From "The 'Quebecistan' Question", by Brigitte Pellerin, in The Ottawa Citizen, Aug. 24, 2006, p. A12:
After prominent Quebec politicians were shown leading a "peace" protest in which Hezbollah supporters and Hezbollah flags appeared in sufficient numbers to warrant a healthy dose of criticism, Ms. [Barbara] Kay [of the National Post] wrote that Quebecers' "cultural and historical sympathy for Arab countries from the francophonie," plus their "reflexive anti-Americanism and a fat streak of anti-Semitism that has marbled the intellectual discourse of Quebec throughout its history has made Quebec the most anti-Israel of the provinces, and therefore the most vulnerable to tolerance for Islamist terrorist sympathizers."
Way to go, Barbara Kay (and Brigitte Pellerin)!
Thursday, August 24, 2006
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
Spontaneous Generation in the Talmud
Must we believe that spontaneous generation of lice occurs, or that it did, at least, during Talmudic times? Many claim we must, pointing to the fact that in this instance, there is a drasha (kind of; see Shabbat 107b) that discusses spontaneous generation, and we can't invalidate a drasha. Some (I believe Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, for example, as well as Rabbi Shlomo Fisher, in Derashot Beit Yishai, siman #47, fn. dalet) suggest Chazal really meant just that the reproduction of lice is not visible to the naked eye, and therefore is not recognized from a halachic perspective; but that they were not, in fact, contradicting the modern understanding of how a louse forms. I'm uncomfortable with this explanation; how are lice different from other insects in this regard? Also, the fact that the entire ancient (and medieval) world believed in spontaneous generation is quite suggestive.
I think we can preserve the validity of the drasha even if we think that Chazal were wrong about spontaneous generation of lice. The drasha (look at it carefully - Shabbat 107b), according to those who argue with Rabbi Eliezer, says that a species must reproduce, like the eilim me'odamim, in order for killing it to be prohibited on Shabbat. It doesn't specify lice. A Talmudic rabbi who thought that lice didn't reproduce would, indeed, derive from this drasha that killing lice is not prohibited mide'oraita, but the faulty science involved in his conclusion would reside exclusively in his application of the drasha, not in the drasha itself. And if the actual drasha doesn't assume that lice are reproduced spontaneously, then we are not obligated to do so either.
But why would there be a drasha about species that don't reproduce, if all species do reproduce (as per modern science)? Doesn't the drasha, regardless of whether it's really talking about lice, clearly endorse the notion that spontaneous generation of animals does occur? It does seem to, but I don't think that's at all in conflict with modern science; in fact, I think it can be explained using modern science. Modern medicine and biotechnology perform new wonders on a regular basis. There is now very serious talk of growing people extra sets of organs, to be used in case the originals need replacement. Such procedures are already in place for some organs. Animal cloning has been done. Test-tube fertilization has been done. Genetic modification has been done. Biologists can create all sorts of amazing things in today's laboratories. Is it far-fetched to think that one day they will be able to make animals "from scratch" (if, indeed, they can't already do it today)? I think that if science wants to, it will definitely be able to make, let's say, a louse, from a bunch of inanimate matter. Would one be permitted to kill such a louse (or fly, or deer) on Shabbat? Mide'oraisa, yes - that's what it says at Shabbat 107b. It may thus be that the drasha, far from being scientifically backward, is actually forecasting a level of scientific sophistication that man has only recently begun to see as within the realm of the possible.
I think we can preserve the validity of the drasha even if we think that Chazal were wrong about spontaneous generation of lice. The drasha (look at it carefully - Shabbat 107b), according to those who argue with Rabbi Eliezer, says that a species must reproduce, like the eilim me'odamim, in order for killing it to be prohibited on Shabbat. It doesn't specify lice. A Talmudic rabbi who thought that lice didn't reproduce would, indeed, derive from this drasha that killing lice is not prohibited mide'oraita, but the faulty science involved in his conclusion would reside exclusively in his application of the drasha, not in the drasha itself. And if the actual drasha doesn't assume that lice are reproduced spontaneously, then we are not obligated to do so either.
But why would there be a drasha about species that don't reproduce, if all species do reproduce (as per modern science)? Doesn't the drasha, regardless of whether it's really talking about lice, clearly endorse the notion that spontaneous generation of animals does occur? It does seem to, but I don't think that's at all in conflict with modern science; in fact, I think it can be explained using modern science. Modern medicine and biotechnology perform new wonders on a regular basis. There is now very serious talk of growing people extra sets of organs, to be used in case the originals need replacement. Such procedures are already in place for some organs. Animal cloning has been done. Test-tube fertilization has been done. Genetic modification has been done. Biologists can create all sorts of amazing things in today's laboratories. Is it far-fetched to think that one day they will be able to make animals "from scratch" (if, indeed, they can't already do it today)? I think that if science wants to, it will definitely be able to make, let's say, a louse, from a bunch of inanimate matter. Would one be permitted to kill such a louse (or fly, or deer) on Shabbat? Mide'oraisa, yes - that's what it says at Shabbat 107b. It may thus be that the drasha, far from being scientifically backward, is actually forecasting a level of scientific sophistication that man has only recently begun to see as within the realm of the possible.
Sunday, July 09, 2006
On Evolution
Updated July 16, 2006
In his article entitled "The Myth of Scientific Objectivity" (The Jewish Observer, May 2006), Rabbi Yonoson Rosenblum quotes the following sentence from the brochure for the British Museum of Natural History's 1981 exhibit on Darwin:
Evolution by natural selection is not, strictly speaking, scientific, because it is established by logical deduction rather than empirical demonstration.
I don't know whether natural selection is "scientific" - that's an uninteresting semantic debate. The important, and true, point, in my estimation, is that natural selection's being the exclusive origin of species is qualitatively different from most other scientific theses. I've tried to express this idea on several occasions; this brochure did it nicely.
In his article entitled "The Myth of Scientific Objectivity" (The Jewish Observer, May 2006), Rabbi Yonoson Rosenblum quotes the following sentence from the brochure for the British Museum of Natural History's 1981 exhibit on Darwin:
Evolution by natural selection is not, strictly speaking, scientific, because it is established by logical deduction rather than empirical demonstration.
I don't know whether natural selection is "scientific" - that's an uninteresting semantic debate. The important, and true, point, in my estimation, is that natural selection's being the exclusive origin of species is qualitatively different from most other scientific theses. I've tried to express this idea on several occasions; this brochure did it nicely.
Monday, June 12, 2006
Thoughts on Afikei Mayim
I just borrowed the recently published volume entitled Afikei Mayim, composed by a (seemingly close) talmid of Rabbi Moshe Shapiro, a Rabbi Schmeltzer, if I remember correctly. (I've returned the book already, and although I took some notes beforehand, I'm working partially from memory.) I read through the introduction and the first section of the book, which is called "Likut Kedushas Ha-Torah," and is mostly comprised of quotations from various sources that advocate what one might call a sort of "fundamentalist" approach to the Torah, the Talmud, Chazal, and the Rishonim. I was glad to read it, because it argues (thoroughly, I hope) for a perspective fiercely opposed to what I present in "Sources Indicating That Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge." The examination of opposing views is an important part of any truth-seeking endeavour; counterarguments will either reinforce a prior opinion, if they prove weak, or change it in their strength. I personally found this book's exposition uncompelling.
I'd like to note a few thoughts I had while reading and pondering the book.
1. Regarding the question that most interests me – the quality (and quantity) of Chazal's scientific knowledge: I counted, in an informal tally, about 7 sources that clearly assumed that Chazal never erred in their scientific statements. Three of them were major authorities: the Rivash, the Maharal, and the Chazon Ish. Two others – the Gra and the Chida – seemed borderline to me; I couldn't decide whether they were definitely taking this position or not. The earliest of all these writers were the Rivash and the Rashbatz, who lived in the fourteenth century. All the rest were Acharonim.
One thing that struck me (as it has in the past) about many of these sources was that they were long on the hyperbole but short on the proofs. Very short. The argument, it seemed to me, generally went like this: "Chazal were unfathomably holy and close to God. We are mere dust at their feet. Anyone who questions them is going straight to Hell. [Insert biblical verse here.] All of those passages that seem to contradict modern science mean something completely different, much deeper and more sublime. What exactly do they mean? I haven't the foggiest – or – I can't tell you. Also, all of modern science is wrong, except for the parts that they stole from us. Chazal never made mistakes. They knew it all. Trust me." That, to me, is not a convincing presentation.
Sorry if you found that last paragraph a bit too biting for your taste. I do generally try to be judicious.
2. I was blown away by the quotation of the Rashbatz in a footnote (#3 or #4, I believe) which seems to aver that Chazal not only didn't make scientific mistakes, but actually knew all scientific facts. I am reluctant to believe that the Rashbatz really thought that Chazal knew everything in the scientific sphere; nonetheless, the quotation from him may lead others to that conclusion. I had started to believe that the fourth grouping in my post on the topic of Chazal's scientific knowledge – sources indicating that "Chazal Were Not Scientifically Omniscient" – was redundant, for nobody with any intelligence would ever contest the point. Now I'm not so sure.
3. Notice footnote #6: a quotation from the Shevus Yaakov that includes his insistence that the Earth must be flat, since the Talmud says so.
4. Perhaps there are some fine distinctions that I missed, but my impression was that some of the sources the book quotes (Rabbi Chaim Vital, for instance) advocate complete literalism in interpreting the statements of Chazal, while others (Maharal, for example), reject literalism in favour of... something else – though maybe not what would classically be called allegory. This does not constitute a flaw in the book; a compilation of views need not present one unified approach to a topic (indeed, variety is often good!). I'm merely pointing out that the book seems not to present a unified approach.
5. I was a bit confused by the author's reference in a footnote (I think at the beginning of the Kabbalah section) to the statement of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (whom he does not actually name) that "They were permitted to hold this opinion; we are not." When Rabbi Aharon Feldman cites this statement of Rabbi Elyashiv, he describes the context as follows: "[Rabbi Elyashiv] was asked: if he considers [Rabbi Nosson] Slifkin’s approach wrong how could so many earlier authorities have held it? He answered: 'They were permitted to hold this opinion; we are not.'" However, as presented in Afikei Mayim, Rabbi Elyashiv seems to have been discussing belief in Kabbalah. It would be nice to know who his interlocutor was when he made this comment. (Or maybe someone could encourage him to write a piece on the topic himself?)
6. I really liked the responsum stating that it is heresy to contradict anything in the Or Hachaim.
7. The author calls into question the authorship of certain letters attributed to Rabbi Shamshon Raphael Hirsch. I'll assume that Rabbi Hirsch was indeed the author, given that Rabbi Dr. Mordechai Breuer, who I understand to be a leading expert on Rabbi Hirsch, believes the letters to have been his (and, indeed, published them as such).
8. The author also calls into question the authorship of certain passages attributed to Rabbeinu Avraham ben Harambam. I know that Mossad Harav Kook – a reputable company – published Rabbeinu Avraham's Milchemot Hashem, containing what I assume are the incriminating passages. The book was edited by Rabbi Reuven Margolios, author of Margoliot Hayam, and the title page says, "Published from a manuscript written during the lifetime of the author." I believe, as well, that the famous (and recently controversial) excerpt from it has been printed in the standard Ein Yaakov editions for more than a century, without any great fuss being made over it by the bulk of rabbinic authorities. These reasons all lead me to assume that it is indeed authentic.
(Aside: I suspect that the authenticity of the Hebrew Bible could be subjected to challenges far greater than those confronting the work of Rabbeinu Avraham.)
I'd like to note a few thoughts I had while reading and pondering the book.
1. Regarding the question that most interests me – the quality (and quantity) of Chazal's scientific knowledge: I counted, in an informal tally, about 7 sources that clearly assumed that Chazal never erred in their scientific statements. Three of them were major authorities: the Rivash, the Maharal, and the Chazon Ish. Two others – the Gra and the Chida – seemed borderline to me; I couldn't decide whether they were definitely taking this position or not. The earliest of all these writers were the Rivash and the Rashbatz, who lived in the fourteenth century. All the rest were Acharonim.
One thing that struck me (as it has in the past) about many of these sources was that they were long on the hyperbole but short on the proofs. Very short. The argument, it seemed to me, generally went like this: "Chazal were unfathomably holy and close to God. We are mere dust at their feet. Anyone who questions them is going straight to Hell. [Insert biblical verse here.] All of those passages that seem to contradict modern science mean something completely different, much deeper and more sublime. What exactly do they mean? I haven't the foggiest – or – I can't tell you. Also, all of modern science is wrong, except for the parts that they stole from us. Chazal never made mistakes. They knew it all. Trust me." That, to me, is not a convincing presentation.
Sorry if you found that last paragraph a bit too biting for your taste. I do generally try to be judicious.
2. I was blown away by the quotation of the Rashbatz in a footnote (#3 or #4, I believe) which seems to aver that Chazal not only didn't make scientific mistakes, but actually knew all scientific facts. I am reluctant to believe that the Rashbatz really thought that Chazal knew everything in the scientific sphere; nonetheless, the quotation from him may lead others to that conclusion. I had started to believe that the fourth grouping in my post on the topic of Chazal's scientific knowledge – sources indicating that "Chazal Were Not Scientifically Omniscient" – was redundant, for nobody with any intelligence would ever contest the point. Now I'm not so sure.
3. Notice footnote #6: a quotation from the Shevus Yaakov that includes his insistence that the Earth must be flat, since the Talmud says so.
4. Perhaps there are some fine distinctions that I missed, but my impression was that some of the sources the book quotes (Rabbi Chaim Vital, for instance) advocate complete literalism in interpreting the statements of Chazal, while others (Maharal, for example), reject literalism in favour of... something else – though maybe not what would classically be called allegory. This does not constitute a flaw in the book; a compilation of views need not present one unified approach to a topic (indeed, variety is often good!). I'm merely pointing out that the book seems not to present a unified approach.
5. I was a bit confused by the author's reference in a footnote (I think at the beginning of the Kabbalah section) to the statement of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (whom he does not actually name) that "They were permitted to hold this opinion; we are not." When Rabbi Aharon Feldman cites this statement of Rabbi Elyashiv, he describes the context as follows: "[Rabbi Elyashiv] was asked: if he considers [Rabbi Nosson] Slifkin’s approach wrong how could so many earlier authorities have held it? He answered: 'They were permitted to hold this opinion; we are not.'" However, as presented in Afikei Mayim, Rabbi Elyashiv seems to have been discussing belief in Kabbalah. It would be nice to know who his interlocutor was when he made this comment. (Or maybe someone could encourage him to write a piece on the topic himself?)
6. I really liked the responsum stating that it is heresy to contradict anything in the Or Hachaim.
7. The author calls into question the authorship of certain letters attributed to Rabbi Shamshon Raphael Hirsch. I'll assume that Rabbi Hirsch was indeed the author, given that Rabbi Dr. Mordechai Breuer, who I understand to be a leading expert on Rabbi Hirsch, believes the letters to have been his (and, indeed, published them as such).
8. The author also calls into question the authorship of certain passages attributed to Rabbeinu Avraham ben Harambam. I know that Mossad Harav Kook – a reputable company – published Rabbeinu Avraham's Milchemot Hashem, containing what I assume are the incriminating passages. The book was edited by Rabbi Reuven Margolios, author of Margoliot Hayam, and the title page says, "Published from a manuscript written during the lifetime of the author." I believe, as well, that the famous (and recently controversial) excerpt from it has been printed in the standard Ein Yaakov editions for more than a century, without any great fuss being made over it by the bulk of rabbinic authorities. These reasons all lead me to assume that it is indeed authentic.
(Aside: I suspect that the authenticity of the Hebrew Bible could be subjected to challenges far greater than those confronting the work of Rabbeinu Avraham.)
Sunday, June 04, 2006
Overhaul of Sources on Chazal and Science
As the title of this post indicates, I have made major changes to my post entitled Sources Indicating That Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge, which can be accessed by clicking on the link provided.
Tuesday, May 30, 2006
The Shemitah Proof Reproof
A well-known argument in favour of the Pentateuch's divine authorship is that advanced (according to Artscroll's Stone Edition of the Pentateuch) by the Chatam Sofer, who says that the section of Leviticus dealing with the shemitah year "proves" (Artscroll's word) that God wrote the Torah, because a mere human would have to be a fool to promise what the text actually predicts: three years' worth of crop in the sixth year of the shemitah cycle. Since only God could make good on such a commitment, it must have been God who made it. While I agree with the Chatam Sofer's conclusion - that the Torah was divinely authored - I think that at least in our age, his argument suffers from major flaws. To wit:
1. Suppose Moses (not God) made the prediction. Suppose Moses knew he was going to die before the shemitah laws were to go into effect - in other words, before the Jews entered Israel - either because he was near death, or, quite possibly, because he simply had no intention of leading the Jews there. He could then promise whatever he wanted with impunity, knowing he would never have to answer for any promise's lack of fulfillment: that would be his successor's headache. Why would he make such a grandiose promise? Possibly to impress the people, as, indeed, the Chatam Sofer was impressed; possibly he had announced the shemitah year without duly considering what the nation would eat, and came up with the three-year-yield promise in response to challenges from the community. No doubt one could conceive of other reasons.
2. The argument assumes that the prediction was made by someone who believed that the Jews would keep the shemitah laws. If the prediction's originator thought otherwise, he could have made the promise confident that he would never be called to task for its non-fulfillment, since no one (or relatively few) would care even if the prediction did not come true. (Indeed, Rashi (Leviticus 26:35) indicates that the Jews observed shemitah less than half of the time between their entrance into Israel and the destruction of the First Temple.) The predictor could also argue, quite legitimately, that only when the nation was observing shemitah properly could it expect extra produce in the sixth year.
3. The argument assumes the predictor had not planned how to explain the lack of fulfillment of the prediction, even if the Jews did observe shemitah. He could always have resorted to the old stand-by that the Jews weren't righteous enough on the whole, observance of one specific commandment aside. A general indictment of a nation is very difficult to refute.
Why would the author of this portion of the Pentateuch have made the promise in the first place? Why would he have created a problem for himself, even if he had a strategy calculated to surmount it? See (1).
4. The argument assumes that the Pentateuchal passage in question was composed for the Jewish nation before or at the beginning of its tenure in Israel. Suppose (as many today might argue) that it was composed later. Let us discuss two cases:
Case 1: It is composed in Israel, but after the Jews have already been living there for some time, without the mitzvah of shemitah. The author invents the idea of the sabbatical year and the three-year-yield pledge, and claims that it had existed since the time of Moses. The people are not well-educated, and no one is the wiser. There is little or no risk to him: the entire nation is in violation, and has been so for a long time. Their practice will probably be very slow to change.
Why would he invent this commandment and associated promise? See (1); also, perhaps, to explain sufferings that have befallen his people ("None of you have been observing this law! No wonder there's a famine!") He could claim to have "found" it, as per the discovery of the Torah scroll in the Temple in the time of King Josiah (II Kings 22:8 ff).
Case 2: It is composed and presented to Jews in exile outside of Israel. The author need not worry; his composition is entirely theoretical (for his purposes), since he and his listeners are not in the land in which his prediction applies. The nation's non-observance while in Israel (which no one, of course, would contest) could be used to explain their exile.
In short, though I believe, for other reasons, that the Torah was divinely authored, it seems to me that many theories aside from divine authorship can account for the inclusion of the three-year-yield shemitah promise in the Pentateuch, and hence the existence of that promise sheds little or no light on the identity of its originator.
1. Suppose Moses (not God) made the prediction. Suppose Moses knew he was going to die before the shemitah laws were to go into effect - in other words, before the Jews entered Israel - either because he was near death, or, quite possibly, because he simply had no intention of leading the Jews there. He could then promise whatever he wanted with impunity, knowing he would never have to answer for any promise's lack of fulfillment: that would be his successor's headache. Why would he make such a grandiose promise? Possibly to impress the people, as, indeed, the Chatam Sofer was impressed; possibly he had announced the shemitah year without duly considering what the nation would eat, and came up with the three-year-yield promise in response to challenges from the community. No doubt one could conceive of other reasons.
2. The argument assumes that the prediction was made by someone who believed that the Jews would keep the shemitah laws. If the prediction's originator thought otherwise, he could have made the promise confident that he would never be called to task for its non-fulfillment, since no one (or relatively few) would care even if the prediction did not come true. (Indeed, Rashi (Leviticus 26:35) indicates that the Jews observed shemitah less than half of the time between their entrance into Israel and the destruction of the First Temple.) The predictor could also argue, quite legitimately, that only when the nation was observing shemitah properly could it expect extra produce in the sixth year.
3. The argument assumes the predictor had not planned how to explain the lack of fulfillment of the prediction, even if the Jews did observe shemitah. He could always have resorted to the old stand-by that the Jews weren't righteous enough on the whole, observance of one specific commandment aside. A general indictment of a nation is very difficult to refute.
Why would the author of this portion of the Pentateuch have made the promise in the first place? Why would he have created a problem for himself, even if he had a strategy calculated to surmount it? See (1).
4. The argument assumes that the Pentateuchal passage in question was composed for the Jewish nation before or at the beginning of its tenure in Israel. Suppose (as many today might argue) that it was composed later. Let us discuss two cases:
Case 1: It is composed in Israel, but after the Jews have already been living there for some time, without the mitzvah of shemitah. The author invents the idea of the sabbatical year and the three-year-yield pledge, and claims that it had existed since the time of Moses. The people are not well-educated, and no one is the wiser. There is little or no risk to him: the entire nation is in violation, and has been so for a long time. Their practice will probably be very slow to change.
Why would he invent this commandment and associated promise? See (1); also, perhaps, to explain sufferings that have befallen his people ("None of you have been observing this law! No wonder there's a famine!") He could claim to have "found" it, as per the discovery of the Torah scroll in the Temple in the time of King Josiah (II Kings 22:8 ff).
Case 2: It is composed and presented to Jews in exile outside of Israel. The author need not worry; his composition is entirely theoretical (for his purposes), since he and his listeners are not in the land in which his prediction applies. The nation's non-observance while in Israel (which no one, of course, would contest) could be used to explain their exile.
In short, though I believe, for other reasons, that the Torah was divinely authored, it seems to me that many theories aside from divine authorship can account for the inclusion of the three-year-yield shemitah promise in the Pentateuch, and hence the existence of that promise sheds little or no light on the identity of its originator.
Tuesday, May 23, 2006
More on Missionaries
To my previous post on the topic, I would like to add the following thoughts:
Many, probably most, missionaries advocate many values that Jews believe in strongly. Judaism's morality isn't identical to that of the "Christian Right," but there are a lot of similarities. Overall, if Christians have success proselytizing to other non-Jews, most of whom are probably not very religious at all to begin with, I think that's terrific, because they are thereby increasing the average level of morality in our society. Therefore, unless they are targeting Jews, I hope that they meet with success.
If they're targeting secular Jews, I really don't know what to think. Is it better for a Jew to be an atheistic secular humanist or a devout Southern Baptist? I'm inclined to think the latter, but I'm not sure whether there are other considerations I'm missing.
In the broad picture, I think that groups that promote religion are almost always good to have around. Our society is predominantly secular, and although that's generally a pretty comfortable setting for orthodox Jews, it's not really what we believe. I figure the more people there are who publicly declare that God exists and that there are absolute standards of morality, the closer society as a whole will be to the real truth, and the closer non-religious Jews will be to Judaism. I also think there's less danger of losing Jews to Catholicism, or Mormonism, or Islam, etc., than there is of losing them to secularism. Thus I don't mind if the Pope gains influence on society; I do mind if atheism becomes more entrenched.
On a different but related point: I don't have all that much sympathy for the outrage some orthodox Jews feel toward proselytizers. This is mainly for the reason I described in my last post. I'll just add to it that what missionaries do is really just their form of kiruv, which we support when it's done by Jews. It's not an inherently objectionable or offensive act. We happen to know that it's wrong when the kiruv is to an incorrect religion, but the motivation is clearly noble and admirable.
Many, probably most, missionaries advocate many values that Jews believe in strongly. Judaism's morality isn't identical to that of the "Christian Right," but there are a lot of similarities. Overall, if Christians have success proselytizing to other non-Jews, most of whom are probably not very religious at all to begin with, I think that's terrific, because they are thereby increasing the average level of morality in our society. Therefore, unless they are targeting Jews, I hope that they meet with success.
If they're targeting secular Jews, I really don't know what to think. Is it better for a Jew to be an atheistic secular humanist or a devout Southern Baptist? I'm inclined to think the latter, but I'm not sure whether there are other considerations I'm missing.
In the broad picture, I think that groups that promote religion are almost always good to have around. Our society is predominantly secular, and although that's generally a pretty comfortable setting for orthodox Jews, it's not really what we believe. I figure the more people there are who publicly declare that God exists and that there are absolute standards of morality, the closer society as a whole will be to the real truth, and the closer non-religious Jews will be to Judaism. I also think there's less danger of losing Jews to Catholicism, or Mormonism, or Islam, etc., than there is of losing them to secularism. Thus I don't mind if the Pope gains influence on society; I do mind if atheism becomes more entrenched.
On a different but related point: I don't have all that much sympathy for the outrage some orthodox Jews feel toward proselytizers. This is mainly for the reason I described in my last post. I'll just add to it that what missionaries do is really just their form of kiruv, which we support when it's done by Jews. It's not an inherently objectionable or offensive act. We happen to know that it's wrong when the kiruv is to an incorrect religion, but the motivation is clearly noble and admirable.
On Missionaries
I recently posted the following in the comments on this post of Rabbi Gil Student, which is about how to (or not to) interact with missionaries. As is my wont, I'm reposting it here. I have other thoughts on this matter, but I'll make them into a separate post at some point.
I once had a very pleasant conversation (mostly about animals; not at all about religion) with a Utahan lady at Yellowstone who had lent me her family's binoculars so I could look at some mountain goats. At the end of the conversation she rather apologetically (and, I might add, nervously) explained that she knew (from my kippah) that I was a Jew; she was a Mormon, and asked me whether I would accept her pamphlet. I took it - quite graciously, I think - and she thanked me with obvious relief and genuine appreciation, shaking my hand. (I later threw the pamphlet away, several states' distance out of her sight.) I believe (hope) my actions were a kiddush hashem. (Maybe I shouldn't have shaken her hand.)
My point: many (probably most) missionaries have undertaken an often unpleasant, thankless task in order to convince people of something that they themselves honestly believe, in an effort to save those others from a terrible fate and/or to serve and glorify God (all values we hold). We obviously don't agree with their understanding of theological fact, but given their beliefs, they're doing a noble thing, and for that I can't help but respect them. One can treat them with respect without implying that one agrees with their religious views. I think that's the way to go.
Who knows? Some missionary may be so impressed by how Jews treat him that he's won over to our beliefs.
I once had a very pleasant conversation (mostly about animals; not at all about religion) with a Utahan lady at Yellowstone who had lent me her family's binoculars so I could look at some mountain goats. At the end of the conversation she rather apologetically (and, I might add, nervously) explained that she knew (from my kippah) that I was a Jew; she was a Mormon, and asked me whether I would accept her pamphlet. I took it - quite graciously, I think - and she thanked me with obvious relief and genuine appreciation, shaking my hand. (I later threw the pamphlet away, several states' distance out of her sight.) I believe (hope) my actions were a kiddush hashem. (Maybe I shouldn't have shaken her hand.)
My point: many (probably most) missionaries have undertaken an often unpleasant, thankless task in order to convince people of something that they themselves honestly believe, in an effort to save those others from a terrible fate and/or to serve and glorify God (all values we hold). We obviously don't agree with their understanding of theological fact, but given their beliefs, they're doing a noble thing, and for that I can't help but respect them. One can treat them with respect without implying that one agrees with their religious views. I think that's the way to go.
Who knows? Some missionary may be so impressed by how Jews treat him that he's won over to our beliefs.
Monday, May 01, 2006
On Bereishit
The Talmud and midrash state that the (approximately) 70 rabbis who were forced to translate the Pentateuch into Greek (producing the Septuagint) all (miraculously), independently of each other, altered the verse "Bereishit bara elohim" to read, in their translations, [the Greek equivalent of] "Elohim bara bereishit." This statement is generally understood to mean that the rabbis switched around the words of the verse in their translation, so that one could not erroneously conclude from the verse that some entity named "Bereishit" had created ("bara") "Elohim" (God) - a mistake one could make when reading the words "Bereishit bara elohim" in the verse's original order.
Dr. Moshe Bernstein, a professor of mine at Yeshiva University, was bothered by the following question: ancient Greek was an inflected language (I'm taking his word for that), meaning that the subject and object of a sentence were gramatically identified. I'll explain inflection with an example from English. If I want to express the first person plural as a subject, I say "we", whereas if I want it to be an object, I say "us". This means that English inflects the first person plural to indicate whether it is acting as a subject or as an object. The distinct usages of "I" and "me", "he" and "him", "she" and "her", and "they" and "them" represent similar inflections. These examples notwithstanding, English does not, generally speaking, inflect nouns to indicate their role in a sentence; anglophones identify which words in a sentence play which role based on the sentence's word order. Hence, if I say "The dog bit the cat," you know that the dog did the biting, and the cat was what was bitten - not because of any grammatical modification to the word "dog" or "cat", but because "dog" came before the verb, and "cat" came after. "The cat bit the dog" has an entirely different meaning, while "The dog the cat bit," as a sentence by itself, is ambiguous: who bit whom?
However, when we use inflections, the word order can be changed around without altering the meaning. Thus, "I bit him," "Him I bit," "Him bit I," "Bit I him," etc., all mean the same thing (though some sound awkward). Now, imagine that English inflected all subjects by adding an "o" prefix, and all objects by adding an "i" suffix. Then, "The odog bit the cati" would mean the same thing as "The cati bit the odog," "The cati the odog bit," and "Bit the odog the cati." They would all mean that the dog bit the cat. According to Dr. Bernstein, ancient Greek inflected all subjects and objects, meaning that regardless of word order, the subject in a sentence was always unmistakably the subject, the object clearly the object, etc. If so, Dr. Bernstein asked, what does it mean that the rabbis translated "Bereishit bara elohim" as "Elohim bara bereishit?" In inflected Greek, the word order wouldn't make any difference!
The only answer I can think of is that the Talmud is distinguishing not between word orders but between meanings. In Hebrew, "Bereishit bara elohim" can mean "Bereishit created God," whereas "Elohim bara bereishit" means "God created in the beginning" (or "God created Bereishit"). Perhaps the Talmud is saying that all of the rabbinic translators, via the proper inflections, assigned Genesis 1:1 the meaning "God created in the beginning..." as opposed to "Bereishit created God." The problem with this explanation is, however, obvious: why would any of the rabbis have translated Genesis 1:1 otherwise? Isn't "God created in the beginning..." the interpretation they all actually held to be the correct one? Why is their agreement on this verse's translation noteworthy, and how did they change its meaning?
Again, I have only one suggestion: perhaps the Talmud is saying that in truth, the simple "peshat" of Genesis 1:1 is "Bereishit created God," and that our accepted interpretation of it - "God created in the beginning" - is actually a more awkward way to read the verse; not the "peshat". This seems like an absurd explanation, but I don't know how else to answer the question. Any ideas?
Dr. Moshe Bernstein, a professor of mine at Yeshiva University, was bothered by the following question: ancient Greek was an inflected language (I'm taking his word for that), meaning that the subject and object of a sentence were gramatically identified. I'll explain inflection with an example from English. If I want to express the first person plural as a subject, I say "we", whereas if I want it to be an object, I say "us". This means that English inflects the first person plural to indicate whether it is acting as a subject or as an object. The distinct usages of "I" and "me", "he" and "him", "she" and "her", and "they" and "them" represent similar inflections. These examples notwithstanding, English does not, generally speaking, inflect nouns to indicate their role in a sentence; anglophones identify which words in a sentence play which role based on the sentence's word order. Hence, if I say "The dog bit the cat," you know that the dog did the biting, and the cat was what was bitten - not because of any grammatical modification to the word "dog" or "cat", but because "dog" came before the verb, and "cat" came after. "The cat bit the dog" has an entirely different meaning, while "The dog the cat bit," as a sentence by itself, is ambiguous: who bit whom?
However, when we use inflections, the word order can be changed around without altering the meaning. Thus, "I bit him," "Him I bit," "Him bit I," "Bit I him," etc., all mean the same thing (though some sound awkward). Now, imagine that English inflected all subjects by adding an "o" prefix, and all objects by adding an "i" suffix. Then, "The odog bit the cati" would mean the same thing as "The cati bit the odog," "The cati the odog bit," and "Bit the odog the cati." They would all mean that the dog bit the cat. According to Dr. Bernstein, ancient Greek inflected all subjects and objects, meaning that regardless of word order, the subject in a sentence was always unmistakably the subject, the object clearly the object, etc. If so, Dr. Bernstein asked, what does it mean that the rabbis translated "Bereishit bara elohim" as "Elohim bara bereishit?" In inflected Greek, the word order wouldn't make any difference!
The only answer I can think of is that the Talmud is distinguishing not between word orders but between meanings. In Hebrew, "Bereishit bara elohim" can mean "Bereishit created God," whereas "Elohim bara bereishit" means "God created in the beginning" (or "God created Bereishit"). Perhaps the Talmud is saying that all of the rabbinic translators, via the proper inflections, assigned Genesis 1:1 the meaning "God created in the beginning..." as opposed to "Bereishit created God." The problem with this explanation is, however, obvious: why would any of the rabbis have translated Genesis 1:1 otherwise? Isn't "God created in the beginning..." the interpretation they all actually held to be the correct one? Why is their agreement on this verse's translation noteworthy, and how did they change its meaning?
Again, I have only one suggestion: perhaps the Talmud is saying that in truth, the simple "peshat" of Genesis 1:1 is "Bereishit created God," and that our accepted interpretation of it - "God created in the beginning" - is actually a more awkward way to read the verse; not the "peshat". This seems like an absurd explanation, but I don't know how else to answer the question. Any ideas?
Yeshivish Mind Experiment
Consider the following list of people:
1. Moshe Rabbeinu
2. David Hamelech
3. Eliyahu Hanavi
4. Ezra Hasofer
5. Shammai Hazaken
6. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai
7. Rabbi Akiva
8. Rabbi Yochanan
9. Abayei
10. Rav Saadia Gaon
11. Rashi
12. Rabbeinu Tam
13. Rambam
14. Ramban
15. Rav Yosef Karo
16. The Maharal
17. The Arizal
18. The Gra
19. The Chofetz Chaim
20. Rav Kook
21. The Chazon Ish
22. Rav Moshe Feinstein
23. Rav Aharon Kotler
24. Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik
25. The Satmar Rebbe
26. Rav Shach
Now perform the following mind experiment. Suppose, in conversation with your average, say, 19-year-old "yeshivish" yeshiva student, I argue that one of these people committed a particular grave error. Assume the student has never heard anybody make this allegation before, although I do have considerable historical evidence to back myself up. Concerning which people do you think I would encounter the most resistance in making my claim? List these personalities in order of least to most resistance. If there are too many people for you, you can leave some out, or make several different lists with different combinations of people.
1. Moshe Rabbeinu
2. David Hamelech
3. Eliyahu Hanavi
4. Ezra Hasofer
5. Shammai Hazaken
6. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai
7. Rabbi Akiva
8. Rabbi Yochanan
9. Abayei
10. Rav Saadia Gaon
11. Rashi
12. Rabbeinu Tam
13. Rambam
14. Ramban
15. Rav Yosef Karo
16. The Maharal
17. The Arizal
18. The Gra
19. The Chofetz Chaim
20. Rav Kook
21. The Chazon Ish
22. Rav Moshe Feinstein
23. Rav Aharon Kotler
24. Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik
25. The Satmar Rebbe
26. Rav Shach
Now perform the following mind experiment. Suppose, in conversation with your average, say, 19-year-old "yeshivish" yeshiva student, I argue that one of these people committed a particular grave error. Assume the student has never heard anybody make this allegation before, although I do have considerable historical evidence to back myself up. Concerning which people do you think I would encounter the most resistance in making my claim? List these personalities in order of least to most resistance. If there are too many people for you, you can leave some out, or make several different lists with different combinations of people.
Intelligent Design
I just posted the following comment to http://hirhurim.blogspot.com. Since it doesn't really require context in order to be understood, I figure I may as well post it here too. It could have been better written, but I wanted to get it up quickly.
Intelligent design is a big deal among Christians in the United States because many religious Christians want it taught in the state-funded, nominally secular public school system, in order that Christian children not be atheistically brainwashed (as they see it). By contrast, orthodox Jews, almost without exception, send their children to schools where they get lots of religious instruction. There is relatively little risk that they will graduate high school believing, as a result of their educational curricula, that Judaism is a bunch of hooey. Since the practical implications of the debate are relatively small, the discussion is not nearly as important within orthodox circles as it is among the American populace as a whole.
I do not mean to imply that the origins of life should not be important to orthodox Jews. It's just that in such circles, the impact of such a discussion is, relatively speaking, more in the realm of philosophy, theology and intellectualism than it is a pressing practical matter.
Intelligent design is a big deal among Christians in the United States because many religious Christians want it taught in the state-funded, nominally secular public school system, in order that Christian children not be atheistically brainwashed (as they see it). By contrast, orthodox Jews, almost without exception, send their children to schools where they get lots of religious instruction. There is relatively little risk that they will graduate high school believing, as a result of their educational curricula, that Judaism is a bunch of hooey. Since the practical implications of the debate are relatively small, the discussion is not nearly as important within orthodox circles as it is among the American populace as a whole.
I do not mean to imply that the origins of life should not be important to orthodox Jews. It's just that in such circles, the impact of such a discussion is, relatively speaking, more in the realm of philosophy, theology and intellectualism than it is a pressing practical matter.
Bible Criticism: Follow-Up
The following post is taken directly from a comment I just posted here in response to an earlier comment to the same post. I feel the topic is sufficiently interesting and important (and that I have enough to say about it) for it to deserve a post of its own.
Please be aware that the site to which I link below (daatemet.org) is, unless I am mistaken, a site dedicated to convincing orthodox Jews to abandon orthodoxy (or maybe Judaism entirely; I'm not sure).
I read the article (in English - the translation is at times a bit clumsy) by Naftali Zeligman to which I believe Mr. Holloway was referring (it can be found here). Most of it is, I think, correct, and in fact I was taught much of the information it contains in my Intro to Bible course at Y.U. (which was a superb course; I will again express my appreciation for it to my professor, Dr. Moshe Bernstein). I think that most of its contents are worthwhile knowledge for people who aren't yet familiar with the material it contains. I object to a few of its assertions, however. To wit:
1. See the paragraphs beginning "Go and see" and "Understand: Reish Lakish", in which Mr. Zeligman cites the record in Tractate Soferim of the discrepancy found in three Torah scrolls - two scrolls had one reading, one had another - resulting in the authorities' deciding in favour of the reading of the two (the majority). Mr. Zeligman comments, "Perhaps it was the two books that were in error." If one believes that the Torah's origins are divine, then it is not unreasonable to posit that God "fixed," so to speak, the outcome, so that the "proper reading" (whatever that means) would prevail. The process might not have been as prone to error as Mr. Zeligman implies.
2. In the paragraph beginning "One who wants to expand", Mr. Zeligman quotes Dr. Menachem Cohen, who, for all I know, may be entirely correct. I disagree, however, with Mr. Zeligman's summary of his words. Mr. Zeligman interprets Dr. Cohen as saying that "the sanctity of the text [of the Torah] is only a human convention ... for it is clear ... that the Torah text has indeed greatly changed in the course of the centuries." I do not believe that this is what Dr. Cohen writes (nor, more importantly, do I believe that it is the truth). The correct principle, I think, is that the Torah text's sanctity does not derive from any precise sequence of letters and words, but from the fact that a (non-heretical) group of Jews has decided, using the proper halachic process, to accept a particular version of the text as valid. In other words, God (not just the Jewish people) assigns sanctity to our text of the Torah because we, following the procedure God wants us to follow, have adopted this text. God similarly would have assigned sanctity to variant texts when they were in use as a result of the correctly applied halachic method. The sanctity of the text is not a "human convention," as Mr. Zeligman would have us believe. It's very divine; it just doesn't work as simplistically as we might have been taught it did in elementary school (or yeshiva gedolah!).
3. Mr. Zeligman, in the paragraphs beginning "Then the high", "The great lights", "Thus wrote the", "Even the Cuzari" and "And though the", discusses the report in the book of Kings of the discovery of a Torah scroll in the Temple. He quotes largely from mainstream orthodox sources, but at the very end attacks the Kuzari's assertion that the Torah was forgotten by most, but not all, of the nation: Mr. Zeligman says that it was entirely forgotten by all, and that the Kuzari, in claiming that a small number of Jews had preserved their religious tradition, was just hypothesizing wildly and desperately to make excuses for his own belief. I would first point out that this issue seems not to be directly related to the accuracy of our written Torah. More importantly, however, I find it quite difficult to believe - all religious convictions aside - that over the course of, let's say, 60 years, there was such a complete and utter destruction of the Jewish religious traditions (which the same book of Kings records were firmly entrenched under King Hezekiah, King Manasseh's immediate predecessor) that no one - not one single person - was familiar with the old ways and beliefs. Is there any record of such a thing ever happening - of a long-held national belief system being completely supplanted, vanishing without a trace, in little more than half a century? I can't think of any such instance, but I know of many counter-examples. Thus, I find the Kuzari's supposition far more plausible than Mr. Zeligman's.
(Additionally, if, again, we assume that the Torah was given initially by divine revelation and that God was "behind" it, one would assume that God would have ensured that his instructions would not have been totally forgotten. But I think the Kuzari's argument stands firmly even if one leaves this consideration aside.)
Addendum: The correct parts of Mr. Zeligman's article, while challenging to various beliefs held by many orthodox Jews, do not undermine the validity of Judaism. To me this is obvious; if anyone wants elaboration, ask a question in the comments and I'll respond (or change my position, if need be!).
Please be aware that the site to which I link below (daatemet.org) is, unless I am mistaken, a site dedicated to convincing orthodox Jews to abandon orthodoxy (or maybe Judaism entirely; I'm not sure).
I read the article (in English - the translation is at times a bit clumsy) by Naftali Zeligman to which I believe Mr. Holloway was referring (it can be found here). Most of it is, I think, correct, and in fact I was taught much of the information it contains in my Intro to Bible course at Y.U. (which was a superb course; I will again express my appreciation for it to my professor, Dr. Moshe Bernstein). I think that most of its contents are worthwhile knowledge for people who aren't yet familiar with the material it contains. I object to a few of its assertions, however. To wit:
1. See the paragraphs beginning "Go and see" and "Understand: Reish Lakish", in which Mr. Zeligman cites the record in Tractate Soferim of the discrepancy found in three Torah scrolls - two scrolls had one reading, one had another - resulting in the authorities' deciding in favour of the reading of the two (the majority). Mr. Zeligman comments, "Perhaps it was the two books that were in error." If one believes that the Torah's origins are divine, then it is not unreasonable to posit that God "fixed," so to speak, the outcome, so that the "proper reading" (whatever that means) would prevail. The process might not have been as prone to error as Mr. Zeligman implies.
2. In the paragraph beginning "One who wants to expand", Mr. Zeligman quotes Dr. Menachem Cohen, who, for all I know, may be entirely correct. I disagree, however, with Mr. Zeligman's summary of his words. Mr. Zeligman interprets Dr. Cohen as saying that "the sanctity of the text [of the Torah] is only a human convention ... for it is clear ... that the Torah text has indeed greatly changed in the course of the centuries." I do not believe that this is what Dr. Cohen writes (nor, more importantly, do I believe that it is the truth). The correct principle, I think, is that the Torah text's sanctity does not derive from any precise sequence of letters and words, but from the fact that a (non-heretical) group of Jews has decided, using the proper halachic process, to accept a particular version of the text as valid. In other words, God (not just the Jewish people) assigns sanctity to our text of the Torah because we, following the procedure God wants us to follow, have adopted this text. God similarly would have assigned sanctity to variant texts when they were in use as a result of the correctly applied halachic method. The sanctity of the text is not a "human convention," as Mr. Zeligman would have us believe. It's very divine; it just doesn't work as simplistically as we might have been taught it did in elementary school (or yeshiva gedolah!).
3. Mr. Zeligman, in the paragraphs beginning "Then the high", "The great lights", "Thus wrote the", "Even the Cuzari" and "And though the", discusses the report in the book of Kings of the discovery of a Torah scroll in the Temple. He quotes largely from mainstream orthodox sources, but at the very end attacks the Kuzari's assertion that the Torah was forgotten by most, but not all, of the nation: Mr. Zeligman says that it was entirely forgotten by all, and that the Kuzari, in claiming that a small number of Jews had preserved their religious tradition, was just hypothesizing wildly and desperately to make excuses for his own belief. I would first point out that this issue seems not to be directly related to the accuracy of our written Torah. More importantly, however, I find it quite difficult to believe - all religious convictions aside - that over the course of, let's say, 60 years, there was such a complete and utter destruction of the Jewish religious traditions (which the same book of Kings records were firmly entrenched under King Hezekiah, King Manasseh's immediate predecessor) that no one - not one single person - was familiar with the old ways and beliefs. Is there any record of such a thing ever happening - of a long-held national belief system being completely supplanted, vanishing without a trace, in little more than half a century? I can't think of any such instance, but I know of many counter-examples. Thus, I find the Kuzari's supposition far more plausible than Mr. Zeligman's.
(Additionally, if, again, we assume that the Torah was given initially by divine revelation and that God was "behind" it, one would assume that God would have ensured that his instructions would not have been totally forgotten. But I think the Kuzari's argument stands firmly even if one leaves this consideration aside.)
Addendum: The correct parts of Mr. Zeligman's article, while challenging to various beliefs held by many orthodox Jews, do not undermine the validity of Judaism. To me this is obvious; if anyone wants elaboration, ask a question in the comments and I'll respond (or change my position, if need be!).
A Page Out of the Vatican's Playbook?
This site contains the account - from the back of Lawrence Kelemen's Permission to Receive - of Rabbi Kelemen's correspondence with the Roman Catholic Church about several apparent inconsistencies within the New Testament. The Church referred Rabbi Kelemen to two books by Dr. Raymond E. Brown, both bearing the Vatican's stamp of approval. The site quotes a few different ideas from Dr. Brown's books, including the assumption that Jesus' birth was not virginal (contrary to popular Christian belief). Dr. Brown cautions, however, that "we should not underestimate the adverse pedagogical impact on the understanding of divine sonship if the virginal conception is denied." And the site reports that
"Brown also considers the possibility that Christianity's founders intended to create the impression that an actual virginal conception took place. Early Christians needed just such a myth, Brown notes, since Mary was widely known to have delivered Jesus too early: 'Unfortunately, the historical alternative to the virginal conception has not been a conception in wedlock; it has been illegitimacy.' Brown writes that:
"Some sophisticated Christians could live with the alternative of illegitimacy; they would see this as the ultimate stage in Jesus' emptying himself and taking on the form of a servant, and would insist, quite rightly, that an irregular begetting involves no sin by Jesus himself. But illegitimacy would destroy the images of sanctity and purity with which Matthew and Luke surround Jesus' origins and would negate the theology that Jesus came from the pious Anawim of Israel. For many less sophisticated believers, illegitimacy would be an offense that would challenge the plausibility of the Christian mystery." [emphasis added]
I quote this because of recent events in orthodox Jewish circles. The devoutly Catholic sentiments of Dr. Brown - his fears of the consequences of revealing the unromanticised facts about Christian doctrine to the public - make me think of the banning of Rabbi Nosson Slifkin's books (and of Rabbi Nathan Kamenetsky's The Making of a Godol), which it seems likely was for almost exactly the same reasons.
"Brown also considers the possibility that Christianity's founders intended to create the impression that an actual virginal conception took place. Early Christians needed just such a myth, Brown notes, since Mary was widely known to have delivered Jesus too early: 'Unfortunately, the historical alternative to the virginal conception has not been a conception in wedlock; it has been illegitimacy.' Brown writes that:
"Some sophisticated Christians could live with the alternative of illegitimacy; they would see this as the ultimate stage in Jesus' emptying himself and taking on the form of a servant, and would insist, quite rightly, that an irregular begetting involves no sin by Jesus himself. But illegitimacy would destroy the images of sanctity and purity with which Matthew and Luke surround Jesus' origins and would negate the theology that Jesus came from the pious Anawim of Israel. For many less sophisticated believers, illegitimacy would be an offense that would challenge the plausibility of the Christian mystery." [emphasis added]
I quote this because of recent events in orthodox Jewish circles. The devoutly Catholic sentiments of Dr. Brown - his fears of the consequences of revealing the unromanticised facts about Christian doctrine to the public - make me think of the banning of Rabbi Nosson Slifkin's books (and of Rabbi Nathan Kamenetsky's The Making of a Godol), which it seems likely was for almost exactly the same reasons.
Sunday, April 30, 2006
Sources Indicating That Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge
Revised November 16, 2010
Comments and update details at the bottom of the Table of Contents post.
View any section individually by clicking on one of the links below. Use the "Back" button on the screen to return to this menu.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
I-A. Overview
I-B. Purpose of This Compilation
I-C. Some Preliminary Observations
I-D. Technical Remarks
I-E. Acknowledgements
II. Sources from the Talmudic Era
Comments and update details at the bottom of the Table of Contents post.
View any section individually by clicking on one of the links below. Use the "Back" button on the screen to return to this menu.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
I-A. Overview
I-B. Purpose of This Compilation
I-C. Some Preliminary Observations
I-D. Technical Remarks
I-E. Acknowledgements
II. Sources from the Talmudic Era
II-A. Babylonian Talmud
II-B. Other Sources
III. Post-Talmudic Sources
III-A. Not All Scientific Assertions in the Talmud Are Necessarily Correct Even If Uncontested in the Talmud
III-A-1. Explicit
III-A-2. Indicative
III-A-3. Suggestive
III-B. Not All of the Talmudic Sages' Scientific Beliefs Were Necessarily Correct
III-B-1. Explicit
III-B-2. Indicative
III-B-3. Suggestive
III-C. Chazal Relied on the Scientific Knowledge, Research and Scientists of Their Times
III-C-1. Explicit
III-C-2. Indicative
III-C-3. Suggestive
III-D. Chazal Were Not Scientifically Omniscient
III-D-1. Explicit
III-D-2. Indicative
Appendices
Bibliography
Overview
I-A. The bulk of this article consists of quotations from post-Talmudic sources indicating that the scientific knowledge of the Talmudic sages (henceforth, Chazal) was less than perfect. These sources are divided into four principal classes:
Class A sources indicate that scientific assertions found in the Talmud may be incorrect, even if they are uncontested in the Talmud.
Class B sources indicate that not every scientific belief of every Talmudic sage was necessarily correct. These sources may not specify that errors are possible in uncontested scientific assertions found (specifically) in the Talmud. Since Class A is just an "extreme" subset of Class B (any source belonging to Class A belongs to Class B as well; see below), I have "double-listed" Class A sources in Class B as well, so that Class B does not appear deceptively small.
Class C sources indicate that Chazal relied on the scientific knowledge, research and scientists of their times. These sources do not directly discuss whether Chazal's scientific beliefs were always correct.
Class D sources merely suggest that Chazal were not all-knowing in matters of science – though I do not believe that this assertion requires sources to justify it at all.
Unless I am mistaken, each class is a subset of the subsequent ones. That is, the sources in Class A also qualify for Classes B, C and D; those in Class B qualify for C and D; and those in Class C could correctly be classed in D. I reason as follows:
Each scientific assertion advocated in the Talmud reflects the scientific belief of at least one Talmudic sage. Therefore, if, as per Class A, scientific assertions found in the Talmud may be incorrect, it follows that at least some Talmudic sage may have held an incorrect scientific belief; this is the defining thesis of Class B.
If (one or) some of the Talmudic sages' scientific beliefs might have been incorrect, as per Class B, then where did their incorrect beliefs come from? Not, surely, from a divine source – God would not make a scientific error. The source must have been a fallible, human one. This having been established, I think it eminently reasonable to posit that their beliefs – at least the wrong ones – came from the science and scientists of their era (possibly as a heritage from previous eras); this is the defining thesis of Class C.
Finally, if Chazal were relying on the science and scientists of their era, as per Class C, then they could not have been scientifically omniscient unless either (a) their scientists were scientifically omniscient, or (b) the entire massive corpus of scientific knowledge came to them divinely, except for certain pieces of information which scientists had to fill in for them. Neither (a) nor (b) is plausible, and thus we conclude that Chazal were not scientifically omniscient, as per Class D.
Within each class, sources are divided into three groups:
Group 1 sources are explicit. (What they are explicit about depends, of course, on the class to which they belong.) I have tried to be fairly conservative in what I judge "explicit."
Group 2 sources are what I have called "indicative." An indicative source seems impossible to explain reasonably unless one supposes that its author accepted the thesis under which it is classified. It is not, however, explicit.
A Group 3 source is one whose most probable meaning (in my opinion, of course) implies the particular viewpoint I have linked it with. It could also be assigned a different, yet still reasonable – albeit less likely – interpretation, according to which its implication would be different.
In cases where I have quoted multiple passages from one individual, I have classed that individual in the first section to which he can be assigned (i.e., A before B, B before C; 1 before 2, 2 before 3; etc.), and all quotations of him appear together in that spot. I have indicated which quotations are out of place as a result, and to which class and group they properly belong.
Sources bounded by question marks are ones I have not yet been able to gain access to; I have read about them in secondary sources only.
The Talmud and other classical rabbinic sources record scores of disputes between Talmudic-era rabbis concerning what are, at least on the surface, questions of scientific fact. These records would seem to constitute strong evidence in favour of (B) (and hence (C) and (D) as well). Numerous other passages in the Talmud and contemporaneous writings record instances in which a Talmudic rabbi consulted with doctors or other scientific experts regarding matters of scientific fact or opinion. These passages would seem, in turn, to constitute strong evidence in favour of (C), as well as being indicative of (B). I have listed some of these Talmudic-era sources in Section II.
I discovered much of this information with the help of secondary sources, including Rabbi Natan Slifkin's book Mysterious Creatures (Jerusalem: Targum, 2003) and his website, http://zootorah.com/controversy; Rabbi Gil Student's website, http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/; the Open Access Project (http://www.yasharbooks.com/Open/) at Yashar Books' website; Torah and Science, by Judah Landa (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1991); and two fine books by Rabbi Dr. Yehudah Levi: Facing Current Challenges (Jerusalem: Hemed, 1998; especially Chap. 33 with accompanying endnotes), and The Science in Torah (Jerusalem: Feldheim, 2004). Please understand that this list began as mere personal notes and has evolved only somewhat beyond that stage of development, so it may strike you as cryptic, unhelpful, incomplete, poorly written, badly edited, inconsistent in style, or in other ways flawed. One flaw I hope you will not find is factual error. If you believe that any of this information is misinterpreted or wrong, please say so in the comments. Also, if you have any sources or other information to add to this list, I would be delighted if you would be kind enough to share your knowledge in the comments too. I will update this post periodically with additions and corrections.
Class A sources indicate that scientific assertions found in the Talmud may be incorrect, even if they are uncontested in the Talmud.
Class B sources indicate that not every scientific belief of every Talmudic sage was necessarily correct. These sources may not specify that errors are possible in uncontested scientific assertions found (specifically) in the Talmud. Since Class A is just an "extreme" subset of Class B (any source belonging to Class A belongs to Class B as well; see below), I have "double-listed" Class A sources in Class B as well, so that Class B does not appear deceptively small.
Class C sources indicate that Chazal relied on the scientific knowledge, research and scientists of their times. These sources do not directly discuss whether Chazal's scientific beliefs were always correct.
Class D sources merely suggest that Chazal were not all-knowing in matters of science – though I do not believe that this assertion requires sources to justify it at all.
Unless I am mistaken, each class is a subset of the subsequent ones. That is, the sources in Class A also qualify for Classes B, C and D; those in Class B qualify for C and D; and those in Class C could correctly be classed in D. I reason as follows:
Each scientific assertion advocated in the Talmud reflects the scientific belief of at least one Talmudic sage. Therefore, if, as per Class A, scientific assertions found in the Talmud may be incorrect, it follows that at least some Talmudic sage may have held an incorrect scientific belief; this is the defining thesis of Class B.
If (one or) some of the Talmudic sages' scientific beliefs might have been incorrect, as per Class B, then where did their incorrect beliefs come from? Not, surely, from a divine source – God would not make a scientific error. The source must have been a fallible, human one. This having been established, I think it eminently reasonable to posit that their beliefs – at least the wrong ones – came from the science and scientists of their era (possibly as a heritage from previous eras); this is the defining thesis of Class C.
Finally, if Chazal were relying on the science and scientists of their era, as per Class C, then they could not have been scientifically omniscient unless either (a) their scientists were scientifically omniscient, or (b) the entire massive corpus of scientific knowledge came to them divinely, except for certain pieces of information which scientists had to fill in for them. Neither (a) nor (b) is plausible, and thus we conclude that Chazal were not scientifically omniscient, as per Class D.
Within each class, sources are divided into three groups:
Group 1 sources are explicit. (What they are explicit about depends, of course, on the class to which they belong.) I have tried to be fairly conservative in what I judge "explicit."
Group 2 sources are what I have called "indicative." An indicative source seems impossible to explain reasonably unless one supposes that its author accepted the thesis under which it is classified. It is not, however, explicit.
A Group 3 source is one whose most probable meaning (in my opinion, of course) implies the particular viewpoint I have linked it with. It could also be assigned a different, yet still reasonable – albeit less likely – interpretation, according to which its implication would be different.
In cases where I have quoted multiple passages from one individual, I have classed that individual in the first section to which he can be assigned (i.e., A before B, B before C; 1 before 2, 2 before 3; etc.), and all quotations of him appear together in that spot. I have indicated which quotations are out of place as a result, and to which class and group they properly belong.
Sources bounded by question marks are ones I have not yet been able to gain access to; I have read about them in secondary sources only.
The Talmud and other classical rabbinic sources record scores of disputes between Talmudic-era rabbis concerning what are, at least on the surface, questions of scientific fact. These records would seem to constitute strong evidence in favour of (B) (and hence (C) and (D) as well). Numerous other passages in the Talmud and contemporaneous writings record instances in which a Talmudic rabbi consulted with doctors or other scientific experts regarding matters of scientific fact or opinion. These passages would seem, in turn, to constitute strong evidence in favour of (C), as well as being indicative of (B). I have listed some of these Talmudic-era sources in Section II.
I discovered much of this information with the help of secondary sources, including Rabbi Natan Slifkin's book Mysterious Creatures (Jerusalem: Targum, 2003) and his website, http://zootorah.com/controversy; Rabbi Gil Student's website, http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/; the Open Access Project (http://www.yasharbooks.com/Open/) at Yashar Books' website; Torah and Science, by Judah Landa (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1991); and two fine books by Rabbi Dr. Yehudah Levi: Facing Current Challenges (Jerusalem: Hemed, 1998; especially Chap. 33 with accompanying endnotes), and The Science in Torah (Jerusalem: Feldheim, 2004). Please understand that this list began as mere personal notes and has evolved only somewhat beyond that stage of development, so it may strike you as cryptic, unhelpful, incomplete, poorly written, badly edited, inconsistent in style, or in other ways flawed. One flaw I hope you will not find is factual error. If you believe that any of this information is misinterpreted or wrong, please say so in the comments. Also, if you have any sources or other information to add to this list, I would be delighted if you would be kind enough to share your knowledge in the comments too. I will update this post periodically with additions and corrections.
Purpose of This Compilation
I-B. I have been compiling this list because recently certain eminent Torah authorities, and many lesser figures following in their wake, seem to have questioned or denied the legitimacy of the belief, most famously advocated by Rabbeinu Avraham ben Harambam, that the Talmudic sages possessed flawed scientific knowledge. This type of viewpoint is presented in numerous works, such as the essay by Rabbi Aharon Feldman, Rosh Yeshiva of Ner Israel Rabbinical College of Baltimore, entitled "The Slifkin Affair – Issues and Perspectives" (available at www.zootorah.com/controversy/ravaharon.html), which is partially based on a discussion Rabbi Feldman had with Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv.
A similar point of view is presented in the first section – entitled "Likut Kedushat Hatorah" – of the book Afikei Mayim, by Rabbi Reuven Mordechai Schmeltzer (Monsey, NY, 2006), which bears the approbation of Rabbi Moshe Shapiro; and Rabbi Schmeltzer's Chaim Be'emunatam (Monsey, 2009), which I have not seen, but which I am told bears the approbations of Rabbi Shapiro, Rabbi Malkiel Kotler of Beth Medrash Govoha in Lakewood, New Jersey, Rabbi Elya Ber Wachtfogel of the Yeshiva of South Fallsburg (New York), and others. Note that the former work, which I have studied, reflects poor scholarship and is an inaccurate source of information. I have it on good authority that the latter book is even more dramatically unreliable. See Rabbi Gil Student's seven posts on Afikei Mayim, linked to at http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2006/07/afikei-mayim-vi_04.html; and Rabbi Natan Slifkin's critique of Chaim Be'emunatam, available at http://www.zootorah.com/controversy/ChaimBEmunasam.pdf.
I have been taught, and continue to believe, that Rabbeinu Avraham's position is legitimate, first and foremost because it is almost certainly true. This list helps me to clarify to myself, and, especially, to explain to others, why I believe it to be true.
A similar point of view is presented in the first section – entitled "Likut Kedushat Hatorah" – of the book Afikei Mayim, by Rabbi Reuven Mordechai Schmeltzer (Monsey, NY, 2006), which bears the approbation of Rabbi Moshe Shapiro; and Rabbi Schmeltzer's Chaim Be'emunatam (Monsey, 2009), which I have not seen, but which I am told bears the approbations of Rabbi Shapiro, Rabbi Malkiel Kotler of Beth Medrash Govoha in Lakewood, New Jersey, Rabbi Elya Ber Wachtfogel of the Yeshiva of South Fallsburg (New York), and others. Note that the former work, which I have studied, reflects poor scholarship and is an inaccurate source of information. I have it on good authority that the latter book is even more dramatically unreliable. See Rabbi Gil Student's seven posts on Afikei Mayim, linked to at http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2006/07/afikei-mayim-vi_04.html; and Rabbi Natan Slifkin's critique of Chaim Be'emunatam, available at http://www.zootorah.com/controversy/ChaimBEmunasam.pdf.
I have been taught, and continue to believe, that Rabbeinu Avraham's position is legitimate, first and foremost because it is almost certainly true. This list helps me to clarify to myself, and, especially, to explain to others, why I believe it to be true.
Some Preliminary Observations
I-C. 1. It would seem that an investigation into the source(s) and quality of Chazal's scientific knowledge ought to be primarily historical, as opposed to halachic. Any particular sage either held a certain belief (belief in spontaneous generation, for example), or did not. He either derived all of his scientific knowledge from the Written Torah and oral tradition, or he employed other sources as well. The truth of the matter is not subject to moral or halachic arguments. It happened in a particular way; which way that was is a question of historical fact. We should attempt to resolve that question – if we wish to do so truthfully – not via the usual method of halachic ruling, but by examining the relevant historical evidence, assigning each piece its appropriate weight. Therefore, by way of example, it would seem appropriate in this matter to assign greater weight to the opinions of the Geonim – who lived closer both in time and in location to Chazal – than we would in a typical halachic debate, where they might be more easily trumped by later, European authorities such as Rashba, Rivash or Rema.
2. I have limited this investigation, somewhat arbitrarily, to the question of Chazal's scientific knowledge. I see no reason, however, to assume that the quality of their scientific knowledge was different from the quality of, for example, their historical knowledge. Thus if we conclude that they relied on the science of their times, with its flaws, for their scientific knowledge, we may then be justified in supposing that they relied on the historical beliefs of their times – accurate or inaccurate, complete or incomplete, as they may have been – for their historical knowledge. This conclusion, if warranted, may be instructive in resolving contradictions between certain historical assertions of the Talmud and the findings of modern archaeology, such as the dating of the construction of the Second Temple.
3. Occasionally a post-Talmudic authority appears, in different passages, to adopt conflicting approaches to the authority of Chazal's science. I believe that one must evaluate each of these apparent contradictions on a case-by-case basis. Sometimes it may prove that there is not really any contradiction. In other cases, the author may have changed his mind. It is also possible that he wrote different things for different audiences or in response to different circumstances; this is not unknown in rabbinic literature.
One general rule of which I am reasonably confident is that a genuine Torah scholar is far more likely to exaggerate Chazal's strengths than their weaknesses. I would not necessarily assume that a statement like "Chazal knew all science" was believed literally by the author, even if he did not contradict it elsewhere in his writings. In contrast, if an orthodox scholar states that Chazal erred in one of their scientific pronouncements, or that they were capable of error, I am inclined to think that he really believes it; for otherwise, his assertion constitutes inexcusable irreverence. This principle will be, I imagine, intuitive to anyone familiar with rabbinic texts.
All things being equal, then, in cases where two passages contradict each other and it seems that one of them does not accurately represent the author's belief, I am more inclined to think that one passage exaggerates Chazal's scientific competence than that the other falsely and gratuitously accuses them of error.
4. Rabbi Dr. Dovid Gottlieb of Ohr Somayach has written an excellent essay entitled "Living Up to the Truth" (available at www.dovidgottlieb.com/works/truth97.doc) regarding the grounds for rational belief in the veracity of the Torah and of orthodox Judaism. Very generally, he argues that many ascertained historical facts associated with the Torah are so exceptional and unprecedented as to defy any reasonable natural explanation. It is more rational, he asserts, to assume supernatural intervention as the cause of these historical anomalies; this assumption leads to the conclusion that there is a God, and that God gave the Israelites the Torah. (Obviously, his essay, more than sixty pages long, has hardly been done justice in my two sentences here.) I wish to examine briefly what bearing this approach to belief in Judaism may have on our topic of Chazal's scientific knowledge.
The crux of Rabbi Gottlieb's argument is that although the divinity of the Torah cannot be proven beyond all possibility of refutation, divine authorship is the most reasonable explanation of its provenance. The evidence in favour of divine authorship overwhelms the evidence against it. Thus, although we may have difficulty believing, for example, the Torah's report that manna fell from heaven for forty years to feed the Jews, the alternative – believing that this account in the Torah is false – is even more unreasonable, and we must therefore accept the truth of the Torah's claim.
Let us now perform the following mind experiment. Suppose the Torah said – without allowing for any possibility of interpreting its assertion non-literally – that Bill Clinton had never existed (and never would exist). What impact would this statement have on our assessment of its credibility (and, hence, its divinity)? I propose that the evidence in favour of the existence of Bill Clinton outweighs the evidence Rabbi Gottlieb presents in favour of the Torah's divinity. Thus if acceptance of the Torah's truth requires us to deny the existence of Bill Clinton – as it does, in our case, by construction – we must, if we are rational, reject instead the reliability of the Torah and maintain our belief in Bill Clinton's existence. We will have to find other ways to explain the historical anomalies associated with the Torah.
Suppose now that the Torah – or its extension, Torah Judaism (see Rabbi Gottlieb's essay) – required us to believe that spontaneous generation of living organisms occurs on a regular basis; or, at least, that it did in the times of the Talmud. What impact would this statement have on our assessment of the Torah's credibility (and, hence, its divinity)? We would have to compare the evidence in favour of the Torah's divinity with the evidence against the regular occurrence of spontaneous generation. If the former outweighs the latter, we would conclude that spontaneous generation occurs, evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. Otherwise, we would be forced to accept that the Torah is false, and, again, we would have to explain away the historical evidence Rabbi Gottlieb presents.
I personally assume that Talmudic science was flawed, and understandably so, given that the greatest scientists of the Talmudic era had reached conclusions that later investigations have since disproved. I do not consider the imperfection of Talmudic science to invalidate the bulk of the Torah, the Talmud, or Judaism as a whole, since I do not believe the assumptions of Talmudic science to be part of the indivisible corpus of Jewish dogma that one must either accept or reject in its entirety. The list of sources that follows is partially intended to demonstrate that many of the greatest scholars in the last 1500 years of Jewish history have held the same view.
2. I have limited this investigation, somewhat arbitrarily, to the question of Chazal's scientific knowledge. I see no reason, however, to assume that the quality of their scientific knowledge was different from the quality of, for example, their historical knowledge. Thus if we conclude that they relied on the science of their times, with its flaws, for their scientific knowledge, we may then be justified in supposing that they relied on the historical beliefs of their times – accurate or inaccurate, complete or incomplete, as they may have been – for their historical knowledge. This conclusion, if warranted, may be instructive in resolving contradictions between certain historical assertions of the Talmud and the findings of modern archaeology, such as the dating of the construction of the Second Temple.
3. Occasionally a post-Talmudic authority appears, in different passages, to adopt conflicting approaches to the authority of Chazal's science. I believe that one must evaluate each of these apparent contradictions on a case-by-case basis. Sometimes it may prove that there is not really any contradiction. In other cases, the author may have changed his mind. It is also possible that he wrote different things for different audiences or in response to different circumstances; this is not unknown in rabbinic literature.
One general rule of which I am reasonably confident is that a genuine Torah scholar is far more likely to exaggerate Chazal's strengths than their weaknesses. I would not necessarily assume that a statement like "Chazal knew all science" was believed literally by the author, even if he did not contradict it elsewhere in his writings. In contrast, if an orthodox scholar states that Chazal erred in one of their scientific pronouncements, or that they were capable of error, I am inclined to think that he really believes it; for otherwise, his assertion constitutes inexcusable irreverence. This principle will be, I imagine, intuitive to anyone familiar with rabbinic texts.
All things being equal, then, in cases where two passages contradict each other and it seems that one of them does not accurately represent the author's belief, I am more inclined to think that one passage exaggerates Chazal's scientific competence than that the other falsely and gratuitously accuses them of error.
4. Rabbi Dr. Dovid Gottlieb of Ohr Somayach has written an excellent essay entitled "Living Up to the Truth" (available at www.dovidgottlieb.com/works/truth97.doc) regarding the grounds for rational belief in the veracity of the Torah and of orthodox Judaism. Very generally, he argues that many ascertained historical facts associated with the Torah are so exceptional and unprecedented as to defy any reasonable natural explanation. It is more rational, he asserts, to assume supernatural intervention as the cause of these historical anomalies; this assumption leads to the conclusion that there is a God, and that God gave the Israelites the Torah. (Obviously, his essay, more than sixty pages long, has hardly been done justice in my two sentences here.) I wish to examine briefly what bearing this approach to belief in Judaism may have on our topic of Chazal's scientific knowledge.
The crux of Rabbi Gottlieb's argument is that although the divinity of the Torah cannot be proven beyond all possibility of refutation, divine authorship is the most reasonable explanation of its provenance. The evidence in favour of divine authorship overwhelms the evidence against it. Thus, although we may have difficulty believing, for example, the Torah's report that manna fell from heaven for forty years to feed the Jews, the alternative – believing that this account in the Torah is false – is even more unreasonable, and we must therefore accept the truth of the Torah's claim.
Let us now perform the following mind experiment. Suppose the Torah said – without allowing for any possibility of interpreting its assertion non-literally – that Bill Clinton had never existed (and never would exist). What impact would this statement have on our assessment of its credibility (and, hence, its divinity)? I propose that the evidence in favour of the existence of Bill Clinton outweighs the evidence Rabbi Gottlieb presents in favour of the Torah's divinity. Thus if acceptance of the Torah's truth requires us to deny the existence of Bill Clinton – as it does, in our case, by construction – we must, if we are rational, reject instead the reliability of the Torah and maintain our belief in Bill Clinton's existence. We will have to find other ways to explain the historical anomalies associated with the Torah.
Suppose now that the Torah – or its extension, Torah Judaism (see Rabbi Gottlieb's essay) – required us to believe that spontaneous generation of living organisms occurs on a regular basis; or, at least, that it did in the times of the Talmud. What impact would this statement have on our assessment of the Torah's credibility (and, hence, its divinity)? We would have to compare the evidence in favour of the Torah's divinity with the evidence against the regular occurrence of spontaneous generation. If the former outweighs the latter, we would conclude that spontaneous generation occurs, evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. Otherwise, we would be forced to accept that the Torah is false, and, again, we would have to explain away the historical evidence Rabbi Gottlieb presents.
I personally assume that Talmudic science was flawed, and understandably so, given that the greatest scientists of the Talmudic era had reached conclusions that later investigations have since disproved. I do not consider the imperfection of Talmudic science to invalidate the bulk of the Torah, the Talmud, or Judaism as a whole, since I do not believe the assumptions of Talmudic science to be part of the indivisible corpus of Jewish dogma that one must either accept or reject in its entirety. The list of sources that follows is partially intended to demonstrate that many of the greatest scholars in the last 1500 years of Jewish history have held the same view.
Technical Remarks
I-D. 1. Hebrew quotations (where provided) sometimes include sentences or even paragraphs that I have not translated into English. I have provided this material in the language of its origin in order to allow the reader to form a more complete impression of the primary source without my interference. Even in Hebrew, however, I have sometimes quoted only part of a paragraph or section where I judged the rest was not essential in the context of this article; my Hebrew typing skills are poor, and I didn't want to spend the time required to copy the rest of the piece.
2. I have provided scholarly translations, with attribution, in cases where I have been able to obtain them. In cases where no translation was available to me, I have, perhaps foolishly, attempted my own. I wish to emphasize that I do not claim my translations to be precise. I have tried to convey the meaning of each passage as best I understand it, and to make the translations smooth, coherent and readable. I have often skipped over or left out sentences or ideas that I did not consider relevant to the topic of this article. I am no expert, and I have no doubt made numerous errors, but I hope that I have at least correctly understood and adequately represented the overall thrust and principal ideas of every text. Any suggestions for improvements in this regard would be greatly appreciated.
3. For the exact names (including their transliterations), life dates and countries of residence of the authorities I cite, I have used a variety of sources, some probably more reliable than others. I would not counsel the reader to rely on this article as a source of precise historical data, though I believe the information to be reasonably accurate. Again, please submit any corrections in the comments.
4. To address some – though not all – of the errors that the blog software makes in displaying Hebrew, I have introduced each quotation with the Hebrew abbreviation ז"ל instead of the colon I would otherwise have placed after the bibliographical information, and I have added עכ"ל after the final punctuation at each quotation's conclusion.
2. I have provided scholarly translations, with attribution, in cases where I have been able to obtain them. In cases where no translation was available to me, I have, perhaps foolishly, attempted my own. I wish to emphasize that I do not claim my translations to be precise. I have tried to convey the meaning of each passage as best I understand it, and to make the translations smooth, coherent and readable. I have often skipped over or left out sentences or ideas that I did not consider relevant to the topic of this article. I am no expert, and I have no doubt made numerous errors, but I hope that I have at least correctly understood and adequately represented the overall thrust and principal ideas of every text. Any suggestions for improvements in this regard would be greatly appreciated.
3. For the exact names (including their transliterations), life dates and countries of residence of the authorities I cite, I have used a variety of sources, some probably more reliable than others. I would not counsel the reader to rely on this article as a source of precise historical data, though I believe the information to be reasonably accurate. Again, please submit any corrections in the comments.
4. To address some – though not all – of the errors that the blog software makes in displaying Hebrew, I have introduced each quotation with the Hebrew abbreviation ז"ל instead of the colon I would otherwise have placed after the bibliographical information, and I have added עכ"ל after the final punctuation at each quotation's conclusion.
Acknowledgements
I-E. Many people have personally assisted me in my research of this topic, lending me their knowledge, their wisdom, their libraries, or simply (!) their time, and I am grateful to them all. Here I will give insufficient acknowledgement to those I can think of; a detailed account of how each has been invaluable would quickly become as long as this article itself.
N.B. The reader should draw no conclusions about the opinions of any of the people thanked herebelow. Not everyone whom I thank was aware of why I solicited his assistance; and some people, notwithstanding their help, disagree with the premise of this article, or have no opinion on the matter. My acknowledgement indicates only my gratitude; nothing more.
My parents, who have supported me through thick and thin, must top any list of those to whom I am grateful, always.
I wish first to thank my teacher, Rabbi Eliezer Ben-Porat, who has been an invaluable resource in many ways. It is a true privilege to have ready access to his storehouse of knowledge and wisdom.
Simon Basalely, the indefatigable Menachem Butler, Max Friedman, Shlomo Friedman, Michael Goldstein, Rabbi Micah Shotkin, Rabbi Gil Student, and another person who requested to remain anonymous, have made major contributions, each in his own way, to this compilation.
Dr. Moshe Bernstein, Yitzchak Brand, Ari Brodsky, Avi Brodsky, Rabbi Yonah Burr, Rabbi Baruch Clinton, David Hellman, Drew Kaplan, Dr. Hana Kasher, Dani Raymon, Dr. Benjamin Richler, Dr. Bernard Septimus, Dr. Marc Shapiro, Y. Shapiro, Rabbi Zischa Shaps, “Voldie,” Rabbi Dr. Jeremy Wieder, and Rabbi Netanel Wiederblank have all been helpful (some, perhaps, without realising it).
I thank the following great teachers and leaders of our generation for allowing me the honour and privilege of speaking to them about this topic: Rabbi Ephraim Greenblatt, Rabbi Shmuel Kamenetsky, Rabbi Hershel Schachter, Rabbi Aharon Schechter, and two other great rabbis who requested not to be named. Please note, again, that this acknowledgement should not be taken as an indication of their position on the subject of Chazal and science, or on any other topic.
I wish to express my appreciation also for my extensive use of the libraries of the Jewish Theological Seminary; the Kollel of Ottawa; the Soloway Jewish Community Centre of Ottawa (with special thanks to librarian Estelle Backman); and Yeshiva University. Rabbi Moshe Schapiro, Zalman Alpert and Zvi Erenyi of the Mendel Gottesman Library of Yeshiva University have been superbly helpful in a multitude of ways, and without them much of this article could not have been written.
I apologize to anyone whom I have neglected to mention.
N.B. The reader should draw no conclusions about the opinions of any of the people thanked herebelow. Not everyone whom I thank was aware of why I solicited his assistance; and some people, notwithstanding their help, disagree with the premise of this article, or have no opinion on the matter. My acknowledgement indicates only my gratitude; nothing more.
My parents, who have supported me through thick and thin, must top any list of those to whom I am grateful, always.
I wish first to thank my teacher, Rabbi Eliezer Ben-Porat, who has been an invaluable resource in many ways. It is a true privilege to have ready access to his storehouse of knowledge and wisdom.
Simon Basalely, the indefatigable Menachem Butler, Max Friedman, Shlomo Friedman, Michael Goldstein, Rabbi Micah Shotkin, Rabbi Gil Student, and another person who requested to remain anonymous, have made major contributions, each in his own way, to this compilation.
Dr. Moshe Bernstein, Yitzchak Brand, Ari Brodsky, Avi Brodsky, Rabbi Yonah Burr, Rabbi Baruch Clinton, David Hellman, Drew Kaplan, Dr. Hana Kasher, Dani Raymon, Dr. Benjamin Richler, Dr. Bernard Septimus, Dr. Marc Shapiro, Y. Shapiro, Rabbi Zischa Shaps, “Voldie,” Rabbi Dr. Jeremy Wieder, and Rabbi Netanel Wiederblank have all been helpful (some, perhaps, without realising it).
I thank the following great teachers and leaders of our generation for allowing me the honour and privilege of speaking to them about this topic: Rabbi Ephraim Greenblatt, Rabbi Shmuel Kamenetsky, Rabbi Hershel Schachter, Rabbi Aharon Schechter, and two other great rabbis who requested not to be named. Please note, again, that this acknowledgement should not be taken as an indication of their position on the subject of Chazal and science, or on any other topic.
I wish to express my appreciation also for my extensive use of the libraries of the Jewish Theological Seminary; the Kollel of Ottawa; the Soloway Jewish Community Centre of Ottawa (with special thanks to librarian Estelle Backman); and Yeshiva University. Rabbi Moshe Schapiro, Zalman Alpert and Zvi Erenyi of the Mendel Gottesman Library of Yeshiva University have been superbly helpful in a multitude of ways, and without them much of this article could not have been written.
I apologize to anyone whom I have neglected to mention.
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