The Orthodoxy Test #14: Female Orthodox Rabbis

Female Orthodox Rabbis

a) are totally impossible and an oxymoron
b) couldn't happen because any woman who wants this must have an agenda
c) might in theory be possible but will never happen for practical reasons
d) may happen some day in the future, but not in my lifetime
e) are something we should press hard to create
f) Leave this question out of my results

Some of you may be surprised (outraged?) by my having chosen (c).

The first thing we need to do is to define "rabbi". (Perhaps "orthodox" needs to be defined, too, but I'll risk assuming we're all operating with more or less the same definition of it. And I hope it's not necessary to define "female".) One could argue that there are female orthodox rabbis even now: there are certainly learned orthodox women who write books about Judaism, teach it, travel extensively to lecture about it, are consulted by other Jews for their advice in matters that relate to religion, engage in kiruv, etc. Many male rabbis do almost exactly the same thing (or less), and their own education may not differ very much either. But I don't think that that's what the question means. The question is probably intended to have the answerer consider two specific functions of rabbis that orthodox women really do not perform: serving as a congregational/pulpit rabbi, and acting as a posek. (Note: Some orthodox women certainly do act as poskot of a certain type; I know for a fact that many learned orthodox women will often field questions from their less learned peers about kashrus questions, or niddah questions, or Shabbat questions, etc., the answers to which they know because they are well-read and are familiar with the halachos that they need to know in order to practise Judaism properly. That's not the type of posek I'm talking about, though. I'm talking about the type of posek to whom people turn for rulings on complex issues that have never been ruled on before: a Rav Moshe Feinstein- or Rav Elyashiv- or Rav Hershel Schachter-type posek (covered my bases, didn't I?).)

(Real) Judaism has survived for thousands of years without (any significant number of) female rabbis, and seems to be continuing to do all right despite the modern phenomenon of feminism, so I don't see why (e) should be correct.

The difference between (c) and (d) is purely an issue of fortune-telling. My instinct is that there will never be female orthodox rabbis of the type described, even after I die (***). We're now in the year 5766. If Mashiach is supposed to come by the year 6000, that only leaves about 234 (Can't have a better number than that!) years for orthodoxy to be persuaded to accept and implement the notion that female rabbis are an okay idea. (Once Mashiach comes, all bets are off, as far as I'm concerned.) Is it conceivable that such a thing may happen? I think it is. Is it likely? I think it's not. Can I prove it? No. Can anyone prove otherwise? I doubt it. Orthodoxy is, after all, orthodox; we're a pretty traditional and inflexible lot, and rightly so: we're responsible for preserving something that it is very important to preserve properly and faithfully. I don't think female rabbis are in the cards (although if they were, my vote would be for the Queen of Spades).

As for (a): I have read, in very traditional, "frum" books, that at least according to some great Jewish authorities, (some) women may learn Gemara; and some of them, I fully believe, are smart enough to become talmidot chachamim of the finest calibre. Would such a woman, having achieved such a level of scholarship, not have a duty to paskan? And consider Devorah the prophetess. If there had been shuls of the modern type in her day, might she not have played the role (with a few alterations) of congregational rabbi? I'm not the first one to point out that many or most pulpit rabbis don't do very much, if anything, that a woman isn't allowed to do; indeed, most pulpit-rabbi tasks are ones that some orthodox - even yeshivish - women already do. So is it "totally impossible"? I don't think so. An oxymoron? I don't think our terms are even tightly enough defined for the word to be applicable.

And I think (b) is a silly answer, because it assumes that since certain ambitions tend currently to be associated with a particular (let us assume, unacceptably feminist) agenda, this association will always exist, and will exist in every single case. There have been examples in Jewish history of very scholarly, very devout, and very unsubversive women who have been Talmudic scholars or leaders of Jewry. It would be, I think, a combination of short-sightedness, narrow-mindedness, axe-grinding, blind acceptance of stereotyping and/or pure lack of imagination that would lead someone to assume it impossible for this ever to happen again, just because in our particular era, most (let us assume) orthodox women who want to be/wish they could be rabbis possess that desire because they feel that orthodox Judaism, in its present state, gives them a raw deal, and they want to change things/stir the pot/make a statement.

The Orthodoxy Test #15: Science and Torah Conflicts

Science and Torah conflicts

a) don't exist because scientists are just atheists out to disprove Torah
b) don't exist because nishtanu hateva
c) don't exist because science simply hasn't caught up with Chazal yet
d) are something we shouldn't think about. Taiku
e) must be resolved because we can't ignore science
f) Leave this question out of my results

Ahhh.... Home, sweet home. (A) is false. I'm willing to accept (b) in some cases, but I'd sooner throw out the whole Torah (for rational, not emotional, reasons) than believe it in others. In the absence of evidence in favour of (c), I see no reason to believe it. (D) may satisfy some people, but it's not acceptable to me: why should I accept evidence that the Torah is true, but ignore evidence that indicates otherwise? That seems dumb. (Note: I am not saying that I believe that science indicates that the Torah is false; it is this option - (d) - that seems to imply that.) I chose (e). However, I don't really like the way it's worded. I don't think that every apparent Torah-science "contradiction" has to be resolved; it may be acceptable in some cases to say "Taiku," as per (d). I'm comfortable with a thoughtful investigation leading to what one considers a rational "Taiku." I'm not comfortable - for the reason I supplied - with (d)'s suggestion that we must not engage in the thoughtful investigation in the first place.

The Orthodoxy Test #16: Fallibility of Chazal

Chazal

a) never erred even in non-Torah matters
b) never erred in Torah matters, but might rarely have erred in science
c) never erred in Torah matters, but relied on the faulty science of their time
d) definitely had faulty science and possibly erred in some history as well
e) did pretty well but made a lot of mistakes
f) Leave this question out of my results

For me, at least, this question overlaps with the last, though it is not the same.

I will first discuss whether Chazal "erred in Torah matters." If this question is asking whether there are halachic or hashkafic statements in the Talmud that are based on incorrect recollection, misunderstanding, or faulty reasoning, I think the answer is clearly that there are. Why else would Rav Dimi and Ravin, for example, argue all the time about what Rabbi Yochanan said? How could anybody ever question anybody else's kal vachomer? How could Rabbi Yehudah ben Tabbai have wrongly ordered someone executed without having adhered to the proper judicial procedures (Makkot 5b)? How could Rabbi Yehoshua et al. have been contradicted by a heavenly voice in their famous dispute with Rabbi Eliezer? In the absence of evidence that the Talmudic sages had perfect memories or flawless analytical minds, I do not believe they had either.

The fact that Chazal were imperfect human beings, just like the rest of us, does not, however, diminish the halachic and hashkafic authority of the Talmud. Even though any given halachic pronouncement of the Talmud may be based on flawed information or skill, it is still binding. Torah lo bashamayim hi; our obligations in the service of God are determined by the earthly, human, halachic process, part of which, in our day and age, is the supremity of the Talmud. Our job as Jews is, ultimately, to do what God expects of us, and God expects us to follow the Talmud, even if he "personally" thinks the Talmud said something stupid.

Mistakes in science? I opined on this topic in the last post on the Orthodoxy Test (#15). Just to summarize in one sentence: I haven't come across sufficient evidence to dissuade me from my initial, intuitive assumptions that (1) Chazal, like all other people, weren't omniscient, in science or in anything else; and (2) some of their scientific beliefs - like the shape of the Earth, or their model of the solar system, or the manner in which lice are formed - are wrong. (I suppose (2) is not really an intuitive belief, but it is one in which I have a great deal of confidence.)

Mistakes in history? The issue that comes immediately to mind is the dating of the construction of the Second Temple: modern archaeology claims it to have been built 166 years (if memory serves) before the Talmud says it was. Could Chazal have been wrong about this, or about other historical assertions that they made? Why not? Again, where's the proof they had perfect memories, never garbled their information, and kept flawless records of every single fact and event?

I chose (d). (E) sounds to me to be suggesting that Chazal's words are not binding, because their judgment was flawed, and if we can judge better, we can override what they said. This assertion is false, because it does not take into account the halachic process and the authority it has lent to the Talmud, as discussed above.

The Orthodoxy Test #17: If the Rambam Was Alive

If the Rambam was alive he'd be

a) Right Wing Yeshivish
b) Left Wing Yeshivish
c) Right Wing Modern Orthodox
d) Left Wing Modern Orthodox
e) considered an apikores
f) Leave this question out of my results

First of all, if the Rambam were alive today he'd be rolling in his grave.

The only one of these options that cannot be disputed is (e). Somebody would consider him an apikores. However, I doubt that everybody would, and so it still remains to fit him into one of categories (a)-(d). I chose (b), because I think he was very "shtark", but had a brain. (C) is almost equally tempting, but I just can't picture him wearing a plaid shirt and a small leather kippah with clips. I flatter myself to think he'd actually be a "Huh?".

I assume that in composing this question, lamedzayin had in mind the fact that the Rambam believed that Chazal had imperfect knowledge of science (as has been mentioned on this and other blogs in the past) - a position that many "yeshivish" rabbis and laymen now understand to be apikorsus. Maybe if the Rambam were alive today he'd feel differently, or maybe he'd just be one of the many rabbis - both "yeshivish" and "modern orthodox" (by the way, which type is Rabbi Hershel Schachter?) - who continue to think that the position is neither heretical nor wrong. Lamedzayin probably also was thinking more generally of the Rambam's knowledge of the gentile philosophy of his day. I imagine the Rambam would probably be reasonably well-versed in a lot of today's secular thought, though he might not recommend that everybody else pursue his level of proficiency. I don't think that such an attitude would preclude his being "left-wing yeshivish".

Basically, it comes down to this: I think the Rambam would wear a white shirt, a dark suit and a black hat, doing which, as far as I can tell, almost always guarantees that you will be "yeshivish" (unless you're Amish).

The Orthodoxy Test #18: Television and Movies

Television and movies are

a) assur and totally worthless
b) not allowed, but not exactly assur
c) ok in small doses but not really kosher
d) ok, but you have to control what you watch
e) perfectly fine
f) Leave this question out of my results

I chose (d). Television and movies are just media, like books, newspapers, magazines and radio. It may be that the television and film industries, relative to other media, produce proportionally more material that one ought to avoid for halachic reasons; one should approach these media with correspondingly greater caution. I don't think, however, that it's necessary or logical to condemn either medium as a whole.

The Orthodoxy Test #19: The Internet

The Internet is

a) a terrible destructive force and assur
b) really bad, but ok for parnassa
c) not great, but ok in moderation
d) perfectly fine
e) a great invention that increased worldwide Torah availability
f) Leave this question out of my results

Once again, the problem with many of these options is that they assume that the internet is a monolithic entity, when in fact it is merely a medium. Proposing, for example, that the internet is "assur" ((a)) is like proposing that books are "assur." Some (the good ones) are, and some aren't. The fact that some books are halachically undesirable does not negate the potential value - and permissibility - of the medium. Basically, my reaction is the same as it was to #18 - the one about television and movies (which see). I choose (d). The internet is as "perfectly fine" as many, many other things most of us deal with on a regular basis; as always, the important question is how one uses it.

The Orthodoxy Test #20: Cell Phones

Cell phones are

a) a source of batala and terrible images
b) a disruptive influence that should be avoided by serious yeshiva bochurim
c) problematic, but the good outweighs the bad
d) really fine, but I understand the concerns
e) just cell phones. I don't even understand why this is a question
f) Leave this question out of my results

I chose (d). I understand concerns with cell phones; I've seen people waste copious amounts of time with them, and I'm sure that people can do even more dastardly things with them, if they are so inclined and lack sufficient self-control. See what I wrote about #18 (television and movies) and #19 (the internet). The same applies here, except that I would classify a cell phone as a tool, rather than a medium. This distinction, however, is irrelevant. Just as one can use a hammer to build a sukkah or to smash annoying people over the head, so too cell phones can be put both to permissible, even desirable, and to forbidden uses. The tool itself is not intrinsically good or evil; one must ensure that one employs it, like any other tool, properly.

The Orthodoxy Test #21: Bible Critics

Bible critics

a) are all atheist kofrim reshaim
b) aren't even worth listening to
c) don't understand the text well enough and ask dumb questions
d) ask some good questions, but we have good answers
e) ask really hard questions which we need to find answers to
f) Leave this question out of my results

I chose (d). I'm not especially knowledgeable about Biblical critics and criticism, but my limited exposure leads me to believe that (a) is false, and that (b) and (c) are certainly not true of all critics. The difference between the two remaining options seems to me to be whether the foundations of Judaism and Jewish belief are threatened by Biblical criticism. I haven't come across any such threats, so to the best of my knowledge (d) is correct. I do not discount as impossible, however, that there may exist among the products of Biblical criticism challenges to Judaism more potent and fundamental than those I am aware of.

The Orthodoxy Test #22: Chareidi Isolationism

Isolationist chassidic and chareidi enclaves like New Square

a) epitomize the proper approach to avodas Hashem
b) are not for me, but I wish I was on that level
c) are not for me, but I understand the attraction
d) have some good points, but the bad outweighs the good
e) showcase all that is negative about Orthodoxy
f) Leave this question out of my results

First, please note that I have no knowledge of New Square, aside from the fact that they make milk and juice.

I chose (c). (A) and (b) imply that intrinsically, such communities are morally superior to others, which I do not believe. I have been taught that within orthodox Judaism, different lifestyles are appropriate for different people; this view coincides nicely with my experience. I would therefore consider the burden of proof to be on any party arguing in favour of such superiority.

(D) and (e) imply that intrinsically, such communities are morally inferior to others, which I also do not believe, for the same reasons that lead me to reject (a) and (b) (see last paragraph).

(C), happily, makes no value judgment about isolationism. The first half of it - "are not for me" - is definitely true. The second half - "but I understand the attraction" - is also true. I have known people who feel intensely uncomfortable when confronted with lifestyles, points of view or practices different from their own. I myself have experienced a certain thrill and passion when submerged within a like-minded community. I therefore can understand why some people would find an isolationist enclave attractive.

Note that by choosing (c), I in no way condone any hostility, prejudice, feeling of superiority or offensive behaviour that is reputed to exist among certain such communities.

The Orthodoxy Test #23: Reading Nonliterally

Reading difficult Torah stories nonliterally is

a) a perversion of Torah
b) sometimes but rarely a valid approach
c) occasionally ok, but makes me uncomfortable
d) ok if you can sort of back yourself up with an obscure Rishon
e) often necessary to make Torah understandable in light of science
f) Leave this question out of my results

I don't remember how I answered this one. I may have chosen (f). I don't even know what it means. I think there's a big difference between saying that a story in Chumash is nonliteral (which may indeed occasionally be okay, but I don't know) and saying that a story in the Talmud or Midrash, for example, is not literally true. In the latter case, given that Rambam and others explicitly state that much of the aggadic material in rabbinic literature is not meant to be taken literally, I'm quite comfortable with it.

The Orthodoxy Test #24: Left-Wing Orthodox Groups

Left wing Orthodox groups like Edah are

a) not really frum
b) frum, but have a totally warped idea of Judaism
c) interesting, but not my cup of tea
d) often thought provoking but occasionally go too far
e) the future of Orthodoxy
f) Leave this question out of my results

I know next to nothing about Edah.

While I would not want the left-wing orthodox groups I am somewhat more familiar with to be running the show in all of orthodoxy, I think it is useful to have them on the fringe, just as I think that groups on the far right are worth having around, as long as they're not too powerful. I think that moderation is usually the way to go, but sometimes we need extremists to show us we're making a big mistake or not seeing things clearly, or to take risks and/or drastic action when the mainstream is unwilling to do so. Therefore, (d), but with the caveats that my answer does not apply specifically Edah, and that the word "occasionally" may understate the case, depending on the organization.

The Orthodoxy Test #25: Midrashim as Pshat

Midrashim should be taken to be pshat

a) always
b) almost always
c) when it's reasonable to do so
d) occasionally, but not usually
e) almost never
f) Leave this question out of my results

(C) all the way. I don't think any justification is required.

תם ונשלם שבח לא-ל בורא עולם

Gosse Theory

I was looking through Rabbi Gil Student's blog, www.hirhurim.blogspot.com, and I came across an article from last November about the much-maligned Gosse theory discussed fleetingly on this blog about a month and a half ago. I read through not only Student's post but also all of the comments (quite a tedious task), then posted a comment of my own, because I felt that none of the comments had adequately addressed the questions being raised. As I acknowledged in my comment, it's very possible that no one will ever look at those comments and read mine, since it was posted many weeks after all the others. I'm posting it below in a different font, and maybe, this way, someone will read it. Maybe.

I assume nobody is even checking these comments any more, but I'll write something because I find this topic a good intellectual workout. Yitzchak is right that just about any objection one can possibly raise about the Gosse hypothesis can be addressed with a little bit of imagination. Albus Dumbledore could probably do almost all the tinkering Gosse theory requires God to have done; I imagine God could do it too.

As for the theological/philosophical issues: God doesn't make his existence or the truth of the Torah too obvious, because if the Torah were as clearly true as the link between jumping off a skyscraper and dying, people would not have enough free will when making a decision of whether to do right or wrong. It's important, theologically, for there to be some grounds for doubting (though not refuting) God's existence and the Torah's credibility. I personally believe that Rabbi Dr. Dovid Gottlieb of Ohr Somayach has put forward a persuasive rational argument in favour of the Torah's veracity ("Living Up to the Truth;" google it and you'll find it). For people who wish to take a rational approach to determining the truth, there need to be objections that they can raise, if they want to, to counter arguments like Rabbi Gottlieb's, and persuade themselves that the Torah is not true. God may thus have decided to create the world looking deceptively old (= Gosse) to provide an excuse, as there must be, to people wishing to shirk their responsibilities to God and religion (and to the truth).

Math Problem

I choose at random a polynomial (call it a function, f (x)) with only non-negative integer coefficients. You get to choose a number, a, and I will tell you what f (a) is. You then get to choose another number, b, and I will tell you what f (b) is. Devise a method of choosing a and b such that after hearing what f (b) is, you can tell me what the polynomial is (i.e., what the coefficients are). Propose your answer in the Comments. You may not participate if you knew the answer before reading this post. I assure you no post-high school math skills are required to solve this problem.

Question About Beliefs and Rabbinic Leaders

Question: To what extent are the rabbinic leaders of the Torah community (however their identity is determined) empowered by the Torah to rule upon what must be regarded as false? It is presumably within their authority to rule that polytheism must be regarded as falsehood. It is presumably not within their authority to rule that monotheism must be regarded as falsehood. Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe that the Code of Hammurabi preceded the giving of the Torah on Mt. Sinai? Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe Julius Caesar lived? Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe Louis XIV was king of France? Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe there is such a thing as a molecule? Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe I have a right foot? Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe that I exist? Obviously, there is a line somewhere, beyond which they are not empowered to dictate beliefs. I very much doubt that it can be simply defined. What is it? Responses please.

Cogitating the Regurgitation

I am writing in response to "Regurgitating the cogitation", which was in turn a response to my original post on the topic, "Cogitation" (Nov. 23/05). To recap very briefly, I initially argued (1) that it is not irrational for Rabbi Gottlieb to use simultaneously "Living Up to the Truth" and the theory that the universe was created 5766 years ago looking billions of years old; and (2) that the latter theory is not inherently "weak or cheap." Captain Salamander, in his response (the bulk of which I have copied and italicized, below), seems not to question (1). He presents two objections: (a) that I used a poor analogy in arguing that Rabbi Gottlieb's "old-looking-creation" theory is not weak or cheap; and (b) that the Gottliebian arguments discussed thus far on this blog do not answer all the problems modern academic findings create with the historical records of Genesis, whereas a non-literal reading of Genesis does. In the paragraphs below, I will address (a), and argue that (b) is simply irrelevant to the discussion at hand.

a) The "soft" sciences vs. the "hard" sciences. "Suppose academia universally accepts the Documentary Hypothesis of Biblical authorship," writes the Dark Lord. I think this approach is flawed being as that their is a clear distinction between the postulations of sociologists, historians and archaeologists based on guesswork and hypothesizing and the conclusions of biologists, geologists and physicists that are the result of experimentation and observation - that is the wonder of the scientific method.

This analogy was meant for illustrative purposes only. If you don't like it, you can ignore it. Read my last paragraph as follows: "I'd like to aver that there is, in fact, nothing weak or cheap about Rabbi Gottlieb's hypothesis. It fits the facts very nicely. There's no evidence that it's wrong. At the risk of sounding like a right-wing Haredi lunatic, academia's acceptance of a particular explanation for the existence of a body of facts does not require Jews to accept that explanation when another explanation exists, one more compatible with the sum total of our knowledge." I think that the point stands on its own merits.

To address your objection directly, however, while I generally agree with the distinction you draw between "hard" and "soft" science, I do not believe it valid in relation to the dating of the universe. You argue, if I may interpret and paraphrase your words, that "hard" science can create hypotheses and then test them out to see whether they hold true; for example, if you want to see whether Newton was really right that Force equals Mass times Acceleration, all you need to do is construct a dynamic situation where you know two of the variables already and can measure the third (e.g., you weigh yourself: you know your mass, and you know the acceleration due to gravity; you use a scale to measure the force your body exerts on the ground). "Soft" science merely gathers evidence and postulates based on that body of data; there is generally no experiment that can be conducted either to prove or to disprove the hypothesis. Dating the universe and the theory of evolution resemble, in this respect, "soft" rather than "hard" science. No one can employ the full scientific method by running an experiment to test the historical claims of the theory of evolution or whether the universe banged into existence 15 billion years ago any more than they can devise a test to see whether the Israelites conquered Canaan en masse 3000 years ago or to determine the validity of the Documentary Hypothesis, because to test any of those theories, you'd have to go back in time and actually observe what was going on. Short of that, any conclusions about historical events, whether events spurred by natural laws or those due to human initiative, are merely conjectured from the available evidence. The fact that some conjectures are more mathematical or technical than others does not make them more verifiable, and it is verifiability that makes "hard" science more accurate than "soft" science, as you yourself state: "experimentation and observation - that is the wonder of the scientific method."

Nonetheless, it is certain that no two historical assertions will be judged equally likely based on the evidence at hand. It is certainly your prerogative to believe, after an examination of the evidence, that the Big Bang theory (for example) is more compelling than (for example) the Documentary Hypothesis. It is my prerogative to conclude the opposite.

(Let me make a parenthetical point at this critical juncture - if scientists had "empirically" proven that the Torah had been written by numerous human authors, I would still reject this theory. I believe b'emunah sheleimah, etc. etc.)

Why would you reject the theory? "Living Up to the Truth" asserts that the reason to reject it is the historical evidence that the Torah was divinely given. If that historical evidence is overridden, then you no longer have reason to believe in the Torah's divine authorship. Doing so would be irrational.

What I assume you mean is that you would reject the Documentary Hypothesis, no matter how compelling it was, because there exists other evidence that God wrote the Torah, and the evidence the Documentary Hypothesis employs does not contradict the notion of divine authorship; the Hypothesis simply ignores supernatural possibilities. I don't see why your approach to the age of the Earth should differ. If the Torah says that the universe is 5766 years old, you should reject the calculations of modern science, no matter how compelling they are, because there exists other evidence (that the Torah is correct and therefore) that the universe is younger than science says, and the evidence used by modern science does not, after all, contradict the notion of a young universe; modern science simply ignores supernatural possibilities in explaining why the Earth seems really old.

b) The inadequacy of Gosse-Gottleib. If one is willing to suspend their rational observations about the age of the universe and believe that the Lord seeks to deceives us (or test us, if you would prefer) in order to give us a chance to doubt his hand in creation, one is still left with several unanswered questions created by a literal reading of Genesis:

-Why is there sound geological evidence that disproves a global flood?
-If that same global flood wiped out all life a mere thousands of years ago, why are there peoples in far-flung places (Aborigines, Native Americans, etc.) with rich histories stretching back for tens of thousands of years?

This point, while worth discussing, is unrelated to the question of whether Rabbi Gottlieb's various theories are incompatible with each other. I don't claim to be any sort of expert on the evidence of which you speak (or even, particularly, to be familiar with it). I attempted merely to deal with the rationality of accepting both the Gosse-Gottlieb hypothesis (that the Earth was created looking aged) and the arguments of "Living Up to the Truth." If you want to know what Rabbi Gottlieb has to say about the evidence to which you refer, I suggest you email him (I've got his address; ask me if you want it).

As my friend Lord Voldemort likes to say - I am not saying that there are not answers to these questions. I do believe, however, that Gosse-Gottleib cannot answer these problems. Why accept a solution that does not nearly do the problem justice and in so doing accept an approach that requires the suspension of our logical inquiry and rational observation. Perhaps I would be willing to do so for an all-encomapassing answer, a Torah and Science "Theory of Everything"* if you will. But for Gosse-Gottleib? Not on your life.

Once again, you're raising a different issue. You're arguing that it makes more sense to say that the Torah's account of creation should not be taken literally in every respect, and that modern science is right about the age of the world, than to say that Genesis should be taken literally, and that modern scientific theory is wrong. That may be true. But it's incompatible with Rabbi Gottlieb's apparent premise, which is that Genesis must be taken literally. If you want to criticize that premise, go right ahead, but that's a theological, not merely a rational, debate, and requires careful analysis of the rabbinic sources on the subject. It's got nothing to do with the validity of Rabbi Gottlieb's subscribing simultaneously to "Living Up to the Truth" and the notion that the world was created looking old.

Cogitation

I was recently discussing the writings of Rabbi Dr. Dovid Gottlieb of Ohr Somayach (is that how you spell it?) with friends. Rabbi Gottlieb is the author of "Living Up to the Truth," a must-read online essay that argues that there exist rational grounds for belief in (orthodox) Judaism (just google the title and you'll find it on the Ohr Sameyach website). Rabbi Gottlieb argues that by combining the information we have about the world around us with rational analysis, we can conclude that the Torah was, in fact, given to the Israelites by God at Mt. Sinai. For example, the single most compelling of his arguments, that of Rabbi Yehudah Halevi in the Kuzari, is that empirically, it is impossible for an entire nation to be convinced that their own ancestors, in the not-inaccessibly-distant past, had experienced a series of events as memorable as those described in the Pentateuch, if those events had not, in fact, taken place; and that since the Jews are known to have possessed such a national belief, it must have been an accurate one. (I'm reducing more than an entire chapter into one sentence here; if you have problems with the argument as I have explained it, read "Living Up to the Truth" for a more complete presentation.)

Rabbi Gottlieb has also written on the topic of reconciling the apparent Torah claim that the Earth is 5766 years old with the scientific evidence suggesting that it is far older than that; he suggests simply that the world was created 5766 years ago with the appearance of being much more ancient.

The following question was posed to me (unless I misunderstood it): Assume the Torah definitively states that the Earth is 5766 years old. Rabbi Gottlieb's premise in "Living Up to the Truth" is that we can use our observations of the world around us (historical records, for example) to draw conclusions regarding the veracity of the Torah. But he also proposes that we ignore the implications of our observations of the world around us when they indicate that the Earth is billions of years old, since those implications conflict with the Torah, which we have established to be factual. Would it not be equally valid to argue that we should accept the scientific evidence about the Earth's age, and ignore the evidence that the Torah is truthful, since the Torah conflicts with compelling science?

I believe the answer to the question is no, because the two sets of conclusions described in the preceding paragraph are neither equally plausible, nor logically equivalent. If we accept, based on the evidence, that the Torah is true, and, hence, that the world is 5766 years old, we must, indeed (based on our initial assumption), discard as misleading the evidence that the world is billions of years old. However, we can fall back on Rabbi Gottlieb's alternative (and logically irrefutable) approach to the age of the world, viz., that it just looks very old. If we believe what the Torah tells us about God, it's certainly within God's capabilities to make an old-looking world (no more difficult than making a new-looking one, in fact). There's no evidence that God didn't do exactly that; indeed, from a theological perspective, it actually makes sense that he would have (ask me if you want more explanation of that). The evidence is all reconcilable; we are left with no contradictions.

However, if we accept initially that the Earth is older than the Torah allows, we must then confront and discard the evidence that the Torah is true. Can we explain how that evidence came to exist? Not to the best of my knowledge. We can't say that God manufactured the evidence, because we have (as yet) no evidence that there's a God at all. The facts we know about Jewish history just sit there, crying out their contradiction of our conclusions about the world's age. This approach, unlike the last one, cannot account for the existence of all the evidence. The Torah-affirming approach discussed above may adopt a hypothesis that seems weak, or cheap, but at least it covers all the bases.

* * * * *

I'd like to aver that there is, in fact, nothing weak or cheap about Rabbi Gottlieb's hypothesis. Suppose academia universally accepts the Documentary Hypothesis of Biblical authorship, and suppose, furthermore, that we all agree with its premise that it is just inconceivable that the Five Books of Moses were authored, in their entirety, by the same human being. Does that mean it's weak, or cheap, or intellectually dishonest or undesirable to ascribe the Pentateuch to God (who can write in a multiplicity of styles)? I believe not, and I believe the same is true of Rabbi Gottlieb's explanation of the world's ancient appearance. It fits the facts very nicely. There's no evidence that it's wrong. At the risk of sounding like a right-wing Haredi lunatic, academia's acceptance of a particular explanation for the existence of a body of facts does not require Jews to accept that explanation when another explanation exists, one more compatible with the sum total of our knowledge.

Iberian Irony

You may recall that recently in the news was a story which involved the Spanish police arresting a dozen Basque separatists on charges of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism. The militants were brought to the national police headquarters in Madrid, where they were detained for three days until their court appearance. The authorities' mistake was in allowing them all to attend the same hearing. They were led out of their cells together as a group, under heavy guard, but just before leaving the building they had to pass through a small vestibule, into which only three officers were able to accompany the suspects, on account of the room's small size. Within seconds, in what was clearly a planned action, the terrorists overpowered their outnumbered guards, jammed the vestibule doors shut, left the building and escaped in waiting cars driven by separatist sympathizers, demonstrating once again the wisdom of the adage, "Don't put all your Basques in one exit."

The Numerology of Casablanca

Suppose you have the following system: each letter of the Roman alphabet is assigned a numerical value reflecting its position in the alphabet, i.e., a = 1, b = 2, ... , z = 26. After calculating any sum of these alphabetical ordinals, you round to the nearest multiple of 10. Consider the following:

t (= 20) + h (= 8) + e (= 5) + u (= 21) + s (= 19) + u (= 21) + a (= 1) + l (= 12) + s (= 19) + u (= 21) + s (= 19) + p (= 16) + e (= 5) + c (= 3) + t (= 20) + s (= 19) = 229 ≈ 230

Hence, you round up "the usual suspects."

Ibn Ezra on Two Isaiahs

As the Outsider requested, here is information on the statements I referred to in "Rabbinic vs. Modern Academic Beliefs" made by Ibn Ezra on Isaiah 40:1 and 49:7. I would like to preface it with the following, however. Prior to my writing of the original article, I had heard many times, mainly at YU, that Ibn Ezra claimed that Isaiah had actually been written by two people, but I had never studied the matter. Before including the reference to Ibn Ezra's two Isaiahs, I searched the internet to find out where Ibn Ezra actually said anything about it, and came up with Isaiah 40:1 and 49:7, which I then looked up. I admit that I did not feel I properly understood his comments in their entirety, but what I saw was enough to convince me that what I had been told at YU, by people I respect, was correct. In writing the article, I referred to the matter of the authorship of Isaiah, and the location of the relevant statements of Ibn Ezra, but did not elaborate, because I did not feel I understood enough to say anything intelligent beyond that. I hoped that no one would merely take my word for it without verifying my sources. Perhaps that was irresponsible of me.

When the Outsider requested that I provide details about the Isaiah Ibn Ezras, however, I decided to bite the bullet and decipher in full what he meant. I made reasonable progress for a while, but eventually I hit a brick wall that I seemed unable to break through or to circumvent. I spent hours trying the figure out what on earth he was saying, and finally, on my final attempt (funny how that always happens), I found more than I could have dreamed of: all the information I sought, spoon-fed right to me, at the following web address:

http://hydepark.hevre.co.il/hydepark/topicarc.asp?topic_id=1221691

What follows is an edited version of what is written there (any of you can, of course, check out the original for yourselves). I was just too lazy to write the whole thing out in my own words, since it is fairly lengthy. This modified version is therefore my partially plagiarized summary of (much of) the evidence indicating that the Ibn Ezra believed the book of Isaiah had been written by two different people. I do not claim that it represents what the author of the article on that website believed. However, I have examined the assertions that I have taken from the website, and have satisfied myself they are reasonable, and that I can't come up with any other set of assertions that are as reasonable. My gratitude goes to the people involved in providing this information on that site.

As always, if you discover problems with the arguments presented here, please let me know. The case I present seems reasonable to me, but I don't dogmatically insist on it, and I do wish to believe what is true and not to believe that which is false. If you think, for reasons with substance, that it's wrong, I want to know about it.

One more thing: I'm tired, and I'm not going to do a careful edit of this piece before I go to bed. I'm going to post it anyway. So please forgive any poor editing as being, rather, lack of editing.

Here goes:

Ibn Ezra says the following at Isaiah 40:1:

נחמו נחמו עמי. נדבקה זאת הפרשה בעבור שהזכיר למעלה כי כל אוצרות המלך גם בניו יגלו לבבל על כן אחרי זאת הנחמות ואלה הנחמות הראשונות מחצי הספר על דעת רבי משה הכהן על בית שני ולפי דעתי הכל על גלותינו רק יש בתוך הספר דברי גלות בבל לזכר כי כורש ששלח הגולה ואולם באחרית הספר דברים הם לעתיד כאשר אפרש. ודע כי מעתיקי המצות ז״ל אמרו כי ספר שמואל כתבו שמואל והוא אמת עד [וימת] שמואל והנה דברי הימים יוכיח ששם דור אחר דור (לפני) [לבני] זרובבל והעד מלכים יראו וקמו שרים וישתחוו ויש להשיב כאשר ישמעו שם הנביא ואם איננו והמשכיל יבין׃

"Be comforted, be comforted, my people." This chapter has been placed here because in the preceding chapter, it is stated that all the treasures of the King, and even his sons, will be carried away to Babylon; thus, it is followed by these words of comfort. These first words of comfort, with which the second part of the book [of Isaiah] begins, refer to the construction of the Second Temple, according to Rabbi Moshe Hakohen; my opinion is that they refer to [the future redemption from] our current exile, only that there are references to the Babylonian exile [of between the two Temple eras] to record that Cyrus, who permitted the exiled Jews to return [text defective; either a misprint or an omission]. However, the statements at the end of the book [definitely] refer to [our] future, as I will explain. [Translation until this point adapted from M. Friedländer's 1873 The Commentary of Ibn Ezra on Isaiah, which I happily found in the JCC library, much to my astonishment. He notes the textual problem that I mention.]

Know that the recorders of the commandments [presumably meaning either the amoraim in general or the redactors of the Gemara specifically] said that Samuel wrote the book of Samuel, and this is [only] true until ''And Samuel died'' [I Samuel 25:1].

[Note: in my Mikraos Gedolos text of Ibn Ezra, the word וימת does not appear. I think that even without it, the meaning of the statement is clearly the same. The website I am using presents וימת as part of the original text. While I do not know the website's source, the existence of many inaccuracies in the texts of medieval commentaries is well-known, and since I do not believe that it alters the meaning of the passage anyway, I have accepted this emendation.]

[This approach to authorship I am hinting at] is proven by the book of Chronicles, where there are [listed] generation after generation of the descendants of Zerubbabel [I Chronicles 3:19–24; 10 generations are listed after Zerubbabel, in all].

[Note: here again, I have emended the text as it appears in my edition. My book says לפני זרובבל, "before Zerubbabel." I am substituting the website's version, לבני זרובבל, "of the descendants of Zerubbabel." I feel justified in doing so because (a) the physical difference between the two words is so slight (פ vs. ב) that an error in transcription can easily have occurred; and (b) I can't make heads or tails of the sentence as it reads according to my edition, whereas according to the website's version, it makes a lot of sense.]

And the evidence [for using this approach here in the book of Isaiah] is ''Kings shall see and arise, princes shall bow" [Isaiah 49:7]. One can reply [that this verse means to say that the kings and princes will do this] when they hear the name of the prophet; and if that interpretation is not correct, he who is enlightened will understand.

I'll spoil the surprise by telling you right now that Ibn Ezra is going to argue that this part of Isaiah (i.e., Chap. 40 until the end) was not written by Isaiah (ben Amotz), because Isaiah lived too early. First Ibn Ezra notes that Samuel didn't write all of the book of Samuel, since he obviously could not have written "And Samuel died'' and the material after it. Then he draws our attention to an extensive genealogy in Chronicles that seems to be a later interpolation, for the following reason: the Gemara (Bava Batra 15a) says that Ezra wrote Chronicles up to (and including) that point at which he own genealogy is recorded (I Chronicles 7:1-5). It says Nehemiah wrote the rest. Now, Ezra, Nehemiah and Zerubbabel were all contemporaries of each other (see, for example, Ezra 2:2 and Nehemiah 8:9; for more proofs, ask me). Thus it is highly unlikely that either of the two authors of Chronicles established by the Talmud could have written down the names of the descendants of Zerubbabel to the tenth generation. Thus he has demonstrated that the fact that the Talmud says X wrote a book of Nach does not mean that X wrote all of it.

After providing us with this background, Ibn Ezra proceeds to explain why he believes this part of Isaiah was not written by Isaiah, by quoting part of Isaiah 49:7: ''מלכים יראו וקמו שרים וישתחוו''.

What is bothering him about these words? Look at that verse and the one immediately following it:

כה אמר־ה׳ גאל ישראל קדושו לבזה־נפש למתעב גוי לעבד משלים מלכים יראו וקמו שרים וישתחוו למען ה׳ אשר נאמן קדש ישראל ויבחרך׃ כה אמר ה׳ בעת רצון עניתיך וביום ישועה עזרתיך ואצרך ואתנך לברית עם להקים ארץ להנחיל נחלות שממות ׃

So says God, the redeemer of Israel, his Holy One, to him whom man despises, to him whom the nation abhors, to a servant of rulers: kings shall see and arise, princes shall bow, because of God who is faithful, the Holy One of Israel, who has chosen you. So says God: in a time of favor I have answered you, and in a day of salvation I have helped you, and I will preserve you and give you for a covenant of the nation, to restore the land and to assign desolate inheritances to their owners [Isaiah 49:7-8].

This is what Ibn Ezra says ad locum about these verses:

ז) מלכים יראו וקמו. הנה כבר רמזתי לך זה הסוד בחצי הספר ועל דעת רבים כי המלכים כמו כורש כאשר ישמע דברי הנביא יקום וישתחוה׃
למען ה׳. כי נאמן בדברו. והנה כ״ף ויבחרך לעד על יושר זה הפירוש׃
ח) בעת רצון עניתיך. גם זה עד על הרמז ורבים אמרו כי כ״ף עניתיך שב אל כורש והנה אין הפרשה דבקה׃

7) "Kings shall see and arise." I have already hinted at this secret halfway through the book [i.e., his comments to 40:1]. According to many, [the interpretation is] that when the kings, like Cyrus, hear the words of the prophet, they will rise and bow. [Emphasis on "the words" added.]
"Because of God." For he is faithful to his word. The [letter] כ״ף of ויבחרך is evidence of the correctness of this explanaton.
8) At a time of favor I have answered you: This [wording] is also evidence for what I have been hinting at. Many say that the [letter] כ״ף of עניתיך refers back to Cyrus, but then the passage doesn't fit.

Ibn Ezra emphasizes the fact that in these two verses, God addresses the prophet in the singular, with the suffix כ״ף. He thus faces a problem: God is not addressing all of Israel (Radak, for example, disagrees). God seems to be promising that when the prophet's prophesies finally come true, kings and princes will show their respect to the prophet, who had been despised and treated badly up until then. But if Isaiah is the prophet here, how will Cyrus and all the other kings and princes be able to bow to him and show him their respect? He will have been dead for 200 years by the time they are alive and have the chance!

Ibn Ezra quotes a simple answer that he claims "many" give: all the verse is saying is that when the vindicated words of Isaiah are mentioned to those kings in the future, they will bow and acknowledge how great a prophet Isaiah was. This does not seem to be the "secret" he suggests will explain this verse. Indeed, recall that back on 40:1 he mentioned this answer of the "many," and said, "if that is not so, he who is enlightened will understand." He does not seem to reject the "many"'s explanation outright, but he has his own secret, one that he feels at least as adequate.

So returning to 40:1, we find that Ibn Ezra points out that the Talmud's ascription of a particular book to a particular person does not always mean that that person wrote the whole book; and that he relates that principle to the book of Isaiah by quoting a verse which, from an historical perspective, is problematic, if understood to have been said by Isaiah. He quotes an interpretation of that verse that reconciles Isaiah's authorship with the historical facts, and then says, "But if that's not the answer, then there is a secret." If the secret is not that someone else wrote the balance of Isaiah, then why did he bother to prove that Talmudically unascribed authorship is possible? Sounds like he means that the part of the book beginning with Chapter 40 was written by a different, presumably later, author.

By the way, I read that Isaiah 1-39 is noticeably different from Isaiah 40-66. I have not investigated this in detail, so I cannot guarantee that it is true. If it is, though, that would help explain why Ibn Ezra chooses Chap. 40 as the point at which "Old Isaiah" and "New Isaiah" meet.

I'm tired, and I think I've presented enough information to make the general outline of the "Ibn Ezra and Isaiah authorship" discussion clear. What follows is most of the rest of the above-cited website, unedited. It contains some added information about Ibn Ezra's theory that God speaks personally to the prophet (periodically) in the latter part of Isaiah, as well as a somewhat more detailed summary of the argument that Ibn Ezra believed in two authors of Isaiah (though not all backed up by presented evidence). I've italicized the whole thing.

Ibn Ezra refers to this ''secret'' again at the end of his commentary on the famous ''Suffering Servant'' section of Sefer Yeshayah, the pesukim between 52:13 to 53:12. Controversy has raged over these pesukim for many centuries, since the Christians claim that they refer to none other than their own messiah. Many of our meforshim do battle with this interpretation, bringing proof after proof that these pesukim couldn't possibly refer to Yoshke.** Ibn Ezra explains the entire section, word by word, according to one of the mainstream Jewish interpretations, which is that the ''servant'' is a symbol for all of Klal Yisroel. But then, suddenly on the last posuk, Ibn Ezra lets us know that he himself doesn't agree with this derech. He tells us his own opinion is that the ''servant'' of the section is one and the same as the servant mentioned in earlier passages. Here are his words:

...והנה פרשתי לך כל הפרשה ולפי דעתי כי הנה ישכיל עבדי הוא שאמר הנביא עליו הן עבדי אתמך בו ויאמר לי עבדי אתה וכן כתוב בדעתו יצדיק צדיק עבדי לרבים וכתוב גוי נתתי למכים והסוד כאשר רמזתי בחצי הספר והנה כל הפרשיות דבקות זאת עם זאת
(פירוש ראב״ע, ישעיה נג׃יב)
…I have thus explained to you the entire section [i.e. according to the majority view, that the ''עבד'' of this section refers to the Jewish people, and not to the prophet himself]. But in my own opinion [the servant here, the one in] ''הנה ישכיל עבדי'' [posuk 53:12] is the very same [servant] about whom the prophet said ''הן עבדי אתמך בו'' [posuk 42:1], as well as ''ויאמר לי עבדי אתה'' [posuk 49:3]. And it is written [here] ''בדעתו יצדיק צדיק עבדי לרבים'' [posuk 53:11], [just as] it is written [above] ''גוי נתתי למכים'' [posuk 50:6]. And the secret is as I hinted halfway through the sefer. Now all the sections fit together well.
(R. Avrohom ibn Ezra to Yeshayah 53:12)

So what exactly is the "secret"? Throughout his explanations of all these nevuos Ibn Ezra systematically and consistently emphasizes the Bablylonian setting. Throughout his explanations of all these nevuos, he also emphasizes their autobiographical nature. He leaves it to us to connect the two and draw the obvious—and shocking—conclusion: A different novi, living two hundred years after the Yeshayah for whom the whole sefer is named, wrote all of these prophecies. According to Ibn Ezra, even the famous ''Suffering Servant'' narrative was written by this anonymous novi.

Note that Ibn Ezra wasn't motivated to come to his conclusion for any of the heretical reasons of the Modern Bible critics. Ibn Ezra obviously has no problem with a novi seeing into the future, which is why he doesn't mention his ''secret'' in his peirush either of the two places where Koresh's name is mentioned, which were the favorite proofs of the kofrim. Ibn Ezra came to his conclusions not because of any doubts as to the powers of nevuoh, but rather as result of his sophisticated literary and grammatical sensibilities, his acute sensitivity to all the dimensions of what we call poshut pshat.