It deals with the relationship between the prophecy regarding Harry and Lord Voldemort, and the fulfillment of that prophecy. I think it can be of use in explaining how free will and divine foreknowledge can coexist, though the discussion in Harry Potter is not entirely analogous.

On the Term "Torah Umadda"

I have written a letter to Rabbi Natan Slifkin suggesting that he not use the term "Torah umadda" in reference to his own position or "camp." The text (without salutations) can be found at www.rationalistjudaism.com/2009/05/torah-umadda-wrong-term.html.

Other Sources About Chazal's Science

My ambition is one day to compile a source list complementary to "Sources Indicating That Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge," which will present rabbinic sources indicating that Chazal did in fact possess perfect scientific knowledge, or at least that scientific statements that go unchallenged in the Talmud are always correct. Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately) I am much busier these days than I was back when I compiled the bulk of the original list, and I simply do not feel I have the time to produce any sort of decent work of the type I have just described. As an entirely inadequate and hopefully temporary substitute, I present below two small lists of sources (references only; no quotations) on the topic of Chazal's science which are not included in "Sources Indicating That Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge." The first list consists of sources averring that Chazal's scientific statements - or at least those uncontested in the Talmud - were always correct. The second group of sources assert neither that Chazal were always right nor that they were sometimes wrong; these sources may nonetheless be of interest to those researching the topic of Chazal's science. Individuals marked with an asterisk (*) are also listed in "Sources Indicating That Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge."

I apologize that these lists are currently extremely short. It goes without saying that there are far more sources of each type than appear here, many of which I am already aware of. I will try to add more sources to this post as my schedule permits. I am posting it now in this ridiculously abbreviated form so that I can solicit feedback and help in finding more sources. I request that anyone knowing of sources that ought to be cited in any of the three "science of Chazal" lists on this blog suggest them in the comments. Thank you in advance for your help.

Category 1: Chazal Did Not Err

Rema (R. Moshe Isserles; 1520-1572; Poland), Torat Ha’olah 1:2; 3:49.
R. Yehuda Briel (1643-1722; Italy), quoted in Pachad Yitzchak, by R. Yitzchak Lampronti, under the entry “Tzeidah.”
R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (1910- ; Israel), as quoted in "The Slifkin Affair – Issues and Perspectives," by R. Aharon Feldman, available at http://www.zootorah.com/controversy/ravaharon.html.

Category 2: Neutral but Interesting

Rabbeinu Tam (R. Yaakov ben Meir Tam; c. 1100-1171; France), quoted in Tosafot, Shabbat 35a s.v. “Trei tiltei mil;” quoted in Shita Mekubetzet, Ketubot 13b.
Tosafot (12th-14th centuries, France-Germany), Pesachim 94a s.v. “Rabbi Yehuda omer mishekiat hachamah ad tzeit hakochavim arba milin.”
*Ramban (R. Moshe ben Nachman; 1194-1270; Spain-Israel), Bereishit 9:12; Bereishit 35:16; Devarim 18:9; “He’ara Nosefet” immediately following the end of Ramban’s commentary on Devarim (Mossad Harav Kook edition).
Maharal (R. Yehuda Loew; 1525-1609; Bohemia), Be’er Hagolah 6.
Vilna Gaon (Gra; R. Eliyahu of Vilna; 1720-1797; Lithuania), Hagahot Hagra 1 to Eruvin 76b.
R. Akiva Eger (1761-1837; Austria-Hungary), Gilyon Hashas, Pesachim 94b s.v. “Venir’in divreihem.”

Links to Audio and Video Shiurim by Rabbi Hershel Schachter

Rabbi Hershel Schachter is among the most masterful teachers of Torah I have had the privilege to see and hear in action. Below, I have assembled links to various recordings of his shiurim available online. These links are to web pages which themselves contain one or more links to recordings of Rabbi Schachter.

This list is undoubtedly incomplete. If you know of any shiurim available online in audio or video format that are not already linked to here, please let me know in a comment, and I will add the link.

If you possess a recording of a shiur (or many shiurim) by Rabbi Schachter or other YU-associated rabbis which you think is not currently available online, please inform me of that as well, and I will try to arrange to have it made available online.

Links to sites that link to shiurim:

613.org: http://613.org/speakers/schachter.html
Adath Israel Poale Zedek Anshei Ozeroff: http://www.adathcongregation.org/audio_classes.html
DRS: http://www.drsaddress.com/drsaudio.html
DRS: http://www.drsaddress.com/issues/0506/issue17/index.html
Kehillas Bais Yehudah Tzvi of Cedarhurst: http://kbyt.libsyn.com/?search_string=schachter&Submit=Search&search=1
Kerem B'Yavneh: http://www.kby.org/torah/filterpage.cfm?type=all&ram=other&language=both&medium=both&date=all&topic=all&sort=TopicRam
OU: http://www.ou.org/ and search for "Schachter".
OU: http://www.ou.org/audio/5764/mesorah64.htm
OU: http://www.ou.org/videos/
TifTorah: http://www.tiftorah.org/guest_lecturers
TorahMedia: http://www.torahmedia.com/author/Rabbi_Hershel~Schachter.html?sid=3e778bw63a7asz3&cid=
Torahspace (several pages of links): http://www.torahspace.com/c/All/
TorahWeb: http://www.torahweb.org/audioFrameset.html
YU Torah: http://www.yutorah.org/searchResults.cfm?types=ALL&length=ALL&publication=ALL&categories=ALL&teacher=80153&masechta=ALL&fromDaf=&toDaf=&series=ALL&dates=ALL&language=ALL&keywords=&submitType=advanced

A Note on Fears Regarding Internet Use

UPDATE----10 years later, having heard and read more about this topic----While what I wrote below may technically be true, I think there is indeed good reason to believe that pornography on the internet poses a real danger to Orthodox Jews as well.

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A considerable number of current orthodox Jewish religious leaders, halachic authorities, and publications are hesitant or disinclined to permit internet use. I believe one of their principal reasons for objecting to internet use is the danger that the user will end up employing the internet for religiously inappropriate or prohibited purposes, in particular the accessing of pornography and other forms of sexually explicit material readily available on the internet.

In determining his attitude toward internet use, the halachic decisor must consider how much weight to assign this danger. (He must also evaluate and weigh the need for and/or benefits of internet use, but that is not the subject of this post.) In this regard, I have heard numbers bandied about regarding the widespread use of the internet for pornography and related purposes, presumably from surveys of American society; possibly from surveys of other industrialized countries as well. My input on this matter is merely the following: Studies regarding internet use for pornography etc. in society will not necessarily help our halachic decisor determine how much weight to assign this concern. Allow me to explain.

Consider a study designed to determine the likelihood that an American who enters into an A&P supermarket will buy and subsequently eat non-kosher food. My guess is such a study would find that a considerable percentage, probably a majority, will buy and eat non-kosher. Should our halachic decisor therefore conclude that no Jew should walk into an A&P, because of the great statistical danger that if he does, he will end up eating non-kosher? Obviously this argument is absurd. The flaw in it is that the study considers a population sample consisting mainly of people who have no reason not to eat non-kosher food, whereas an orthodox Jew does have such a reason. The study offers no data about people whose values include eating only kosher. Consequently, the study will not assist in predicting the likelihood that an orthodox Jew will buy and eat non-kosher food if he walks into an A&P. It's the wrong study to answer that question.

It is reasonable to assume that a considerably higher percentage of orthodox Jews than of the American, or Western, population at large consider not looking at pornography and other sexually explicit material to be a major value. Therefore, analogous to the A&P example, a study about internet use for pornography in any Western society will not assist - at least not much - in predicting the likelihood that an orthodox Jew will look at pornography if he uses the internet. Therefore, if such studies are quoted in this regard, their limited predictive powers regarding orthodox Jewish behaviour should be acknowledged.

(Obviously, this argument does not apply to a study specifically (a) about orthodox Jews, or (b) about a population sample from which one can reasonably extrapolate conclusions about orthodox Jews.)

Rashbam on Creation Days Before Creation Nights

Rashbam - the great rishon and tosafist, Rashi's grandson, author of the standard commentary on most of Bava Batra and part of Pesachim - writes in his peshat-oriented commentary on the Torah that the words "Vayehi erev, vayehi boker" in the first chapter of Genesis mean that during the six days of creation, daytime preceded nighttime - in contrast to the general view. This interpretation does not imply that Rashbam contested the halachic principle that (for most purposes) a halachic day consists of nighttime followed by daytime, as Rashbam himself affirms; elsewhere he explains that his Torah commentary is not at all intended to serve as a source or explanation of halacha, or indeed to function on the halachic plane at all. He advances his interpretation exclusively as the simplest - not the halachic - meaning of the verse.

To my astonishment, I recently discovered that this piece of Rashbam has been edited out of some editions of the Mikra'ot Gedolot Chumash, seemingly because it has been misconstrued as a challenge to accepted halacha and is thus considered offensive. I find it shocking (or, perhaps more accurately, I wish I found it shocking) that someone would edit the words of one of the great rishonim because he found them distasteful. I cannot fathom how anyone today could with such confidence judge himself, and not Rashbam, the greater arbiter of exegetical propriety, particularly if one has already decided to print Rashbam's commentary alongside those of Rashi, Ramban, Seforno, etc. Even more atrocious than cutting out part of the commentary is the dishonesty of the publisher/s in not noting that portions of the work have been omitted; the reader is given the impression that he is being provided with Rashbam's entire (extant) commentary, when in fact he is not. This is destructive to scholarship and the pursuit of truth; perhaps it is theft as well.

In the interests of setting the record straight and helping provide access to that which has been so brazenly censored, what follows is the omitted piece of Rashbam, plus other related excerpts from the commentary. I have used the text of Mikra'ot Gedolot Hama'or (Jerusalem: Hamo'or, 1990).

בראשית א, ה - ולחשך קרא לילה. לעולם אור תחילה ואח"כ חשך: ויהי ערב ויהי בקר. אין כתיב כאן ויהי לילה ויהי יום אלא ויהי ערב, שהעריב יום ראשון ושיקע האור, ויהיה בקר, בוקרו של לילה, שעלה עמוד השחר. הרי הושלם יום א' מן הו' ימים שאמר הקב"ה בי' הדברות, ואח"כ התחיל יום שני, ויאמר אל[ק]ים יהי רקיע. ולא בא הכתוב לומר שהערב והבוקר יום אחד הם, כי לא הצרכנו לפרש אלא היאך היו ששה ימים, שהבקיר יום ונגמרה לילה, הרי נגמר יום אחד והתחיל יום שני: עכ"ל

א, ו - ויאמר אל[ק]ים יהי רקיע. לאחר שנגמר יום ראשון לבוקרו, ויאמר אל[ק]ים: עכ"ל

א, ח - ויהי ערב ויהי בקר יום שני. שנטה היום לערוב, ואח"כ ויהי בקר של יום שני. הרי נגמר יום שני מששת הימים שאמר הקב"ה בעשרת הדברות, והתחיל עתה יום שלישי בבקר: עכ"ל

On Asking Questions the Rishonim Didn't Ask

There is probably a difference between deviating from the methods of the Rishonim on intrinsic Torah issues, and deviating from them as a result of extra-Judaic developments. For example, the Rishonim were bothered by certain questions that bothered the philosphers of their day, and weren't bothered by others that the contemporary philosophers didn't care about (or never thought of). Moderns find some of the great medieval philosophic questions to be unimportant or trivially answerable, and have other problems that bother them which the Rishonim never dealt with. These shifts in what bothers people are often attributable not to deteriorating Torah knowledge and instincts, but to changes in how external society thinks. The Rishonim were influenced by the thought of external society just as we are, and the questions they pondered and answers they wrote because of that influence are not necessarily any more valid than the questions and answers our generation is inspired to offer by the equivalent influence in our times.

(Comment originally posted at http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2007/03/musings-on-proper-way-to-learn-chumash.html.)

On the Study of History

Modern science has demonstrated the enormous value of empirical study in testing theorems and thereby isolating the truth from everything else. Unfortunately, planned and controlled experimentation is not possible in all fields of human intellectual endeavour. For example, a theory of national governance cannot be tested in a laboratory to see whether it results in a just and happy society.

I believe that one of the principal merits of the study of history is that it reveals the closest available approximations of experimental evidence regarding political and sociological questions. The dynamics of every historical situation are highly complex and only ever partially understood, and no situation ever repeats itself in all its details - so no social theory can ever be rigorously tested for accuracy or effectiveness in one historical scenario and then applied to another with any sort of guarantee of success. Nonetheless, history provides us with the best (and only) empirical evidence that exists about humanity - in particular, about the human collective. It therefore allows us to test and improve our understanding of humanity via some of the methods that make science so reliable and successful.

On Evolution: Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, and Rabbi Joseph Elias in The Jewish Observer

Note: This letter was sent to The Jewish Observer for publication, but was not published.

January 2, 2007

Letters to the Editor
The Jewish Observer

To the Editor:

I am writing in response to Rabbi Joseph Elias' article and his subsequent response (in your September and December issues, respectively) regarding Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch's position on the theory of evolution, both of which I believe, with greatest respect, confuse two distinct issues.

Allow me first to clarify that I do not hold a strong personal position on whether the theory of evolution in any of its multitudinous versions is correct. I really don't care whether it turns out to be wholly true, partially true, or entirely false. I do strongly believe, however, that any conclusions on the matter ought to be drawn only after rigorous and thorough investigation, free of unnecessary dogmatic restraint and obscurantism, and with the exclusive purpose of discovering the truth. That stated, I shall proceed to Rabbi Elias' articles.

Rabbi Elias acknowledges Rabbi Hirsch's assertion that if ever evolution were to be accepted by the scientific community, "Judaism would be able to deal with it" (Dec. issue, p. 11, middle column). Rabbi Hirsch states thereby that there is no "Jewish" position on evolution; Torah is compatible with both the acceptance and the rejection of evolution. It necessarily follows that Torah study cannot tell us whether the theory is correct – that task falls to science.

Since the veracity of evolution is not a Torah question but a scientific one, surely (a) the experts on it will be scientists, not Torah scholars; and (b) in our day, the experts on it will be people familiar with the up-to-date scientific research. We would insist upon the same personal qualifications for every other scientific matter as well. Now, I would make the following two observations: (1) Rabbi Hirsch was not a scientist; (2) Rabbi Hirsch did not have at his disposal the last 120 years of scientific research – the broadest and deepest scientific research the world has ever seen. It follows that today, Rabbi Hirsch's scientific opinion on the veracity of evolution should be assigned little or no weight. Even if what he wrote on a scientific topic such as evolution is still considered true, we can know this only by the corroboration of his statements by modern scientists – not merely from the fact that he, an outdated scientific amateur (albeit a brilliant one), wrote it.

In light of the above, I am at a loss to understand the intent behind much of Rabbi Elias' two articles, which do not seem relevant to the topic of evolution in the modern context.

Rabbi Elias devotes considerable space to Rabbi Hirsch's discussion of species in his commentary on Genesis (Sept. issue: p. 42, title, and left and middle columns; p. 43, right column; Dec. issue: p. 10, middle and right columns). Though the commentary is of course a work of genius in its own right, I fail to see how it is relevant to a modern discussion about whether evolution is correct. Since Rabbi Hirsch believed that evolution was compatible with Torah (see above), he must not have felt that his interpretations of Genesis constituted a disproof of it – either because they did not contradict it, or because they were subject to modification in light of new information about it. His commentary thus reflects not a dogmatic position on evolution, but merely the scientific belief of an educated non-scientist of 124 years ago. While that belief is interesting for historical reasons, it is entirely inconclusive in a modern scientific discussion. Why is it quoted in an article that clearly focuses on what the modern Jew should think about evolution? It would seem to be irrelevant.

Rabbi Elias also discusses at length (Sept. issue: p. 43, all; Dec. issue: p. 11, middle and right columns) the numerous flaws and holes Rabbi Hirsch pointed out in evolutionary theory – some of which are still unresolved today. While the existence of these problems is significant, the fact that Rabbi Hirsch points them out is not. Unless I am mistaken, they are all problems that many other writers with greater and more current scientific knowledge than Rabbi Hirsch have discussed. Either they still present difficulties for evolutionary theory, or they do not. Again, Rabbi Hirsch wrote about these problems as a nineteenth-century scientific layman. Why should we assign weight (indeed, most of an article) to Rabbi Hirsch's presentation of information on this topic, when far more authoritative sources (both for and against evolution) are available?

I believe that, with greatest respect to Rabbi Elias, he conflates two distinct issues: Rabbi Hirsch's theological position on evolution, and his scientific beliefs about the same.

Theologically, Rabbi Hirsch was not opposed to evolution; that is clear and uncontested by Rabbi Elias. (It is also, based on what I have read, the principal point Rabbi Slifkin makes.)

Scientifically, as Rabbi Elias demonstrates, Rabbi Hirsch was strongly skeptical about the correctness of the evolutionary theory. Most of what Rabbi Elias quotes from Rabbi Hirsch serves to prove this assertion. However, there is no reason for Rabbi Hirsch's scientific views to be of especial interest to the modern Jew, given that all of his points are discussed, and either upheld or negated, by individuals better qualified for the task. (I believe the Observer has quoted such individuals in the past.)

Rabbi Hirsch also notes that many scientists may be motivated to advocate evolutionary theory despite its flaws, because without it there seems to be no choice but to recognize the existence and worldly interference of God, something they are loath to do. This point is still highly relevant today, and very much worth citing, but Rabbi Elias quotes it only at the very end of his two pieces; it is not the focus of his discussion. Hence my letter.

In sum, the bulk of Rabbi Elias' quotations of Rabbi Hirsch seem to be uninstructive for the modern Jew. Rabbi Hirsch's principal relevant statement is that which he made in his area of expertise – Torah: namely, that evolution is compatible with Torah, and that the Jew should let the scientific chips fall where they may, compensating, if necessary, for anti-theistic bias in the scientific community. Would Rabbi Elias not agree with this assessment?

(As a side point, I contest Rabbi Elias' understanding of Rabbi Hirsch's position regarding man's descent from the apes. Rabbi Hirsch writes ("The Educational Value of Judaism" – Collected Writings, Vol. VII, p. 264), "Even if this notion [evolution] were ever to gain complete acceptance by the scientific world, Jewish thought, unlike the reasoning of the high priest [Darwin?] of that notion, would nonetheless never summon us to revere a still extant representative of this primal form as the supposed ancestor of us all. Rather, Judaism in that case would call upon its adherents to give even greater reverence than ever before to the one, sole God Who, in His boundless creative wisdom and eternal omnipotence, needed to bring into existence no more than one single, amorphous nucleus and one single law of "adaptation and heredity" in order to bring forth, from what seemed chaos but was in fact a very definite order, the infinite variety of species we know today, each with its unique characteristics that sets [sic] it apart from all other creatures." Now, I do not have the benefit of being able to read the original German, but in my view this passage says merely that even if man is descended from the apes, it is solely to God, and not at all to primates (or amoebas) or natural laws, systems and processes – the so-called "Mother Nature" worshipped by so many in the scientific community – that we should give credit and reverence. I do not believe Rabbi Hirsch is negating the possibility of man's descent from apes.)

ברכה והצלחה בכל מעשי ידיכם.

On Government and Marriage

As is my wont, I have copied portions of my comments on www.hirhurim.blogspot.com (this time on the post http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2006/12/civil-unions.html) and posted them here. I have edited the comments mildly in an effort to quote other people without license as little as possible. Some of my comments would be fairly unintelligible without either (a) a major rewrite, which I am too lazy to do, or (b) quotations from other commenters to provide context. In such cases, where I have judged my comment to be sufficiently worth posting here, I have quoted someone else's words in italics. I have not attributed these statements, since I do not know whether their authors would wish their (screen-)names to appear here. If any of them wishes to have his comments removed from here, or to have his name associated with what I have quoted from him, he may notify me by (a) emailing me, or (b) leaving a comment here.

If there is a legitimate religious reason to oppose homosexual marriages, should there not similarly be a legitimate religious reason to oppose homosexuality in general? While this reason does not necessarily imply that government should actively interfere with homosexual acts, it should argue against any sort of government recognition, legitimization or condonation of homosexuality. Thus I do not really see why use of the term "marriage" makes or breaks anything.

He Who Must Not Be Named Homepage 12.15.06 - 12:35 pm #

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This is not an issue that relates to any particular church; thus it is not strictly a matter of separation of church and state (which I do not believe in fully anyway). This has to do with what society considers to be moral or immoral. Society considers it immoral to rape or sodomize children, so it prohibits that activity. If society considers it immoral to involve oneself in a homosexual relationship, it may prohibit that activity; or it may discourage, that activity; or it may not lend any support to that activity. Doing so is not inconsistent with any intelligent philosophy of governance.

He Who Must Not Be Named Homepage 12.15.06 - 3:18 pm #

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Response to [another commenter]:

don't we have anything better to do than seek to deny people a way to become fully functioning members of society? or is Torah so weak and frail that it can not abide other people and their differences?

Um... The Torah does not abide all people, nor all differences. That's not our call; it's God's, and God has made his position quite clear. Under Jewish law, male sodomy is a capital offence. (I personally can't fathom why, but again, it's not my call.) Why should we want our society to encourage or legitimize in any way the commission of capital offences, by Jews or by non-Jews?

Re. "oppression and ignorance": Why is it oppressive to oppose homosexual marriages? And why is it ignorant? Isn't promotion of homosexuality the result of (albeit excusable) ignorance of what God wants, i.e., what the true morality is?

compassion goes a very long way, and is notably absent fromthis dialogue.

Compassion is irrelevant to this dialogue. It goes without saying that one should feel compassion for someone who is naturally homosexual and has no moral means of acting on his desires. That feeling of compassion does not come into play in the analysis of whether government should recognize homosexual unions; at least as far as I can tell. That compassion is entirely trumped by the moralistic considerations.

He Who Must Not Be Named Homepage 12.15.06 - 3:34 pm #

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Follow that argument to the conclusion that marriage should not be recognized by the government at all. Let people "get married" if they want. Pretty much every "benefit" given to married couples can be more efficiently utilizied in other ways.

I disagree. We should hope that whatever vestiges of old-fashioned (and therefore usually Torah-compatible) morality, practice and principles are still in our countries' legal codes remain there. The fact that they may be technically inconsistent with certain of our government's guiding principles (such as equality, or separation of church and state) should not concern us, for at least the following two reasons:

(1) No human collective as large and complex as a country can be governed well if it adheres with absolute consistency to any particular principle (I defy anyone to come up with a counter-example). Thus we need not be concerned with the violation of a principle of governance merely because it constitutes such an inconsistency.

(2) As Torah Jews, who says we have to want or advocate consistency in the application of meta-rules of governance? It seems far more plausible that we should wish to see our gentile hosts legislate with the help of some biblically inspired morality. If you think that never works out well for the Jews, consider the last 200-300 years of British, American and Canadian history, just as examples.

He Who Must Not Be Named Homepage 12.17.06 - 2:15 am #

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Note to (1): The only exception, if there is one at all, might be a divinely mandated rule.

He Who Must Not Be Named Homepage 12.17.06 - 2:17 am #

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If you oppose all homosexual partnerships, and liken them to such immoral acts as prostitution, one could argue that homosexual unions should be regulated for the same reason that other acts are regulated, in order to bring them into the ambit of the state and thus more easily controlled.

No, because it is the homosexual act, not the homosexual union, that Judaism principally objects to. Regulating homosexual unions will have little or no impact on the incidence of homosexual sex; just as government institutionalization of marriage does not (nowadays) prevent extramarital sex.

He Who Must Not Be Named Homepage 12.17.06 - 12:58 pm #

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We need to ask whether or not the current continuation of past practices, at least those which follow Torah morals, is helpful or hurtful.

Why would continuation of past Torah-consistent practices be hurtful? I can conceive of its being hurtful if Torah morals were being forced down the throats of a large majority of the population who opposed it. But since we're talking about democratic governments, that's almost impossible, and need not concern us. If a democratic government legislates something so unpopular that the population at large will react destructively to it, the legislation is almost guaranteed not to stand, and thus the negative consequences will be minimal or nonexistent. The goal, theoretically, for Jews in this and other instances would thus be to convince people that our view is right - swinging popular opinion until our desired legislation is realistic for the democratic government to pass - if it is not already (which in this case I think is debatable).

(It remains to be discussed whether it is actually worth Jews' spending much time, energy and money on such a campaign. I'm almost sure it's not worth it. But at least on this blog, we can discuss what we would really like to see, even if we're not willing to do more than that to make it happen.)

He Who Must Not Be Named Homepage 12.17.06 - 10:29 pm #

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Additionally, you have to ask, what's the benefit of the law? 300 years ago, where people weren't having as much extra marital sex, there may have been a benefit to marriage. But the benefits to marriage now consist of tax incentives and other benefits, nothing that's inherently "married" about them. The marriage of today is far different than the marriage 300 years ago, or even 100. And, if there's nothing inherently better, what's the point.

For those who care not a whit about marriage, there is very little benefit. But I think we are better off with a good and universal institution that (a) some people respect fully; (b) some people respect partially; and (c) some people respect at least insofar as it is so widely valued by others that the government has taken a hand in it; than we are if that institution exists merely parochially. Government recognition of something affects how people view that thing, often making it seem more legitimate, important and relevant. That's how I would like people to view marriage. Therefore I would like government to remain in the marriage business.

He Who Must Not Be Named Homepage 12.17.06 - 10:39 pm #

On Hosting

Several years ago, I partook in a meal of some sort - I think it was Shalosh Seudos - sponsored by a husband and wife observing a yahrzeit, I think of the wife's father or grandfather. I think I was in Baltimore, Los Angeles, or possibly Toronto, but I don't remember for sure. (If anybody can figure out from the following account where I was or who the family was, please tell me.) Anyway, during the meal, the sponsoring husband spoke about the man whose yahrzeit was being commemorated. He had apparently been a rabbi in eastern Europe - Lithuania, I think; not one of the really famous ones, but a talmid chacham and respected leader of his community nonetheless. I don't remember much of what the speaker said about him, but one thing stuck in my mind. The speaker related that this rabbi had advised his wife not to put herself out too much, or to pour enormous energy, into hosting the houseguests they periodically had. He explained that if she tried too hard to be an exemplary hostess, she would end up feeling that having guests was a burden, and would be less amenable to putting people up - i.e., fulfilling the mitzvah of hachnasat orchim. Better, he advised, to be more modest in her hospitality, but to be always willing to provide it, than to put such effort into it that she would burn herself out and sometimes - consciously or otherwise - avoid hosting altogether.

I felt then, and still feel now, that this was truly wise and excellent advice. I travel not infrequently, and I have often been faced with the task of finding myself a place to stay. On several occasions I have struggled mightily to land myself a host, despite having many contacts in my destination city. How much happier I would have been to hear, rather than a gentle refusal on account of logistical considerations, the following: "You're welcome to stay here, but I don't think we'll have any beds available. I can give you a pillow and a sleeping bag, and you can sleep on the floor;" or "You can definitely sleep here, but we're eating out, so you'll need to arrange for meals for yourself." How much easier and less stressful my life would have been at those moments!

Additionally, I do not think I am unusual in preferring to stay with people who are moderate in the efforts they put into hosting me. I feel more comfortable in a home where I am treated more like a member of the family than like a guest at a hotel, because I find the experience far more relaxed and authentic. Hosts who roll out the red carpet for their guests and "go the whole nine yards" often put (generally unintended) pressure on the objects of their hospitality to put equal effort into being exemplary guests - through frequent and elaborate expressions of gratitude, fastidiousness in not imposing upon their hosts an iota more than they already are, etc. I think it is fair to say that the more effort a guest senses his host is putting into hosting him, the more the guest feels his presence to be an imposition, and the less comfortable he will consequently feel in asking for anything more. The experience of being a guest in such circumstances is simply more awkward and stressful than it would otherwise be.

Unquestionably, this is all a matter of taste. There are certainly people who enjoy being hosted in fine style, and consider anything less to be skimping, or even a slight. On the whole, however, I think the aforementioned rabbi's advice was good counsel to every potential host and hostess.

Thanks to SW for encouraging me to write this piece specifically, and to write, generally.

FKM and I

The blogger known as "Freelance Kiruv Maniac" and I seem recently to have concluded a lengthy discussion about the scientific knowledge of Chazal; the reliability of scientific assertions contained in the Talmud in both halachic and aggadic contexts; and, in that regard, the appropriateness of banning the invocation of Rabbeinu Avraham ben Harambam's opinion (i.e., that Chazal made occasional scientific errors), as seems to have been the intention of Rabbi Y.S. Elyashiv and others in their banning of some of the books of Rabbi Natan Slifkin. The discussion took place in the comments on three posts on Freelance Kiruv Maniac's blog, as well as in the main body of the latter 2 posts. The posts are, in order:

http://fkmaniac.blogspot.com/2006/09/slifkins-sources-i.html
http://fkmaniac.blogspot.com/2006/10/rejoinder-to-he-who-must-not-be-named.html
http://fkmaniac.blogspot.com/2006/11/round-three-with-hwmnbn.html

Someone with an interest in the topic and a lot of time on his hands may find the discussion interesting.

The Problem with Rabbi Eliezer Breil's Response to the Pachad Yitzchak

In the (now-)famous entry entitled "Tzeidah" in Rabbi Yitzchak Lampronti's Pachad Yitzchak, Rabbi Lampronti (1679-1756) suggests that since modern science has disproven the Talmudic belief that lice are spontaneously generated, the halacha should now proscribe killing lice on Shabbat, since the Talmudic statement that killing them is permitted was based on the ancient - and incorrect - view on how they are produced. He quotes a letter written to him by Rabbi Eliezer Breil, who strongly objects to his proposal. One of Rabbi Breil's principal arguments is that we must trust the Talmudic sages' understanding of science. In support of his assertion that Chazal's science is reliable, he writes (among other points) the following:

ועוד עדות נאמנה אצלי מ"ש בגמ' דפסחים על ענין אם הגלגל קבוע ומזל חוזר שחזרו חכמי ישראל באותו הזמן והודו לחכמי א"ה, וסוף דבר אחרי מאות רבות משנים כל התוכנים מא"ה בחקירתם עפ"י הנסיון והמופת שבו לדברי חכמינו וקבלתנו הקדמונית.

"Another sound testimony [to my view] is what is written in the Gemara in Pesachim (94b) about whether the sphere is fixed and the constellations move [or the opposite], regarding which question the sages of Israel recanted at that time and conceded to the gentile sages; yet finally, after many centuries, all of the gentile astronomers, as a result of their investigations and experiments, have returned to [accept] the words of our sages and our earlier received tradition."

This argument is invalid for several reasons. One is especially glaring, however, to anyone who has examined the passage in question on Pesachim 94b. The sages of Israel did not concede that the gentile sages were right regarding the movement of the sphere versus the movement of the constellations. Their concession was that at night, the sun travels beneath the earth, not above the sky. It goes without saying that all astronomers from Rabbi Breil and Rabbi Lampronti's time to the present have agreed that at night, the sun's path takes it beneath the earth, as per the gentile sages, not above the sky, as Chazal had first claimed. Thus Rabbi Breil's proof - that despite their recantation, the Jewish sages' original, tradition-based view was ultimately vindicated - is entirely fallacious.

I have noticed that in writing about the Jewish-gentile disputes on Pesachim 94b, numerous rabbis commit the same error of confusing the two issues of (1) whether it is the sphere or the constellations that move, and (2) whether the sun travels above the sky or below the earth at night. They write that the Jewish sages conceded in the former dispute, whereas in truth, the concession is recorded regarding the latter. Sometimes this inaccuracy is inconsequential. Other times, as in the case of Rabbi Breil's letter, it is enormously important. In yet other instances, it is not clear to me whether it makes a difference.

I just wanted to raise awareness of this issue.

Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Shechitah 10:12-13

The following, except for the Hebrew, is from a comment I have posted to Lakewood Yid's blog article at http://lakewoodyid.blogspot.com/2006/09/rambam-ignore-evidence.html.

הלכות שחיטה פרק י

יב ואין להוסיף על טריפות אלו, כלל: שכל שיארע לבהמה או לחיה או לעוף חוץ מאלו שמנו חכמי הדורות הראשונים, והסכימו עליהן בתי דיני ישראל--אפשר שתחיה. ואפילו נודע לנו מדרך הרפואה, שאין סופה לחיות. יג וכן אלו שמנו ואמרו שהן טריפה--אף על פי שייראה בדרכי הרפואה שבידינו שמקצתן אינן ממיתין, ואפשר שתחיה מהן, אין לך אלא מה שמנו חכמים, שנאמר "על פי התורה אשר יורוך:

This Rambam says the following to me: Chazal wouldn't have said an animal can live with a certain injury unless they had reason to think it could - presumably meaning evidence that an animal with such an injury had indeed lived. Therefore, even if we can't explain it, we have to go with their empirical evidence.

However, it's much harder to understand how we could be witnessing a tereifah live more than a year. Maybe we're not so good at keeping non-tereifot alive, and so even though Chazal could sustain them for a year or more, we can't. But how do we explain a tereifah that lives beyond a year? Chazal couldn't sustain the animal, but we can?

Rambam's implicit answer is that this is indeed the case, but hilchot tereifot are nonetheless already etched in stone (perhaps because the 2000 years of Torah that the Chazon Ish spoke of have ended), and so, "Ein lecha ela mah shemanu chachamim." The halacha they established is permanent, as per "Al pi hatorah asher yorucha."

That doesn't, however, mean their science was right. Just as Rabbi Eliezer was theoretically right in the case of tanur achnai, but the halacha nonetheless follows Rabbi Yehoshua, so too in this case certain animals may really - medically speaking - not be tereifot, but since they have been established as tereifot by the halachic process, they are halachically tereifot, period.

Scruples Question

Suppose you're a school principal looking to hire a new Judaic studies teacher. There's a certain fellow, X, you'd like to hire, who you think is well qualified and well suited for the job - in fact, you consider him the best person available. However, X subscribes to beliefs p and q, and the majority of the school board - the people who hired you - mistakenly believe p and q to be heretical. They therefore would feel that X was unsuitable for the job. (We will leave aside whether they actually consider him to be a heretic.) Should you hire X, because your mandate is (let's assume) to ensure your students get as good an education as possible, and your job is to pursue that goal to the best of your ability, or should you hire someone else, because your employer won't like the particular decision to hire X?

(Assume that (a) you cannot disabuse the board of their incorrect opinion regarding p and q; and (b) if you get fired, you're confident of landing on your feet without trauma to yourself or your family.)

The Harsh Truth About Quebec: Telling It Like It Is

From "The 'Quebecistan' Question", by Brigitte Pellerin, in The Ottawa Citizen, Aug. 24, 2006, p. A12:

After prominent Quebec politicians were shown leading a "peace" protest in which Hezbollah supporters and Hezbollah flags appeared in sufficient numbers to warrant a healthy dose of criticism, Ms. [Barbara] Kay [of the National Post] wrote that Quebecers' "cultural and historical sympathy for Arab countries from the francophonie," plus their "reflexive anti-Americanism and a fat streak of anti-Semitism that has marbled the intellectual discourse of Quebec throughout its history has made Quebec the most anti-Israel of the provinces, and therefore the most vulnerable to tolerance for Islamist terrorist sympathizers."

Way to go, Barbara Kay (and Brigitte Pellerin)!

Spontaneous Generation in the Talmud

Must we believe that spontaneous generation of lice occurs, or that it did, at least, during Talmudic times? Many claim we must, pointing to the fact that in this instance, there is a drasha (kind of; see Shabbat 107b) that discusses spontaneous generation, and we can't invalidate a drasha. Some (I believe Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, for example, as well as Rabbi Shlomo Fisher, in Derashot Beit Yishai, siman #47, fn. dalet) suggest Chazal really meant just that the reproduction of lice is not visible to the naked eye, and therefore is not recognized from a halachic perspective; but that they were not, in fact, contradicting the modern understanding of how a louse forms. I'm uncomfortable with this explanation; how are lice different from other insects in this regard? Also, the fact that the entire ancient (and medieval) world believed in spontaneous generation is quite suggestive.

I think we can preserve the validity of the drasha even if we think that Chazal were wrong about spontaneous generation of lice. The drasha (look at it carefully - Shabbat 107b), according to those who argue with Rabbi Eliezer, says that a species must reproduce, like the eilim me'odamim, in order for killing it to be prohibited on Shabbat. It doesn't specify lice. A Talmudic rabbi who thought that lice didn't reproduce would, indeed, derive from this drasha that killing lice is not prohibited mide'oraita, but the faulty science involved in his conclusion would reside exclusively in his application of the drasha, not in the drasha itself. And if the actual drasha doesn't assume that lice are reproduced spontaneously, then we are not obligated to do so either.

But why would there be a drasha about species that don't reproduce, if all species do reproduce (as per modern science)? Doesn't the drasha, regardless of whether it's really talking about lice, clearly endorse the notion that spontaneous generation of animals does occur? It does seem to, but I don't think that's at all in conflict with modern science; in fact, I think it can be explained using modern science. Modern medicine and biotechnology perform new wonders on a regular basis. There is now very serious talk of growing people extra sets of organs, to be used in case the originals need replacement. Such procedures are already in place for some organs. Animal cloning has been done. Test-tube fertilization has been done. Genetic modification has been done. Biologists can create all sorts of amazing things in today's laboratories. Is it far-fetched to think that one day they will be able to make animals "from scratch" (if, indeed, they can't already do it today)? I think that if science wants to, it will definitely be able to make, let's say, a louse, from a bunch of inanimate matter. Would one be permitted to kill such a louse (or fly, or deer) on Shabbat? Mide'oraisa, yes - that's what it says at Shabbat 107b. It may thus be that the drasha, far from being scientifically backward, is actually forecasting a level of scientific sophistication that man has only recently begun to see as within the realm of the possible.

On Evolution

Updated July 16, 2006

In his article entitled "The Myth of Scientific Objectivity" (The Jewish Observer, May 2006), Rabbi Yonoson Rosenblum quotes the following sentence from the brochure for the British Museum of Natural History's 1981 exhibit on Darwin:

Evolution by natural selection is not, strictly speaking, scientific, because it is established by logical deduction rather than empirical demonstration.

I don't know whether natural selection is "scientific" - that's an uninteresting semantic debate. The important, and true, point, in my estimation, is that natural selection's being the exclusive origin of species is qualitatively different from most other scientific theses. I've tried to express this idea on several occasions; this brochure did it nicely.

Thoughts on Afikei Mayim

I just borrowed the recently published volume entitled Afikei Mayim, composed by a (seemingly close) talmid of Rabbi Moshe Shapiro, a Rabbi Schmeltzer, if I remember correctly. (I've returned the book already, and although I took some notes beforehand, I'm working partially from memory.) I read through the introduction and the first section of the book, which is called "Likut Kedushas Ha-Torah," and is mostly comprised of quotations from various sources that advocate what one might call a sort of "fundamentalist" approach to the Torah, the Talmud, Chazal, and the Rishonim. I was glad to read it, because it argues (thoroughly, I hope) for a perspective fiercely opposed to what I present in "Sources Indicating That Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge." The examination of opposing views is an important part of any truth-seeking endeavour; counterarguments will either reinforce a prior opinion, if they prove weak, or change it in their strength. I personally found this book's exposition uncompelling.

I'd like to note a few thoughts I had while reading and pondering the book.

1. Regarding the question that most interests me – the quality (and quantity) of Chazal's scientific knowledge: I counted, in an informal tally, about 7 sources that clearly assumed that Chazal never erred in their scientific statements. Three of them were major authorities: the Rivash, the Maharal, and the Chazon Ish. Two others – the Gra and the Chida – seemed borderline to me; I couldn't decide whether they were definitely taking this position or not. The earliest of all these writers were the Rivash and the Rashbatz, who lived in the fourteenth century. All the rest were Acharonim.

One thing that struck me (as it has in the past) about many of these sources was that they were long on the hyperbole but short on the proofs. Very short. The argument, it seemed to me, generally went like this: "Chazal were unfathomably holy and close to God. We are mere dust at their feet. Anyone who questions them is going straight to Hell. [Insert biblical verse here.] All of those passages that seem to contradict modern science mean something completely different, much deeper and more sublime. What exactly do they mean? I haven't the foggiest – or – I can't tell you. Also, all of modern science is wrong, except for the parts that they stole from us. Chazal never made mistakes. They knew it all. Trust me." That, to me, is not a convincing presentation.

Sorry if you found that last paragraph a bit too biting for your taste. I do generally try to be judicious.

2. I was blown away by the quotation of the Rashbatz in a footnote (#3 or #4, I believe) which seems to aver that Chazal not only didn't make scientific mistakes, but actually knew all scientific facts. I am reluctant to believe that the Rashbatz really thought that Chazal knew everything in the scientific sphere; nonetheless, the quotation from him may lead others to that conclusion. I had started to believe that the fourth grouping in my post on the topic of Chazal's scientific knowledge – sources indicating that "Chazal Were Not Scientifically Omniscient" – was redundant, for nobody with any intelligence would ever contest the point. Now I'm not so sure.

3. Notice footnote #6: a quotation from the Shevus Yaakov that includes his insistence that the Earth must be flat, since the Talmud says so.

4. Perhaps there are some fine distinctions that I missed, but my impression was that some of the sources the book quotes (Rabbi Chaim Vital, for instance) advocate complete literalism in interpreting the statements of Chazal, while others (Maharal, for example), reject literalism in favour of... something else – though maybe not what would classically be called allegory. This does not constitute a flaw in the book; a compilation of views need not present one unified approach to a topic (indeed, variety is often good!). I'm merely pointing out that the book seems not to present a unified approach.

5. I was a bit confused by the author's reference in a footnote (I think at the beginning of the Kabbalah section) to the statement of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (whom he does not actually name) that "They were permitted to hold this opinion; we are not." When Rabbi Aharon Feldman cites this statement of Rabbi Elyashiv, he describes the context as follows: "[Rabbi Elyashiv] was asked: if he considers [Rabbi Nosson] Slifkin’s approach wrong how could so many earlier authorities have held it? He answered: 'They were permitted to hold this opinion; we are not.'" However, as presented in Afikei Mayim, Rabbi Elyashiv seems to have been discussing belief in Kabbalah. It would be nice to know who his interlocutor was when he made this comment. (Or maybe someone could encourage him to write a piece on the topic himself?)

6. I really liked the responsum stating that it is heresy to contradict anything in the Or Hachaim.

7. The author calls into question the authorship of certain letters attributed to Rabbi Shamshon Raphael Hirsch. I'll assume that Rabbi Hirsch was indeed the author, given that Rabbi Dr. Mordechai Breuer, who I understand to be a leading expert on Rabbi Hirsch, believes the letters to have been his (and, indeed, published them as such).

8. The author also calls into question the authorship of certain passages attributed to Rabbeinu Avraham ben Harambam. I know that Mossad Harav Kook – a reputable company – published Rabbeinu Avraham's Milchemot Hashem, containing what I assume are the incriminating passages. The book was edited by Rabbi Reuven Margolios, author of Margoliot Hayam, and the title page says, "Published from a manuscript written during the lifetime of the author." I believe, as well, that the famous (and recently controversial) excerpt from it has been printed in the standard Ein Yaakov editions for more than a century, without any great fuss being made over it by the bulk of rabbinic authorities. These reasons all lead me to assume that it is indeed authentic.

(Aside: I suspect that the authenticity of the Hebrew Bible could be subjected to challenges far greater than those confronting the work of Rabbeinu Avraham.)

Overhaul of Sources on Chazal and Science

As the title of this post indicates, I have made major changes to my post entitled Sources Indicating That Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge, which can be accessed by clicking on the link provided.