Friday, March 31, 2006

The Dark Lord's Dictionary

Abbas, Mahmoud, n. A snowball in a handbasket crossing the Styx.

Always, adv. When convenient.

Ascribe, v.t. Attribute; as, Paradise Lost to Milton, or any opinion at all to Rabbi J.B. Soloveitchik.

Bagel, n. A chewy, ring-shaped bread roll that is simmered before baking. In Toronto, its shape is mistaken for a numerical representation of the amount of flavour it ought to have.

Balanced, adj. (Of a media report). Reflecting no will or effort on the part of the journalist to discriminate fact from falsehood; evidencing gullibility, ineptitude or cowardice; warped.

Banana republic, n. A country dependent on trade with the West, notable for the large gap between its high-end merchant fleet and its old navy.

Bat boy, n. Batman's summer job when he was a kid.

Beowulf, n. A piece of junk celebrated by academics in the field of English literature since 1936, when Professor Tolkien wrote a 56-page essay explaining that it was not a piece of junk.

Beverly Hills, n. A city whose inhabitants strive for ever greater quantities of wealth, fame, and marriages.

Billiard, n. Brit. One thousand billion.

Bohemian, n. A self-styled intellectual, usually young and upper-middle-class, who expresses his individuality by aping other Bohemians.

Bono, adj. From the Latin pro bono, "for free;" hence, gratuitous, worthless.

Bonsai, n. A method popular in Japan of artificially dwarfing trees and shrubs so they will fit inside Japanese cars.

Bourgeoisie, n. Those wealthier or more intellectually prestigious than I of whom I am jealous or with whom I disagree.

Brainwave, n. The stroke of genius that enables Frank to save himself and Joe, plus one of their girlfriends, after they've been captured by the bad guys. Usually his inspiration derives from his shop teacher at school or from reading his Boy Scout manual or the latest edition of Popular Science.

Bronze Age, n. The epoch in which civilization discovered the merit of placing third.

Calumnus, n. My relationship to my former school mates.

Cancer, n. A disease the risk of which is increased and decreased by every food and activity known to mankind.

Caning, n. A form of corporal punishment considered "cruel and unusual," unlike life imprisonment, which is not.

Choose, v.i. Kill one's unborn child.

Communism, n. Government that unwittingly mass-produces ropes for its own hangmen.

Convict, n. A criminal not defended by a Jewish lawyer.

Courage, n. A disease; common precursor of the plague of ostracism. Antidotes include rationalization, persecution of family and threats of discontinued employment or loss of prestige. Ostracism itself has no known cure, but sufferers can be partially rehabilitated using generous doses of contrition and grovelling, combined with skillful osculation of the posteriors of the infecting bodies.

Criteria, n. A principle or standard that a thing are judged by.

Defenestrate, v. An English word, notable for possessing the lowest ratio of usefulness of denotation to rudeness of sound.

Deist, n. One who wishes to believe in God without having to deal with the consequences.

Demon, n. A phenomenon that ceased to exist when Maimonides wrote that it had never existed.

Error, n. A phenomenon that began to exist when Maimonides wrote that it had always existed.

Dubious, adj. Relating to the latter President Bush.

Euthenasia, n. Chinese children.

Existence, n. That attribute of another which one studiously ignores while walking past him - a practice whose frequency is proportional inversely to one's age and directly to one's proximity to New York.

Fashion, n. An ingenious system whereby individuals are persuaded to pay large sums of money in order to publicly identify themselves as having an affinity for inglorious wastes of time and funds.

Ferric, adj. Ironic.

Ferrous, adj. Irony.

Fraternité, n. French. Last of the three guiding principles of the French Revolution. It translates roughly as "death by the guillotine."

Free verse, n. Irregular
or
unrhymed verse in which




the traditional
rules
of prosody are

disregarded.

Freedom of speech, n. The ability to say, without fear of violent attack, anything that does not provoke a violent attack.

Garbage can, n. A New York subway station.

God, n. A mythical creature the non-existence of which, in our age of scientific rigour and intellectual maturity, may surely be taken on faith.

Gossip, v.i. Discuss or relay information concerning the affairs of others, especially their shortcomings, such as their sinfulness or how they waste their time.

Gun, n. According to the National Rifle Association, an important catalyst in the development of good manners. The higher rate of gun ownership in the United States than in Canada accounts for Americans' international reputation for being politer than Canadians.

Hand, n. An especially profitable investment in which a bird yields double what is typically returned by a matured nest egg.

Heaven, n. Chicagoan. Ken's Diner.

Hell¹, n. Chiefly yeshivish. Where you go after living in Teaneck.
Hell², n. Chiefly modern orthodox. Brooklyn.

History, n. A narrative that distorts the events of the past. Formerly, history was written by the victor. Now it is written by whoever yells loudest.

Holocaust, n. Large-scale destruction, esp. the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews in the mid-20th century, after which the nations of the world swore not to stand idly by and allow brutal tyrants to seize power and commit gross atrocities. The democratic West recognized that the policy of appeasement was ineffective in preventing such crimes, and that instead genocidal autocrats must be stopped by use of force—a belief the West still maintains, with the sole qualification that such use of force must not result in anybody being offended or hurt.

Homogedeity, n. Monotheism.

Homosexuality, n. A tendency which scholarly research has shown prevalent among 10% of modern society and 95% of historical and fictional personages since time immemorial.

Honest, adj. Middle East etc. Unable to think of a lie more serviceable than the truth.

Hothead, n. One whose mouth is big enough to accommodate his foot.

Hydrant, n. A local access point of flame-retardant liquid supplied by dogs.

Hypocritical, n. A very important African mammal.

Iambic Pentameter, n.

Pentameter iambic, O! Thou art
The finest form the poet e'er did write;
Didst serve Shakespeare and Chaucer, then depart
With Thomas, gentle into that good night.

For who can name a poem—long
Or short, with metre weak or strong,
With couplets or a-b-a-b,
But in the last half-century
Composed, and lovèd well by those
Who fly from the incessant prose
To refuge in the ebbs and flows
Of poetry—again, who knows
Of such a poem, in whose rows
The rhythm in five iambs goes?

Idiocy, n. That gift of Nature with which mankind is most generously endowed.

Imprimatur. The child's confession.

Incomplete, adj.

Insincerity, n. "How are you?"

Integrity, n. A characteristic that Ontario premiers used to have.

Introversion, n. Any text, course, or other presentation designed for beginners.

Irregardless¹, interj. A declaration meaning, "I am an ignorant dolt."
Irregardless², interj. A declaration meaning, "I live down Renfrew way, and I like calling in to the Lowell Green Show, eh. (And I am an ignorant dolt.)"

Islam, n. A religion whose adherents were, a millenium ago, incited and humiliated until they had no choice but to attack and conquer all of North Africa, the Middle East and south-central Asia.

Italics, n. A style of print developed in Italy, in the Leaning Tower of Pisa.

Jewish person, n. Modern form of the archaic Jew; - The rabbi was a Jewish person.

Jewish person, v. Cheat or steal; - He Jewish personed me out of all my money.

Land on one's own two feet. American. Emerge unharmed from a difficult situation. The equivalent Canadian expression is land on either of one's feet.

Lemming, n. The Northern Man, as opposed to sheep - the Southern Man.

Yak, n. Woman.

Libertarian, n. A polite name for someone under the absurd impression that he believes in the application of absolute principles to public policy.

Literally¹, adv. Archaic. Literally literally, as in, "He was literally in tears at her funeral."
Literally², adv. Modern. Literally figuratively, as in, "I literally died laughing."

Man, n. Person.

Marooned, p. part. Stranded on a remote island in a Disney adventure flick.

Marriage, n. In Canadian law, an institution created by Parliament and equally holy.

Masses, n. pl. The opiate of the religion.--The Pope

Medic, adj. Of or containing the element medium in its higher valence state.

Merry, adj. Season's.

Christmas, n. Greetings.

Memorandas, pl. of memorandums.

Methane. Macbeth, Act I, Scene iii.

Modern, adj. Arts. Of or pertaining to an era that ended approximately four decades ago.

Post-modern, adj. Arts. Modern.

Multiculturalism, n. A culture more equal than all other cultures.

Neighbourhood, n. Formerly, the area in which one resided, and with whose inhabitants one was generally acquainted. More recently, the area in which one resides, and with whose inhabitants' cars one's car is acquainted.

Neutral, adj. Shamelessly partisan, as the United Nations.

New York¹, n. The world.
New York², n. Lower Manhattan.

Niagara Falls, n. Somewhere beyond Monsey, past Woodbury Common on the Thruway. It might be farther than Monticello, even.

Nineteen, n. & adj. The age at which Ontarians become mature and responsible enough to smoke, gamble and get drunk.

Non sequitur, n. The medium is the message.

Nose, n. One of the five sensing organs, generally situated in another's business.

Opiate, n. The religion of the masses.--Sherlock Holmes

Opposition, n. A wonderful lens which permits the politician to perceive every matter of governance as clear-cut and straightforward.

Ordinary Canadian, n. Someone who shares my opinion. Though many politicians, elitists and special-interest groups disagree, ordinary Canadians define the term my way.

Ottoman, n. An upholstered seat, without back or arms, sat on by Europeans after centuries of neglect.

Owe, v.i. & t. Be unable to evade payment (of).

Paralegals, n. pl. Two legals.

Parrot, n. A species of bird endowed with the power of speech but with little intelligence otherwise, merely repeating what its masters dictate it. Parrots typically have red plumage and sit in the back rows of the House of Commons.

Peacetime, n. A span of years or decades during which the modern Western chivalric code requires that powerful democracies preach pacifism, demilitarization and international cooperation and allow their sworn enemies to arm and fortify themselves, to make it a fair fight.

People's Republic (also Democratic Republic), n. An oppressive dictatorship.

Periodic, adj. Recurring at regular intervals, as a phase in a cyclical system, or the demise and revival of any of the eating establishments around Yeshiva University.

Phd, n. abbv. (Philosophiae Doctor - Latin). Among academics, a highly addictive drug which acts primarily on the pulmonary apparatus, catalysing the production of large quantities of hot air which in turn increases the relative altitude of the entire respiratory system, especially the nose.

Poland, n. A country whose principal asset is its wealth of consonants.

Polite, adj. Dishonest.

Politics, n. The art of the possible.

Israeli politics, n. The art of the impossible.

Midwestern politics, n. The art of the passable.

Polygamy, n. A form of adultery that remains illegal because it does not enjoy the widespread popularity of the other type. An arrangement which compounds the sin of licentiousness with that of honesty.

Profundity, n. A quality the sportscaster tries to impart to the public by demonstrating its opposite.

Puritan, n. & adj. Seventeenth-century Haredi.

Quarterback, n. The white guy.

Quoti, v. Cite a QUOTI. Quoti is one of those rare verbs, like ski and taxi, that feature two consecutive i's in their present participle and gerund forms: quotiing.

Rhea, n. A large, flightless South American bird, which unlike its cousin, the African ostrich, suffers from neither starvation nor AIDS, preferring instead the more lucrative pastimes of kidnapping and the drug trade. Both species, however, enjoy a good coup d'état or civil war.

Rhombus, n. An inoffensive geometric shape which languishes in obscurity along with the hectometre and the word "penultimate."

Romantic, n. An artist concerned less with form and æsthetic qualities than with feeling, emotion, and dying before 40.

Rotunda, n. A regular feature at an opera, inspiring the expression, "The game ain't over till the rotunda sings." A fat lady.

Russia, n. A nation that has long suffered the misfortune of dishonourable leaders, and vice versa.

Salamander, n. A newt-like amphibian born from fire, whose existence proves that Chazal knew more than modern scientists about the natural world.

School uniform, n. A form of brainwashing with which a school represses a student's individuality by preventing him from voluntarily copying the dress of his classmates.

Second cousin, n. Someone related to you just closely enough to make it embarrassing that you can't remember whether he's divorced.

Self-explanatory, adj.

Self-referential, adj. Self-referential.

Shoulder, n. That part of the anatomy looking over which the journalist finds out what to write.

Snivel, v.i. Contraction of "impersonate Woody Allen."

South Africa, n. A country occupying the southernmost part of the continent of Africa; ethnically, it is 13.6% white, 8.6% of mixed origin, and 75.2% African-American.

Speaker, n. Sedative.

Speed limit, n. The maximum speed at which a vehicle may travel, a figure inversely proportional to the driver's age.

Spine, n. A recessive trait common among Southern Baptists, occasional among Roman Catholics and unknown amongst Anglicans.

Staff psychologist, n. A professional whose primary mandate is to convince you that your best interests always coincide with those of his employer.

Statistic, n. A numerical record of a quantitatively superlative occurrence.

There are three kinds of cold: cold, damned cold, and statistics.—-Mark Twain

Sycophant, n. An obscene pachyderm.

Swing, n. Baseball. A batter's gamble that he will hit rather than strike.

Taste, n. A human artistic faculty whose influence scholars agree reached its zenith in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, declining sharply ever since. Objectively defined good taste, studied by intellectuals in arts colleges worldwide, goes, sadly, unrecognized today by tens of thousands of artists and hundreds of millions of art consumers.

Tautological, adj. See circular.

Circular, adj. See tautological.

Their, adj. His or her.

"Each instructor must submit their final grades by tomorrow," announced the Dean.

Professor Wright gasped and hobbled from the room, wailing, "Ouch! I stubbed our toe!"

Thesis, n. Product of a writer's need to publish, which affords him the insight that appearances notwithstanding, his work must not really belong in the dustbin.

Ugly, adj. Aesthetically displeasing. Washington Heights in the winter is windy and ugly. Washington Heights in the summer is sticky and ugly.

Undemocratic, adj. Incompatible with the principle that political power resides in the people; hence, more specifically, in conflict with any or all of the values I personally hold.

Unicycle, v.i. & t. Throw out.
Unicycle, n. Garbage.

Value, n. A principle or moral standard. Western democracies condemn governmental imposition of values as being in contravention of the values their governments impose.

Walrus, n. Since John Lennon is the eggman, and he is also the walrus, ergo, the walrus is an eggman. This disproves the long-held scientific theory that walruses are mammals, which do not lay eggs.

Wealth, n. That which the successful businessman earns through such endeavours as managing a store, directing a company, offering a service, or filing a lawsuit.

Wig, n. A device worn by eighteenth-century nobility to protect their heads from view and use.

William Carlos Williams.
He ate
the plums
that were in
the icebox

and otherwise
wrote poems
as exquisite
as this one

Forgive me
I've never read
such balderdash
in my life

World, n. New York.

Thursday, March 30, 2006

The Jew's Minor Misfortunes

The guy leading Hallel on Rosh Chodesh decides to do it full Carlebach style.

The guy davening behind you takes a really long time to say the Shmoneh Esrei.

Washing your hands in the winter in Ottawa on Shabbos (no warm water).

It's a hot, humid day, and you're in Flatbush.

It's winter in Israel, you're in a large room, the room is overheated so the windows have been opened at the behest of the people in the middle, and you're sitting next to the window.

It's winter in Israel, you're in a large room, the room is overheated, the people next to the windows refuse to open them so as not to freeze themselves, and you're sitting in the middle of the room.

You're walking down Me'a She'arim, and a bus comes.

It's a hot day in Israel, you've been running around doing stuff, you're really thirsty, and the only thing to drink is Jerusalem tap water.

It's a hot day in Israel, you've been running around doing stuff, you're really thirsty, and the only thing to drink is Petel.

Benching on Rosh Chodesh Teves on Shabbos.

Shabbos Mevarchim with a chazzan.

You don't have your own tallis, you have to wear one, and the one you're given is the type that's constantly slipping off your shoulders.

It's nearing the end of the 9 Days, and you're next to a guy who isn't meikel on showering.

You are reminded why you swore you'd never go to that minyan again.

Circumcision.

The Zionist's Minor Misfortunes: By mistake, you play "Hatikva" in a major key, so it comes out "I'm a Little Teapot."

The Anti-Zionist's Minor Misfortunes: By mistake, you play "I'm a Little Teapot" in a minor key, so it comes out "Hatikva."

The Jew's Major Misfortunes: Jukim.

Monday, March 27, 2006

Linguistic Challenge

Name a French plural noun whose letters, in reverse order, spell the English translation of the noun's singular.

(For example, "livres" would be such a French plural noun, if only "servil" were an English word meaning "book.")

Monday, March 06, 2006

On Tetzaveh

Hey, if Ephraim can write this stuff, why can't I? (Because he knows what he's talking about and I don't, you say? Well, harrumph.)

A popular question about parshat Tetzaveh is why Moses's name does not appear anywhere in the parsha, a phenomenon unique among all parshiyot of the Torah except those of the book of Genesis, where you wouldn't expect to find Moses's name, since he was only born in parshat Shemot. I've always wondered how legitimate this question is, considering that God did not divide the Torah into our parshiyot: those divisions are rabbinic in origin, and of a later vintage, and so the absence of Moses's name in Tetzaveh could be a purely coincidental by-product of the fact that the rabbis who made our divisions judged Tetzaveh to be the right size for an independent portion. Indeed, there have been a variety of different ways of dividing the Torah into different weekly portions: in some places, in some periods of history, for example, the Torah was divided up in such a way that it took three years to complete. Obviously, the parshiyot in this system were on average only about one-third the size of ours, and I would not be at all surprised if there were several such post-Bereishit parshiyot in which Moses's name did not appear. If we followed that system today, I doubt this question - about Moses's absence - would be asked at all.

However, many scholars have evidently accepted the question as valid, presumably on the assumption that either (a) the rabbis who came up with our division intentionally divided things up so that Moses's name would not appear in Tetzaveh; or (b) God intentionally wrote the Torah in such a way that when the rabbis created our division, they would find natural a division in which one parsha would contain no mention of Moses's name; or (c) God manipulated the minds of the rabbis who created our division so that they would create a "Moses"-less Tetzaveh.

The standard answer given to the question of why Moses's name does not appear in Tetzaveh is that of the Ba'al Haturim (Exodus 27:20, s.v. "Ve'atah tetzaveh"): the Gemara says that a wise man's curse is fulfilled even if the curse was conditional and the condition was not satisfied (Makkot 11a). Moses, when pleading that the Jews be forgiven after the sin of the golden calf, said to God, "If [you do] not [forgive them], then erase me from your book that you have written" (Exodus 32:32). Moses was thereby conditionally cursing himself to be erased from the Torah, and even though the condition was not satisfied - God did forgive the Jews - the curse was still fulfilled, at least to the extent that Moses's name was wiped out of one parsha - Tetzaveh.

My questions on this explanation are the following: (1) The Gemara doesn't say that a wise man's conditional curse is sort of fulfilled even if the condition is not satisfied. How is the erasure of Moses's name from parshat Tetzaveh a fulfillment of his curse? That's not what he said! (2) Why Tetzaveh, as opposed to any other parsha or set of parshiyot? (The Ba'al Haturim does offer an explanation as to why specifically Tetzaveh does not contain Moses's name, but I'll bet you could make equally compelling arguments for several other parshiyot.)

I have a suggestion about Moses's self-curse which does not explain why his name is absent from Tetzaveh (as discussed, I'm not sure that's a problem), but does, I think, better reflect the words of the Gemara at Makkot 11a.

Moses, as you all know, was named "Moshe" by the daughter of Pharaoh, who found him floating in a little boat on the Nile (Exodus 2:5-10). His mother, Yocheved, had presumably named him something else: he was three months old by the time she set him afloat (Exodus 2:2) - well old enough to have been named. What was Moses's real name - the one given to him by his Israelite mother?

Furthermore, I question whether Pharaoh's daughter really gave Moses the name "Moshe". From Exodus 2:10 it seems pretty clear that "Moshe" is a name derived from a Hebrew verb. What are the odds that Pharaoh's daughter spoke Hebrew? I propose that Moses was given a name that might have sounded nothing like "Moshe", but meant in Egyptian approximately what "Moshe" means in Hebrew, and that the Torah simply translates all of the words of Pharaoh's daughter, including the name she gave Moses and her explanation of its meaning, from the original Egyptian into Hebrew. What did his real Egyptian name sound like? No idea.

I imagine you can see where I'm going with this. The real, Hebrew name that Moses presumably had - the one given to him by Yocheved (or possibly Amram) - is never mentioned in the Torah. Neither, perhaps, is the one the daughter of Pharaoh gave him. What is the only "name" we have for Moses in the Torah? "Moshe" - something he may never in his life have been called; not his name. It may thus really be that Moses's name was completely erased from the Torah, as per his self-curse.

Friday, February 24, 2006

My Correspondence with Mr. Dan Gardner of The Ottawa Citizen

February 24, 2006

As some of you may know (and if you don't, all the better), I published yesterday my correspondence with Mr. Dan Gardner of The Ottawa Citizen - one email of mine, and one of his - regarding his column of one week ago today entitled "The trouble with all religions." My email to him, which I would now like to make into an open letter, was as follows, in italics:

Dear Mr. Gardner,

I read with interest your article entitled "The trouble with all religions," in this morning's paper. I agreed with some of the opinions expressed therein, and disagreed with others. I am all for allowing public criticism of religion, and I sympathize with Mr. Harris's views about religious moderates' self-delusion.

I contest, however, an underlying assumption of the article - namely, that religion is necessarily irrational and that, as you quote from Salman Rushdie, "All religions ... didn't get it right:" that at least some of the claims of every religion are factually incorrect. This assertion is incredibly broad and sweeping; it condemns simultaneously all of the thousands of religions in the world as preaching what is fundamentally falsehood. This assumption seems to be accepted dogmatically within the article; no supporting evidence is provided. I am not so sure that it is true.

Before I suggest very strongly that you read an essay, available on the internet, on the topic of the veracity of Judaism, I beg you not to roll your eyes and proceed to your next email on the assumption that the material I am recommending is just another religious crackpot's mediocre and desperate theological self-justification replete with shoddy evidence, specious argumentation and tautological nonsense. For it is not. It is written by Dr. Rabbi David Gottlieb, a former Professor of Philosophy at the renowned Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, and using modern philosophical argumentation, it makes a powerful and compelling case for the veracity of the Jewish religion. It is entitled "Living Up to the Truth," and it can be found at http://ohr.edu/yhiy/article.php/992. The most important sections, in addition to the forward and preface, are Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 6. Please note that, as the preface explains, the essay is actually a transcription of oral presentations; you may otherwise be put off by its somewhat informal tone and occasional stylistic errors. The content, however, is formidable. This work ought to be read and thoughtfully considered by anyone wishing to discount the truth of all religions in one fell swoop.

I would certainly be interested to read any thoughts you have on this matter, and I thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,

He Who Must Not Be Named, Ottawa


About fifteen minutes ago, the following comment (which I have italicized) was posted:

Dan Gardner said...

Dear Gaby,

This is Dan Gardner.

I'd like to raise two things.

First, I received dozens of emails after publishing that column, many from people as thoughtful, earnest and sincere as you. Unlike many columnists, I try very hard to answer every email with at least something a little more substantive than "thanks for writing." If my email to you came off as abrupt, I am sorry, but that is because I was slogging away at them on my own free time (of which I have virtually none).

It is simply impossible for me to engage every person who writes in a lengthy and substantial discussion. I'd love to. I really would. But there's only so much time in the day.

Secondly, I would like to ask you a question. You wrote me a private email. I responded with a private email. Now you have published these emails on a blog. Do you think that is a fair and decent thing to do?

Sincerely,

Dan Gardner

I am assuming that this message is, indeed, from Mr. Gardner.

I apologise to Mr. Gardner for having published his email. I assumed there was nothing in it that would have embarrassed him or otherwise made him unhappy about its being shown publicly, but evidently I was mistaken. I have therefore removed it, as I believe he was implicitly asking me to do. (I assume I am authorised to leave his comment on the original post on this blog, since the comment was published for the public (such as it is) to see.)

Normally I would not even consider publishing a personal email, regardless of its content. However, in a case such as this one, I find my usual scruples are tempered by other considerations. Mr. Gardner has, of course, a forum in which to express his opinions - a forum read by over 135,000 people, in a hard-copy print medium, no less, which lends his words more credibility. If I, or if anybody else, disagrees with his opinions, we can try sending in a letter to the editor, and hope that it gets published in a more or less edited form, in which case we will have made our thoughts known to those who read the Letters section, with all the authority that goes along with having been chosen by the Letters editor as sufficiently interesting, or inflammatory, or diverse, or novel, or quirky. Certainly, within the pages of the Citizen, we cannot hope to have an intelligent debate on an equal footing with a regular Citizen columnist.

I attempted to circumvent this problem by appealing to Mr. Gardner directly (and privately), and asking him to look at material that I believe convincingly refutes the assertions he presented in the Citizen and considered so obvious that he did not even bother trying to justify them. I hoped he would investigate the matter, especially as he was only two or three mouse-clicks away from doing so, and that he would, at the very least, get back to me with a thoughtful reply, hopefully accompanied by a modification in position that might find its way into some of his future articles.

As I wrote in the original version of this post, I was disappointed, because while Mr. Gardner did reply (for which I give him credit), he did not seem to have checked the easily accessible source I had referred him to, nor, frankly, to be concerned at all with the issue I was raising. (In deference to his apparent wishes, I will not present here what he actually wrote; you will have to make do with my representation of it.) I felt that my concerns had received the standard brush-off from someone whose mind was already unalterably made up, and I saw no indication from Mr. Gardner's letter that further efforts on my part to discuss the matter with him would meet with a greater degree of interest or open-mindedness.

I therefore used the only public medium at my ready disposal - the internet - to have the closest thing I felt I could get to a fair debate with Mr. Gardner, by publishing my letter to him, and his response to me (his original article being a matter of public record, and under copyright - otherwise I would have considered publishing it, too). I could, of course, have simply criticised Mr. Gardner's article, without making any reference whatsoever to my correspondence with him. I wished, however, to present the discussion in as full a manner as I could, and I therefore included the reply Mr. Gardner had sent me, it being the only explanation I had of his perspective on the matter. I do not really understand why Mr. Gardner would have preferred me not to have published his response, but since those do seem to be his sentiments, I will respect them.

As for Mr. Gardner's statement that he does not have the time for thoughtful discussions with readers who write to him, I believe him, but I feel no resultant sympathy for his position. I consider the opinions he published in the mass media to be not only factually incorrect, but also destructive, and I do not believe that lack of time gives a journalist, or anybody else, carte blanche to write such material and to refuse even to investigate the possibility that he may have been in error.

Wednesday, February 08, 2006

Retraction

In previous posts or comments, I may have falsely stated that Rabbi Dr. Dovid Gottlieb of Ohr Somayach advocates the "Gosse" theory - that the earth was created 5766 years ago with the appearance of being billions of years old. While that statement - if I made it - may be true, as I believed it was, I now realise that I based myself on a careless reading of his website. I do not know whether he considers the Gosse theory possible, probable or certain. All I can say with self-assurance is that he does not totally reject it. Of course, you can form your own opinion on the matter by looking here. It's a nice, concise, well-argued summary of some points discussed on this blog a few months ago.

Thursday, February 02, 2006

Question About the Messiah

Is it asur to believe that mashiach may turn out to be someone who will have died prior to the era of mashiach? Is it asur to believe that mashiach will definitely be such a person? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes," then my follow-up question is whether the position is kefirah, or merely asur.

Friday, January 20, 2006

New News

Did you hear about the optometrist who fell into his eyeglass-making machine and made a monocle of himself?

Thursday, January 05, 2006

The Orthodoxy Test

I just took "The Orthodoxy Test." "This test asks for your positions on crucial issues that help distinguish where you stand in the spectrum of Orthodox Judaism," according to the test's designer, lamedzayin. It's fast and fun. Below, in italics, are my results, followed by a little e-certificate of my status. Those who know me will be unsurprised to learn that I'm delighted. In fact, I'm tickled pink (or maybe gray).

Left Wing Modern Orthodox: 21%
Right Wing Modern Orthodox: 64%
Left Wing Yeshivish/Chareidi: 70%
Right Wing Yeshivish/Chareidi: 25%

This means you're: Huh?

What does it [Huh?] mean?
[It means] I give up. What are you?

NerdTests.com User Test: The Orthodoxy  Test.

Of course, in addition to all that, I'm also a naval, a leitz and a mumar l'teyavon. But I'm an unclassifiable one!

The Orthodoxy Test #1: Daas Torah

Daas Torah is

a) an essential component of Orthodox Judaism
b) important, but not necessarily binding
c) based on a real concept of listening to rabbinc leadership but extended too far
d) something rabbis made up to maintain communal control
e) What's Daas Torah?
f) Leave this question out of my results


I answered (b). I'm all for (e), because I don't know how "daas torah" ought to be defined (or if it even can be), but I don't think that's what he intended (e) to mean. I suspect (a) is also true, but I choose (b) over (a) because after comparing (a) and (b), I conclude that (a) advocates the unconditional acceptance, all the time, of whatever "daas torah" is, any other attitude being illegitimate and very possibly heretical; a view I'm not willing to commit to.

All of this is very vague, though, because the test doesn't define "daas torah," and there's no accepted definition. This is the test question I struggled most with (aside from the couple I didn't answer). I remember that during my KBY years I discussed certain orthodox fringe viewpoints with friends, and came to the happy (and naïvely simple) conclusion that they were illegitimate, assur or heresy because they didn't coincide with "daas torah," a concept that had just been introduced to me. As I thought about more and more issues, I began to discover that I badly needed a more precise definition of just what "daas torah" is, and gradually I came to the messy realization that such a definition is quite elusive, and may furthermore vary from era to era, from place to place and from person to person. So I'm afraid that I really don't feel up to the task of even trying to write anything coherent in response to this question, although I'd certainly appreciate any help any of you can offer in clarifying the issue for me.

The Orthodoxy Test #2: The State of Israel

The State of Israel is

a) the work of the sitra achra
b) not religiously significant in and of itself and overall negative
c) not religiously significant in and of itself but overall positive
d) possibly a step towards Moshiach
e) Reishit Tzmichat Geulateinu
f) Leave this question out of my results

I chose (d). Well, heck, anything is possibly a step towards Mashiach. The World Wars were viewed as steps toward Mashiach. Why not Israel?

The other options were less convincing. Based on what I have been taught, neither (a) nor (e) is definitely true (though perhaps not definitely false either). ((D) basically translates into "Possibly (e).") I don't think the state is overall negative; I'm not sure how things would be better if Israel were a part of Jordan. I admit I seriously considered (c), but I ultimately decided that the state does have religious significance, if for no other reason than that it helps Rabbi Gottlieb's "Living Up to the Truth" essay.

By the way, at YU, the gabbai (depending on who he is) will sometimes omit the words "reishis tzmichas geulaseinu" from the Prayer for the State of Israel. It's the only place I've ever seen that done. I like it.

Another point: though there may be a statistical correlation between religious Zionism and modern orthodoxy, I don't see why that correlation need be theologically obligatory.

The Orthodoxy Test #3: Higher Secular Education

Higher secular education is

a) assur
b) bad, but necessary for parnassa
c) good, but mostly because its necessary for parnassa
d) occasionally worthwhile but often full of apikorsus
e) something positive and worthwhile
f) Leave this question out of my results


I answered (c). Before you jump all over me, let me explain. I had a hard time with this one. I think the amount of higher secular education a person should obtain varies widely. Some people probably shouldn't go to university at all, and doing so may be spiritually perilous for them; for such people, (a) is correct. For people of a similar ilk who need a post-secondary degree to earn a living, (b) is correct. Overall, I think that the right kind of post-secondary secular education can be valuable for many people (that's my own personal experience). I also think that for many people, the same positive intellectual and religious ends attained via university attendance and adherence to a college's curriculum can be achieved in other, less expensive and more purely beneficial ways; but you need a degree to get a large number of jobs. That's more or less what (c) says, only I think I value the non-career benefits of a university education a bit more than (c) implies. I don't agree with (d) any more completely, though: university education is sometimes full of apikorsus, but I think a lot of that can be avoided by intelligent course selection, so I don't see that as being such a big issue. And I think a post-secondary education is more than just occasionally worthwhile. I'd be tempted to choose (e), except that as I mentioned earlier there are many people for whom such education is on the whole not positive and beneficial, so I don't want to endorse it too completely.

The Orthodoxy Test #4: Evolution

Evolution is

a) kefira
b) not exactly kefira, but not true
c) possibly true. Who knows?
d) definitely true, and compatible with Orthodoxy
e) definitely true, even if it isn't compatible with Orthodoxy
f) Leave this question out of my results


I'm very comfortable with (c) here. I'm satisfied that many versions of the evolutionary theory contain no kefirah. Given that, why would I be sure it's not true, as per (b)? I like neither (d) nor (e) because I don't think that macroevolution - which is what I assume this question is about, otherwise I choose (e) - has been so conclusively proven to have taken place that all other possibilities regarding the origins of species can be discarded as definitely false.

The Orthodoxy Test #5: The Gedolim

The Gedolim are

a) nearly perfect examples of pious devotion to God
b) holy men, but they have some faults
c) smart rabbis who know Torah but shouldn't be looked at for guidance in other things
d) well meaning scholars often out of their depth
e) crazy old rabbis
f) Leave this question out of my results


Obviously, it depends on whom one is defining as "the Gedolim." I assume that the test intends the connotation the word has in the idiom of the Slifkin debates, namely, the group that signed the ban on the three Slifkin books (see the posters accessible from http://zootorah.com/controversy for their identities), plus some others judged to be in league with them. As I wrote recently to a rabbi with whom I'm corresponding, I know these people not personally, but by reputation only. Their reputation, as it has reached me, corresponds pretty well to (b) and (c): they are holy men, they have faults (that's hardly surprising: I think Tanach tells us to expect that.... Oh, I forgot, we don't learn Tanach; but I'm sure it's in the Gemara anyway), they're smart rabbis who know Torah, and they're not necessarily experts on everything else (like Captain Salamander's example of home renovations). I chose (b), because I got the impression that (c) is intended to imply that these Gedolim are smart, but not necessarily wise or in other ways holy men - basically, just Torah academics. I think there's more to them than just brains and scholarship (many of them, anyway).

The Orthodoxy Test #6: Yeshiva University

Yeshiva University is

a) a makom tumah
b) frum, but just barely. "Not for us."
c) acceptable, although a little leftish
d) a good example of a centrist "normal" Orthodoxy
e) way too right wing
f) Leave this question out of my results


Oh, boy, I think I'm going to get it for this one (if anybody's reading). I chose (d). That's right - (d). It was either (c) or (d). I don't know how the orthodox community breaks down statistically into subgroups, so I don't know if YU is statistically "centrist" or "normal." I believe, however, that it should be. There are people there both to the right and to the left of me (i.e., ideological perfection) on every single issue. Of the places I've seen (granted, I'm not the world's most widely travelled person, but I haven't spent the last 5 years in total isolation), YU is the one in which I feel the Truth is most present and accessible (albeit with a lot of other stuff you have to put up with). In particular, I think of RIETS (YU's seminary) as the religiously healthiest post-secondary school I know of. I would really like to study at YU. Too bad for me.

The Orthodoxy Test #7: Women Learning Gemara

Women learning Gemarah is

a) assur
b) not allowed, although not exactly assur
c) allowed I guess, but not something a normal frum girl would do
d) something that should be supported for anyone who wishes to do so
e) very important to the future of Orthodoxy
f) Leave this question out of my results


I answered (c), because my impression is that it's the truth, both in that it's allowed, and in that the typical frum girl would not want to do it.

Question: does "assur" mean "not allowed?" If it does, what does (b) mean? If "assur" doesn't mean "not allowed," then what does it mean? "Prohibited?" What's the difference between "prohibited" and "not allowed?" Or does "assur" mean something like "You'll go to Hell for doing this," as opposed to "not allowed," which just means "You're prohibited from doing this, but you won't go to Hell if you do?" How can it mean that? Why shouldn't you do something if you won't go to Hell for it, and, conversely, if you shouldn't do it, then why won't you go to Hell if you do? In short, I don't understand (b).

Orthodoxy seems to have survived, and despite all the doom and gloom, to continue to survive, quite nicely without widespread Talmudic study by females, so I don't think (e) can be correct. As for (d): I don't know; I can't say this for sure, but it seems quite possible to me that a lot of females who want to study Gemara want to do it not because, or certainly not principally because, they are genuinely interested in serving God by doing so, but because they have been inspired/bought into feminist ideas to some extent, ideas that, if not antithetical to Judaism, are certainly not Torah-derived. I'm not sure such women should be encouraged to study Talmud; or at least, I don't think that's an attitude that should be promoted.

On the other hand, as I understand it, it is perfectly legitimate according to all major opinions for a woman to study those parts of Torah Shebe'al Peh that are of relevance to her life (i.e., halacha, hashkafa, etc). Gemara is Torah Shebe'al Peh. I highly doubt that most orthodox men ever succeed in properly studying all of the portions of Gemara that are relevant to women, with rishonim, acharonim, Tur, Shulchan Aruch, commentaries, etc. That's a huge body of material; it's a large portion of what you find in any bais midrash. I suspect that any woman pining to learn Gemara be'iyun (or otherwise) can be fully occupied in the endeavour for many years without taking on material that women shouldn't be encouraged to study. So in a way, I agree with (d), even (e); I just don't think that's what those answers are intended to mean.

(Parenthetically, maybe if girls studied more Gemara - whichever parts of it - they'd (on average) be less annoyingly unanalytical, dogmatic, intellectually inflexible, closed-minded, touchy-feely, and prone to outrage or offense when exposed to a bais-midrash-style debate. Or maybe they should all go to law school.)

One more point: why on earth should there be an "h" appended to the end of "Gemara?"

The Orthodoxy Test #8: Tnzius for Women

Tznius is

a) a woman's most important mitzvah

b) very important, but not the most important mitzvah
c) required, but not something to focus on
d) mostly minhag and there's a lot more legitimate leeway than people believe
e) not very important
f) Leave this question out of my results

As I understand it, tznius is an important mitzvah for both men and women, although in our society men feel less pressure than women to deviate from its dictates, and thus men's tznius is less discussed. I don't know why it wouldn't be something to focus on; as far as I know, every mitzvah ought to be the subject of our focus, although of course some people will be better suited to focusing on certain mitzvot, and others on others. On the other hand, I don't see how I could justify the assertion that tznius is the most important mitzvah for anybody. Why would it be more important that pikuach nefesh, or shmirat shabbat, or kashrut, or lashon hara? So (a) doesn't make sense to me. I chose (b).

The Orthodoxy Test #9: Being Machmir

Being machmir is

a) an important way to grow closer to God
b) always safe
c) sometime appropriate, but often done out of ignorance
d) rarely appropriate and just turns people off to Judaism
e) something I never do
f) Leave this question out of my results


This question, again, leaves an important term undefined: "being machmir". Does saying "Baruch shem k'vod malchuto le'olam va'ed" after making the bracha "al mitzvat tefillin" count as "being machmir"? After all, we only do it (those of us who do) because we're afraid the bracha may be levatalah. How about putting on tefillin on Chol Hamo'ed? Or not putting them on? How about keeping your mouth shut rather than saying something that might - you're not sure - be lashon hara? Or getting someone to make Al Hamichyah for you if you're not sure you had a kezayis of mezonos? Or doing the yichud room jazz after the chuppah (after all, you don't need it according to some poskim)?

I assume that in this context, "being machmir" refers to adhering to chumras in situations where many current authorities would aver that doing so is not necessary. I can rule out (e). (A) may be true if it is qualified, but I do not think it is correct all the time for everyone: if competent halachic authorities (of course, who are they? But that would make this piece way too long) say that a certain action is permissible, then it's probably not true that it should nonetheless never be done by anyone. I don't think (b) is correct either, and for the same reason: there may be situations in which being machmir on a certain issue leads to an overall poor decision (like, for example, annoying one's hosts by refusing to eat their non-chalav-yisrael milk products). I wouldn't say it's rarely appropriate, though: most of the time, it seems to me, no harm results, and in such a situation, if you're interested, why not take kiyum hamitzvos seriously and play it safe? So (c) seems most correct to me: it's often not a bad idea, but I think that on many occasions, it is indeed done out of ignorance (isn't that what Rashi implies somewhere in his commentary on the Gemara when he says that the mark of a knowledgeable person is someone who will say "mutar"?).

The Orthodoxy Test #10: Men's Torah Study

Men should learn Torah

a) all day, even if this requires a lot of sacrifice by their families
b) all day, if reasonably possible, but not if it requires great sacrifice by their families
c) for a few hours at a fixed time every day
d) when they feel like it
e) rarely - I can just ask my rabbi when I have a question
f) Leave this question out of my results


I left this question out of my results [(f)] because I think the answer varies so widely, depending on one's personality and personal circumstances. For some people, (a) is correct; for others, (b); for yet others, (c). I don't know if I'd endorse (d) for anybody, but there should be another option between (c) and (d) allowing for less that "a few hours" of study per day, while still involving a regular routine. What's the difference between (d) and (e)? Does (e) mean "at set times, even if I don't feel like it, but the set times are infrequent?" If so, I may agree with (e) for some people too, depending on how infrequent "infrequent" is. I dislike (d) because it seems to place a bit too much importance on whim and not enough on duty; my problems with (e) are more (1) the notion that the only reason to study Torah is to know halacha, and (2) that it's not necessary to actually study halacha because you can always just ask halachic questions when you need to know the law.

The Orthodoxy Test #11: Coed Activities

Coed activities are

a) completely, unequivocally assur
b) very much frowned upon
c) ok, but only for people "in the parsha" and only under supervision
d) usually fine
e) necessary for a normal and healthy society
f) Leave this question out of my results


I apologize for not being more opinionated and controversial, but I took a pass [(f)] on this one too. There are way too many rabbis I know and respect who approve of coed activities of one sort or another for me to believe (a), or even an unqualified (b). These rabbis do not support exclusively activities of the type described by (c), either (indeed, some of them probably would not support activities of the (c) type). Rejecting (a), (b) and (c) does not, however, mean that coed activities are "usually fine" - (d). And while (e) may technically be correct in a limited sort of way, my feeling is that (e) is intended to express even more broad and enthusiastic approval of coed activities than does (d); obviously, that's not my position either. So I'm forced to choose (f).

The Orthodoxy Test #12: Kabbala

Kabbala is

a) the essential core of Torah
b) crucial, although often misunderstood
c) a mixed bag - some of it's probably true
d) mostly silly
e) totally a crock
f) Leave this question out of my results


I choose (c). Most, if not all, of the great Jewish authorities of the last several centuries have said that Kabbala is important, so I'm not going to question that. The Rambam apparently didn't know Kabbala, and I can't imagine that we'd pay any attention to him if he knew nothing about "the essential core of Torah". So I rule out (a). Is Kabbala crucial? What exactly does that mean? That you need to know it? Most people who are considered good Jews don't know very much of it, so far as I can tell, so I eliminate (b). Some of it must be true, otherwise the generally accepted opinion would presumably not be that it has value. Is everything that is taught as Kabbala true? How am I supposed to know? I've studied virtually none of it myself! I know that many people raise questions about the authenticity of some of what passes as Kabbala, so I'm willing to accept that it's not all true. So I choose (c), although I'd like it modified to read, "some of it's definitely true."

The Orthodoxy Test #13: Segulas

Segulas

a) work, and are very important

b) might work, so why not try them
c) probably dont work, but whats the harm
d) definitely dont work
e) are mostly avoda zara
f) Leave this question out of my results

I chose (c). I think that most of the rabbis I know kind of roll their eyes at the mention of most segulas, but the attitudes vary somewhat, and certain segulas seem to be more accepted as authentic than others. Doesn't the Gemara assume that some segulas have some value, e.g., in Tractate Shabbat, Perek Bameh Ishah? I personally don't use them, and I don't doubt that some people who worry about them are just falling victim to the same irrational human tendency toward superstition - as a countermeasure to the feeling of lack of control over a situation - that makes people always, or never, step on cracks in the sidewalk, and prompted Vida Blue to wear the same baseball cap for several years without washing it. But God certainly has the power to make segulas work, if he so chooses, and I don't feel the need to categorically deny the validity of something just because Western culture snickers at people who believe in it. Some of them probably are avodah zarah, and it behooves one, I would think, to verify the permissibility of a segulah before using it.

The Orthodoxy Test #14: Female Orthodox Rabbis

Female Orthodox Rabbis

a) are totally impossible and an oxymoron
b) couldn't happen because any woman who wants this must have an agenda
c) might in theory be possible but will never happen for practical reasons
d) may happen some day in the future, but not in my lifetime
e) are something we should press hard to create
f) Leave this question out of my results


Some of you may be surprised (outraged?) by my having chosen (c).

The first thing we need to do is to define "rabbi". (Perhaps "orthodox" needs to be defined, too, but I'll risk assuming we're all operating with more or less the same definition of it. And I hope it's not necessary to define "female".) One could argue that there are female orthodox rabbis even now: there are certainly learned orthodox women who write books about Judaism, teach it, travel extensively to lecture about it, are consulted by other Jews for their advice in matters that relate to religion, engage in kiruv, etc. Many male rabbis do almost exactly the same thing (or less), and their own education may not differ very much either. But I don't think that that's what the question means. The question is probably intended to have the answerer consider two specific functions of rabbis that orthodox women really do not perform: serving as a congregational/pulpit rabbi, and acting as a posek. (Note: Some orthodox women certainly do act as poskot of a certain type; I know for a fact that many learned orthodox women will often field questions from their less learned peers about kashrus questions, or niddah questions, or Shabbat questions, etc., the answers to which they know because they are well-read and are familiar with the halachos that they need to know in order to practise Judaism properly. That's not the type of posek I'm talking about, though. I'm talking about the type of posek to whom people turn for rulings on complex issues that have never been ruled on before: a Rav Moshe Feinstein- or Rav Elyashiv- or Rav Hershel Schachter-type posek (covered my bases, didn't I?).)

(Real) Judaism has survived for thousands of years without (any significant number of) female rabbis, and seems to be continuing to do all right despite the modern phenomenon of feminism, so I don't see why (e) should be correct.

The difference between (c) and (d) is purely an issue of fortune-telling. My instinct is that there will never be female orthodox rabbis of the type described, even after I die (***). We're now in the year 5766. If Mashiach is supposed to come by the year 6000, that only leaves about 234 (Can't have a better number than that!) years for orthodoxy to be persuaded to accept and implement the notion that female rabbis are an okay idea. (Once Mashiach comes, all bets are off, as far as I'm concerned.) Is it conceivable that such a thing may happen? I think it is. Is it likely? I think it's not. Can I prove it? No. Can anyone prove otherwise? I doubt it. Orthodoxy is, after all, orthodox; we're a pretty traditional and inflexible lot, and rightly so: we're responsible for preserving something that it is very important to preserve properly and faithfully. I don't think female rabbis are in the cards (although if they were, my vote would be for the Queen of Spades).

As for (a): I have read, in very traditional, "frum" books, that at least according to some great Jewish authorities, (some) women may learn Gemara; and some of them, I fully believe, are smart enough to become talmidot chachamim of the finest calibre. Would such a woman, having achieved such a level of scholarship, not have a duty to paskan? And consider Devorah the prophetess. If there had been shuls of the modern type in her day, might she not have played the role (with a few alterations) of congregational rabbi? I'm not the first one to point out that many or most pulpit rabbis don't do very much, if anything, that a woman isn't allowed to do; indeed, most pulpit-rabbi tasks are ones that some orthodox - even yeshivish - women already do. So is it "totally impossible"? I don't think so. An oxymoron? I don't think our terms are even tightly enough defined for the word to be applicable.

And I think (b) is a silly answer, because it assumes that since certain ambitions tend currently to be associated with a particular (let us assume, unacceptably feminist) agenda, this association will always exist, and will exist in every single case. There have been examples in Jewish history of very scholarly, very devout, and very unsubversive women who have been Talmudic scholars or leaders of Jewry. It would be, I think, a combination of short-sightedness, narrow-mindedness, axe-grinding, blind acceptance of stereotyping and/or pure lack of imagination that would lead someone to assume it impossible for this ever to happen again, just because in our particular era, most (let us assume) orthodox women who want to be/wish they could be rabbis possess that desire because they feel that orthodox Judaism, in its present state, gives them a raw deal, and they want to change things/stir the pot/make a statement.

The Orthodoxy Test #15: Science and Torah Conflicts

Science and Torah conflicts

a) don't exist because scientists are just atheists out to disprove Torah

b) don't exist because nishtanu hateva
c) don't exist because science simply hasn't caught up with Chazal yet
d) are something we shouldn't think about. Taiku
e) must be resolved because we can't ignore science
f) Leave this question out of my results

Ahhh.... Home, sweet home. (A) is false. I'm willing to accept (b) in some cases, but I'd sooner throw out the whole Torah (for rational, not emotional, reasons) than believe it in others. In the absence of evidence in favour of (c), I see no reason to believe it. (D) may satisfy some people, but it's not acceptable to me: why should I accept evidence that the Torah is true, but ignore evidence that indicates otherwise? That seems dumb. (Note: I am not saying that I believe that science indicates that the Torah is false; it is this option - (d) - that seems to imply that.) I chose (e). However, I don't really like the way it's worded. I don't think that every apparent Torah-science "contradiction" has to be resolved; it may be acceptable in some cases to say "Taiku," as per (d). I'm comfortable with a thoughtful investigation leading to what one considers a rational "Taiku." I'm not comfortable - for the reason I supplied - with (d)'s suggestion that we must not engage in the thoughtful investigation in the first place.

The Orthodoxy Test #16: Fallibility of Chazal

Chazal

a) never erred even in non-Torah matters
b) never erred in Torah matters, but might rarely have erred in science
c) never erred in Torah matters, but relied on the faulty science of their time
d) definitely had faulty science and possibly erred in some history as well
e) did pretty well but made a lot of mistakes
f) Leave this question out of my results


For me, at least, this question overlaps with the last, though it is not the same.

I will first discuss whether Chazal "erred in Torah matters." If this question is asking whether there are halachic or hashkafic statements in the Talmud that are based on incorrect recollection, misunderstanding, or faulty reasoning, I think the answer is clearly that there are. Why else would Rav Dimi and Ravin, for example, argue all the time about what Rabbi Yochanan said? How could anybody ever question anybody else's kal vachomer? How could Rabbi Yehudah ben Tabbai have wrongly ordered someone executed without having adhered to the proper judicial procedures (Makkot 5b)? How could Rabbi Yehoshua et al. have been contradicted by a heavenly voice in their famous dispute with Rabbi Eliezer? In the absence of evidence that the Talmudic sages had perfect memories or flawless analytical minds, I do not believe they had either.

The fact that Chazal were imperfect human beings, just like the rest of us, does not, however, diminish the halachic and hashkafic authority of the Talmud. Even though any given halachic pronouncement of the Talmud may be based on flawed information or skill, it is still binding. Torah lo bashamayim hi; our obligations in the service of God are determined by the earthly, human, halachic process, part of which, in our day and age, is the supremity of the Talmud. Our job as Jews is, ultimately, to do what God expects of us, and God expects us to follow the Talmud, even if he "personally" thinks the Talmud said something stupid.

Mistakes in science? I opined on this topic in the last post on the Orthodoxy Test (#15). Just to summarize in one sentence: I haven't come across sufficient evidence to dissuade me from my initial, intuitive assumptions that (1) Chazal, like all other people, weren't omniscient, in science or in anything else; and (2) some of their scientific beliefs - like the shape of the Earth, or their model of the solar system, or the manner in which lice are formed - are wrong. (I suppose (2) is not really an intuitive belief, but it is one in which I have a great deal of confidence.)

Mistakes in history? The issue that comes immediately to mind is the dating of the construction of the Second Temple: modern archaeology claims it to have been built 166 years (if memory serves) before the Talmud says it was. Could Chazal have been wrong about this, or about other historical assertions that they made? Why not? Again, where's the proof they had perfect memories, never garbled their information, and kept flawless records of every single fact and event?

I chose (d). (E) sounds to me to be suggesting that Chazal's words are not binding, because their judgment was flawed, and if we can judge better, we can override what they said. This assertion is false, because it does not take into account the halachic process and the authority it has lent to the Talmud, as discussed above.

The Orthodoxy Test #17: If the Rambam Was Alive

If the Rambam was alive he'd be

a) Right Wing Yeshivish

b) Left Wing Yeshivish
c) Right Wing Modern Orthodox
d) Left Wing Modern Orthodox
e) considered an apikores
f) Leave this question out of my results

First of all, if the Rambam were alive today he'd be rolling in his grave.

The only one of these options that cannot be disputed is (e). Somebody would consider him an apikores. However, I doubt that everybody would, and so it still remains to fit him into one of categories (a)-(d). I chose (b), because I think he was very "shtark", but had a brain. (C) is almost equally tempting, but I just can't picture him wearing a plaid shirt and a small leather kippah with clips. I flatter myself to think he'd actually be a "Huh?".

I assume that in composing this question, lamedzayin had in mind the fact that the Rambam believed that Chazal had imperfect knowledge of science (as has been mentioned on this and other blogs in the past) - a position that many "yeshivish" rabbis and laymen now understand to be apikorsus. Maybe if the Rambam were alive today he'd feel differently, or maybe he'd just be one of the many rabbis - both "yeshivish" and "modern orthodox" (by the way, which type is Rabbi Hershel Schachter?) - who continue to think that the position is neither heretical nor wrong. Lamedzayin probably also was thinking more generally of the Rambam's knowledge of the gentile philosophy of his day. I imagine the Rambam would probably be reasonably well-versed in a lot of today's secular thought, though he might not recommend that everybody else pursue his level of proficiency. I don't think that such an attitude would preclude his being "left-wing yeshivish".

Basically, it comes down to this: I think the Rambam would wear a white shirt, a dark suit and a black hat, doing which, as far as I can tell, almost always guarantees that you will be "yeshivish" (unless you're Amish).

The Orthodoxy Test #18: Television and Movies

Television and movies are

a) assur and totally worthless
b) not allowed, but not exactly assur
c) ok in small doses but not really kosher
d) ok, but you have to control what you watch
e) perfectly fine
f) Leave this question out of my results

I chose (d). Television and movies are just media, like books, newspapers, magazines and radio. It may be that the television and film industries, relative to other media, produce proportionally more material that one ought to avoid for halachic reasons; one should approach these media with correspondingly greater caution. I don't think, however, that it's necessary or logical to condemn either medium as a whole.

The Orthodoxy Test #19: The Internet

The Internet is

a) a terrible destructive force and assur
b) really bad, but ok for parnassa
c) not great, but ok in moderation
d) perfectly fine
e) a great invention that increased worldwide Torah availability
f) Leave this question out of my results

Once again, the problem with many of these options is that they assume that the internet is a monolithic entity, when in fact it is merely a medium. Proposing, for example, that the internet is "assur" ((a)) is like proposing that books are "assur." Some (the good ones) are, and some aren't. The fact that some books are halachically undesirable does not negate the potential value - and permissibility - of the medium. Basically, my reaction is the same as it was to #18 - the one about television and movies (which see). I choose (d). The internet is as "perfectly fine" as many, many other things most of us deal with on a regular basis; as always, the important question is how one uses it.

The Orthodoxy Test #20: Cell Phones

Cell phones are

a) a source of batala and terrible images
b) a disruptive influence that should be avoided by serious yeshiva bochurim
c) problematic, but the good outweighs the bad
d) really fine, but I understand the concerns
e) just cell phones. I don't even understand why this is a question
f) Leave this question out of my results

I chose (d). I understand concerns with cell phones; I've seen people waste copious amounts of time with them, and I'm sure that people can do even more dastardly things with them, if they are so inclined and lack sufficient self-control. See what I wrote about #18 (television and movies) and #19 (the internet). The same applies here, except that I would classify a cell phone as a tool, rather than a medium. This distinction, however, is irrelevant. Just as one can use a hammer to build a sukkah or to smash annoying people over the head, so too cell phones can be put both to permissible, even desirable, and to forbidden uses. The tool itself is not intrinsically good or evil; one must ensure that one employs it, like any other tool, properly.

The Orthodoxy Test #21: Bible Critics

Bible critics

a) are all atheist kofrim reshaim
b) aren't even worth listening to
c) don't understand the text well enough and ask dumb questions
d) ask some good questions, but we have good answers
e) ask really hard questions which we need to find answers to
f) Leave this question out of my results

I chose (d). I'm not especially knowledgeable about Biblical critics and criticism, but my limited exposure leads me to believe that (a) is false, and that (b) and (c) are certainly not true of all critics. The difference between the two remaining options seems to me to be whether the foundations of Judaism and Jewish belief are threatened by Biblical criticism. I haven't come across any such threats, so to the best of my knowledge (d) is correct. I do not discount as impossible, however, that there may exist among the products of Biblical criticism challenges to Judaism more potent and fundamental than those I am aware of.

The Orthodoxy Test #22: Chareidi Isolationism

Isolationist chassidic and chareidi enclaves like New Square

a) epitomize the proper approach to avodas Hashem
b) are not for me, but I wish I was on that level
c) are not for me, but I understand the attraction
d) have some good points, but the bad outweighs the good
e) showcase all that is negative about Orthodoxy
f) Leave this question out of my results

First, please note that I have no knowledge of New Square, aside from the fact that they make milk and juice.

I chose (c). (A) and (b) imply that intrinsically, such communities are morally superior to others, which I do not believe. I have been taught that within orthodox Judaism, different lifestyles are appropriate for different people; this view coincides nicely with my experience. I would therefore consider the burden of proof to be on any party arguing in favour of such superiority.

(D) and (e) imply that intrinsically, such communities are morally inferior to others, which I also do not believe, for the same reasons that lead me to reject (a) and (b) (see last paragraph).

(C), happily, makes no value judgment about isolationism. The first half of it - "are not for me" - is definitely true. The second half - "but I understand the attraction" - is also true. I have known people who feel intensely uncomfortable when confronted with lifestyles, points of view or practices different from their own. I myself have experienced a certain thrill and passion when submerged within a like-minded community. I therefore can understand why some people would find an isolationist enclave attractive.

Note that by choosing (c), I in no way condone any hostility, prejudice, feeling of superiority or offensive behaviour that is reputed to exist among certain such communities.

The Orthodoxy Test #23: Reading Nonliterally

Reading difficult Torah stories nonliterally is

a) a perversion of Torah
b) sometimes but rarely a valid approach
c) occasionally ok, but makes me uncomfortable
d) ok if you can sort of back yourself up with an obscure Rishon
e) often necessary to make Torah understandable in light of science
f) Leave this question out of my results

I don't remember how I answered this one. I may have chosen (f). I don't even know what it means. I think there's a big difference between saying that a story in Chumash is nonliteral (which may indeed occasionally be okay, but I don't know) and saying that a story in the Talmud or Midrash, for example, is not literally true. In the latter case, given that Rambam and others explicitly state that much of the aggadic material in rabbinic literature is not meant to be taken literally, I'm quite comfortable with it.

The Orthodoxy Test #24: Left-Wing Orthodox Groups

Left wing Orthodox groups like Edah are

a) not really frum
b) frum, but have a totally warped idea of Judaism
c) interesting, but not my cup of tea
d) often thought provoking but occasionally go too far
e) the future of Orthodoxy
f) Leave this question out of my results

I know next to nothing about Edah.

While I would not want the left-wing orthodox groups I am somewhat more familiar with to be running the show in all of orthodoxy, I think it is useful to have them on the fringe, just as I think that groups on the far right are worth having around, as long as they're not too powerful. I think that moderation is usually the way to go, but sometimes we need extremists to show us we're making a big mistake or not seeing things clearly, or to take risks and/or drastic action when the mainstream is unwilling to do so. Therefore, (d), but with the caveats that my answer does not apply specifically Edah, and that the word "occasionally" may understate the case, depending on the organization.

The Orthodoxy Test #25: Midrashim as Pshat

Midrashim should be taken to be pshat

a) always
b) almost always
c) when it's reasonable to do so
d) occasionally, but not usually
e) almost never
f) Leave this question out of my results

(C) all the way. I don't think any justification is required.

תם ונשלם שבח לא-ל בורא עולם

Wednesday, January 04, 2006

Gosse Theory

I was looking through Rabbi Gil Student's blog, www.hirhurim.blogspot.com, and I came across an article from last November about the much-maligned Gosse theory discussed fleetingly on this blog about a month and a half ago. I read through not only Student's post but also all of the comments (quite a tedious task), then posted a comment of my own, because I felt that none of the comments had adequately addressed the questions being raised. As I acknowledged in my comment, it's very possible that no one will ever look at those comments and read mine, since it was posted many weeks after all the others. I'm posting it below in a different font, and maybe, this way, someone will read it. Maybe.

I assume nobody is even checking these comments any more, but I'll write something because I find this topic a good intellectual workout. Yitzchak is right that just about any objection one can possibly raise about the Gosse hypothesis can be addressed with a little bit of imagination. Albus Dumbledore could probably do almost all the tinkering Gosse theory requires God to have done; I imagine God could do it too.

As for the theological/philosophical issues: God doesn't make his existence or the truth of the Torah too obvious, because if the Torah were as clearly true as the link between jumping off a skyscraper and dying, people would not have enough free will when making a decision of whether to do right or wrong. It's important, theologically, for there to be some grounds for doubting (though not refuting) God's existence and the Torah's credibility. I personally believe that Rabbi Dr. Dovid Gottlieb of Ohr Somayach has put forward a persuasive rational argument in favour of the Torah's veracity ("Living Up to the Truth;" google it and you'll find it). For people who wish to take a rational approach to determining the truth, there need to be objections that they can raise, if they want to, to counter arguments like Rabbi Gottlieb's, and persuade themselves that the Torah is not true. God may thus have decided to create the world looking deceptively old (= Gosse) to provide an excuse, as there must be, to people wishing to shirk their responsibilities to God and religion (and to the truth).

Wednesday, December 07, 2005

Math Problem

I choose at random a polynomial (call it a function, f (x)) with only non-negative integer coefficients. You get to choose a number, a, and I will tell you what f (a) is. You then get to choose another number, b, and I will tell you what f (b) is. Devise a method of choosing a and b such that after hearing what f (b) is, you can tell me what the polynomial is (i.e., what the coefficients are). Propose your answer in the Comments. You may not participate if you knew the answer before reading this post. I assure you no post-high school math skills are required to solve this problem.

Tuesday, December 06, 2005

Question About Beliefs and Rabbinic Leaders

Question: To what extent are the rabbinic leaders of the Torah community (however their identity is determined) empowered by the Torah to rule upon what must be regarded as false? It is presumably within their authority to rule that polytheism must be regarded as falsehood. It is presumably not within their authority to rule that monotheism must be regarded as falsehood. Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe that the Code of Hammurabi preceded the giving of the Torah on Mt. Sinai? Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe Julius Caesar lived? Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe Louis XIV was king of France? Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe there is such a thing as a molecule? Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe I have a right foot? Are they empowered to rule that it is forbidden to believe that I exist? Obviously, there is a line somewhere, beyond which they are not empowered to dictate beliefs. I very much doubt that it can be simply defined. What is it? Responses please.

Thursday, November 24, 2005

Cogitating the Regurgitation

I am writing in response to "Regurgitating the cogitation", which was in turn a response to my original post on the topic, "Cogitation" (Nov. 23/05). To recap very briefly, I initially argued (1) that it is not irrational for Rabbi Gottlieb to use simultaneously "Living Up to the Truth" and the theory that the universe was created 5766 years ago looking billions of years old; and (2) that the latter theory is not inherently "weak or cheap." Captain Salamander, in his response (the bulk of which I have copied and italicized, below), seems not to question (1). He presents two objections: (a) that I used a poor analogy in arguing that Rabbi Gottlieb's "old-looking-creation" theory is not weak or cheap; and (b) that the Gottliebian arguments discussed thus far on this blog do not answer all the problems modern academic findings create with the historical records of Genesis, whereas a non-literal reading of Genesis does. In the paragraphs below, I will address (a), and argue that (b) is simply irrelevant to the discussion at hand.

a) The "soft" sciences vs. the "hard" sciences. "Suppose academia universally accepts the Documentary Hypothesis of Biblical authorship," writes the Dark Lord. I think this approach is flawed being as that their is a clear distinction between the postulations of sociologists, historians and archaeologists based on guesswork and hypothesizing and the conclusions of biologists, geologists and physicists that are the result of experimentation and observation - that is the wonder of the scientific method.

This analogy was meant for illustrative purposes only. If you don't like it, you can ignore it. Read my last paragraph as follows: "I'd like to aver that there is, in fact, nothing weak or cheap about Rabbi Gottlieb's hypothesis. It fits the facts very nicely. There's no evidence that it's wrong. At the risk of sounding like a right-wing Haredi lunatic, academia's acceptance of a particular explanation for the existence of a body of facts does not require Jews to accept that explanation when another explanation exists, one more compatible with the sum total of our knowledge." I think that the point stands on its own merits.

To address your objection directly, however, while I generally agree with the distinction you draw between "hard" and "soft" science, I do not believe it valid in relation to the dating of the universe. You argue, if I may interpret and paraphrase your words, that "hard" science can create hypotheses and then test them out to see whether they hold true; for example, if you want to see whether Newton was really right that Force equals Mass times Acceleration, all you need to do is construct a dynamic situation where you know two of the variables already and can measure the third (e.g., you weigh yourself: you know your mass, and you know the acceleration due to gravity; you use a scale to measure the force your body exerts on the ground). "Soft" science merely gathers evidence and postulates based on that body of data; there is generally no experiment that can be conducted either to prove or to disprove the hypothesis. Dating the universe and the theory of evolution resemble, in this respect, "soft" rather than "hard" science. No one can employ the full scientific method by running an experiment to test the historical claims of the theory of evolution or whether the universe banged into existence 15 billion years ago any more than they can devise a test to see whether the Israelites conquered Canaan en masse 3000 years ago or to determine the validity of the Documentary Hypothesis, because to test any of those theories, you'd have to go back in time and actually observe what was going on. Short of that, any conclusions about historical events, whether events spurred by natural laws or those due to human initiative, are merely conjectured from the available evidence. The fact that some conjectures are more mathematical or technical than others does not make them more verifiable, and it is verifiability that makes "hard" science more accurate than "soft" science, as you yourself state: "experimentation and observation - that is the wonder of the scientific method."

Nonetheless, it is certain that no two historical assertions will be judged equally likely based on the evidence at hand. It is certainly your prerogative to believe, after an examination of the evidence, that the Big Bang theory (for example) is more compelling than (for example) the Documentary Hypothesis. It is my prerogative to conclude the opposite.

(Let me make a parenthetical point at this critical juncture - if scientists had "empirically" proven that the Torah had been written by numerous human authors, I would still reject this theory. I believe b'emunah sheleimah, etc. etc.)

Why would you reject the theory? "Living Up to the Truth" asserts that the reason to reject it is the historical evidence that the Torah was divinely given. If that historical evidence is overridden, then you no longer have reason to believe in the Torah's divine authorship. Doing so would be irrational.

What I assume you mean is that you would reject the Documentary Hypothesis, no matter how compelling it was, because there exists other evidence that God wrote the Torah, and the evidence the Documentary Hypothesis employs does not contradict the notion of divine authorship; the Hypothesis simply ignores supernatural possibilities. I don't see why your approach to the age of the Earth should differ. If the Torah says that the universe is 5766 years old, you should reject the calculations of modern science, no matter how compelling they are, because there exists other evidence (that the Torah is correct and therefore) that the universe is younger than science says, and the evidence used by modern science does not, after all, contradict the notion of a young universe; modern science simply ignores supernatural possibilities in explaining why the Earth seems really old.

b) The inadequacy of Gosse-Gottleib. If one is willing to suspend their rational observations about the age of the universe and believe that the Lord seeks to deceives us (or test us, if you would prefer) in order to give us a chance to doubt his hand in creation, one is still left with several unanswered questions created by a literal reading of Genesis:

-Why is there sound geological evidence that disproves a global flood?
-If that same global flood wiped out all life a mere thousands of years ago, why are there peoples in far-flung places (Aborigines, Native Americans, etc.) with rich histories stretching back for tens of thousands of years?

This point, while worth discussing, is unrelated to the question of whether Rabbi Gottlieb's various theories are incompatible with each other. I don't claim to be any sort of expert on the evidence of which you speak (or even, particularly, to be familiar with it). I attempted merely to deal with the rationality of accepting both the Gosse-Gottlieb hypothesis (that the Earth was created looking aged) and the arguments of "Living Up to the Truth." If you want to know what Rabbi Gottlieb has to say about the evidence to which you refer, I suggest you email him (I've got his address; ask me if you want it).

As my friend Lord Voldemort likes to say - I am not saying that there are not answers to these questions. I do believe, however, that Gosse-Gottleib cannot answer these problems. Why accept a solution that does not nearly do the problem justice and in so doing accept an approach that requires the suspension of our logical inquiry and rational observation. Perhaps I would be willing to do so for an all-encomapassing answer, a Torah and Science "Theory of Everything"* if you will. But for Gosse-Gottleib? Not on your life.

Once again, you're raising a different issue. You're arguing that it makes more sense to say that the Torah's account of creation should not be taken literally in every respect, and that modern science is right about the age of the world, than to say that Genesis should be taken literally, and that modern scientific theory is wrong. That may be true. But it's incompatible with Rabbi Gottlieb's apparent premise, which is that Genesis must be taken literally. If you want to criticize that premise, go right ahead, but that's a theological, not merely a rational, debate, and requires careful analysis of the rabbinic sources on the subject. It's got nothing to do with the validity of Rabbi Gottlieb's subscribing simultaneously to "Living Up to the Truth" and the notion that the world was created looking old.

Wednesday, November 23, 2005

Cogitation

I was recently discussing the writings of Rabbi Dr. Dovid Gottlieb of Ohr Somayach (is that how you spell it?) with friends. Rabbi Gottlieb is the author of "Living Up to the Truth," a must-read online essay that argues that there exist rational grounds for belief in (orthodox) Judaism (just google the title and you'll find it on the Ohr Sameyach website). Rabbi Gottlieb argues that by combining the information we have about the world around us with rational analysis, we can conclude that the Torah was, in fact, given to the Israelites by God at Mt. Sinai. For example, the single most compelling of his arguments, that of Rabbi Yehudah Halevi in the Kuzari, is that empirically, it is impossible for an entire nation to be convinced that their own ancestors, in the not-inaccessibly-distant past, had experienced a series of events as memorable as those described in the Pentateuch, if those events had not, in fact, taken place; and that since the Jews are known to have possessed such a national belief, it must have been an accurate one. (I'm reducing more than an entire chapter into one sentence here; if you have problems with the argument as I have explained it, read "Living Up to the Truth" for a more complete presentation.)

Rabbi Gottlieb has also written on the topic of reconciling the apparent Torah claim that the Earth is 5766 years old with the scientific evidence suggesting that it is far older than that; he suggests simply that the world was created 5766 years ago with the appearance of being much more ancient.

The following question was posed to me (unless I misunderstood it): Assume the Torah definitively states that the Earth is 5766 years old. Rabbi Gottlieb's premise in "Living Up to the Truth" is that we can use our observations of the world around us (historical records, for example) to draw conclusions regarding the veracity of the Torah. But he also proposes that we ignore the implications of our observations of the world around us when they indicate that the Earth is billions of years old, since those implications conflict with the Torah, which we have established to be factual. Would it not be equally valid to argue that we should accept the scientific evidence about the Earth's age, and ignore the evidence that the Torah is truthful, since the Torah conflicts with compelling science?

I believe the answer to the question is no, because the two sets of conclusions described in the preceding paragraph are neither equally plausible, nor logically equivalent. If we accept, based on the evidence, that the Torah is true, and, hence, that the world is 5766 years old, we must, indeed (based on our initial assumption), discard as misleading the evidence that the world is billions of years old. However, we can fall back on Rabbi Gottlieb's alternative (and logically irrefutable) approach to the age of the world, viz., that it just looks very old. If we believe what the Torah tells us about God, it's certainly within God's capabilities to make an old-looking world (no more difficult than making a new-looking one, in fact). There's no evidence that God didn't do exactly that; indeed, from a theological perspective, it actually makes sense that he would have (ask me if you want more explanation of that). The evidence is all reconcilable; we are left with no contradictions.

However, if we accept initially that the Earth is older than the Torah allows, we must then confront and discard the evidence that the Torah is true. Can we explain how that evidence came to exist? Not to the best of my knowledge. We can't say that God manufactured the evidence, because we have (as yet) no evidence that there's a God at all. The facts we know about Jewish history just sit there, crying out their contradiction of our conclusions about the world's age. This approach, unlike the last one, cannot account for the existence of all the evidence. The Torah-affirming approach discussed above may adopt a hypothesis that seems weak, or cheap, but at least it covers all the bases.

* * * * *
I'd like to aver that there is, in fact, nothing weak or cheap about Rabbi Gottlieb's hypothesis. Suppose academia universally accepts the Documentary Hypothesis of Biblical authorship, and suppose, furthermore, that we all agree with its premise that it is just inconceivable that the Five Books of Moses were authored, in their entirety, by the same human being. Does that mean it's weak, or cheap, or intellectually dishonest or undesirable to ascribe the Pentateuch to God (who can write in a multiplicity of styles)? I believe not, and I believe the same is true of Rabbi Gottlieb's explanation of the world's ancient appearance. It fits the facts very nicely. There's no evidence that it's wrong. At the risk of sounding like a right-wing Haredi lunatic, academia's acceptance of a particular explanation for the existence of a body of facts does not require Jews to accept that explanation when another explanation exists, one more compatible with the sum total of our knowledge.

Monday, November 21, 2005

Iberian Irony

You may recall that recently in the news was a story which involved the Spanish police arresting a dozen Basque separatists on charges of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism. The militants were brought to the national police headquarters in Madrid, where they were detained for three days until their court appearance. The authorities' mistake was in allowing them all to attend the same hearing. They were led out of their cells together as a group, under heavy guard, but just before leaving the building they had to pass through a small vestibule, into which only three officers were able to accompany the suspects, on account of the room's small size. Within seconds, in what was clearly a planned action, the terrorists overpowered their outnumbered guards, jammed the vestibule doors shut, left the building and escaped in waiting cars driven by separatist sympathizers, demonstrating once again the wisdom of the adage, "Don't put all your Basques in one exit."

Wednesday, November 09, 2005

The Numerology of Casablanca

Suppose you have the following system: each letter of the Roman alphabet is assigned a numerical value reflecting its position in the alphabet, i.e., a = 1, b = 2, ... , z = 26. After calculating any sum of these alphabetical ordinals, you round to the nearest multiple of 10. Consider the following:

t (= 20) + h (= 8) + e (= 5) + u (= 21) + s (= 19) + u (= 21) + a (= 1) + l (= 12) + s (= 19) + u (= 21) + s (= 19) + p (= 16) + e (= 5) + c (= 3) + t (= 20) + s (= 19) = 229 ≈ 230

Hence, you round up "the usual suspects."

Friday, November 04, 2005

Ibn Ezra on Two Isaiahs

As the Outsider requested, here is information on the statements I referred to in "Rabbinic vs. Modern Academic Beliefs" made by Ibn Ezra on Isaiah 40:1 and 49:7. I would like to preface it with the following, however. Prior to my writing of the original article, I had heard many times, mainly at YU, that Ibn Ezra claimed that Isaiah had actually been written by two people, but I had never studied the matter. Before including the reference to Ibn Ezra's two Isaiahs, I searched the internet to find out where Ibn Ezra actually said anything about it, and came up with Isaiah 40:1 and 49:7, which I then looked up. I admit that I did not feel I properly understood his comments in their entirety, but what I saw was enough to convince me that what I had been told at YU, by people I respect, was correct. In writing the article, I referred to the matter of the authorship of Isaiah, and the location of the relevant statements of Ibn Ezra, but did not elaborate, because I did not feel I understood enough to say anything intelligent beyond that. I hoped that no one would merely take my word for it without verifying my sources. Perhaps that was irresponsible of me.

When the Outsider requested that I provide details about the Isaiah Ibn Ezras, however, I decided to bite the bullet and decipher in full what he meant. I made reasonable progress for a while, but eventually I hit a brick wall that I seemed unable to break through or to circumvent. I spent hours trying the figure out what on earth he was saying, and finally, on my final attempt (funny how that always happens), I found more than I could have dreamed of: all the information I sought, spoon-fed right to me, at the following web address:

http://hydepark.hevre.co.il/hydepark/topicarc.asp?topic_id=1221691

What follows is an edited version of what is written there (any of you can, of course, check out the original for yourselves). I was just too lazy to write the whole thing out in my own words, since it is fairly lengthy. This modified version is therefore my partially plagiarized summary of (much of) the evidence indicating that the Ibn Ezra believed the book of Isaiah had been written by two different people. I do not claim that it represents what the author of the article on that website believed. However, I have examined the assertions that I have taken from the website, and have satisfied myself they are reasonable, and that I can't come up with any other set of assertions that are as reasonable. My gratitude goes to the people involved in providing this information on that site.

As always, if you discover problems with the arguments presented here, please let me know. The case I present seems reasonable to me, but I don't dogmatically insist on it, and I do wish to believe what is true and not to believe that which is false. If you think, for reasons with substance, that it's wrong, I want to know about it.

One more thing: I'm tired, and I'm not going to do a careful edit of this piece before I go to bed. I'm going to post it anyway. So please forgive any poor editing as being, rather, lack of editing.

Here goes:

Ibn Ezra says the following at Isaiah 40:1:

נחמו נחמו עמי. נדבקה זאת הפרשה בעבור שהזכיר למעלה כי כל אוצרות המלך גם בניו יגלו לבבל על כן אחרי זאת הנחמות ואלה הנחמות הראשונות מחצי הספר על דעת רבי משה הכהן על בית שני ולפי דעתי הכל על גלותינו רק יש בתוך הספר דברי גלות בבל לזכר כי כורש ששלח הגולה ואולם באחרית הספר דברים הם לעתיד כאשר אפרש. ודע כי מעתיקי המצות ז״ל אמרו כי ספר שמואל כתבו שמואל והוא אמת עד [וימת] שמואל והנה דברי הימים יוכיח ששם דור אחר דור (לפני) [לבני] זרובבל והעד מלכים יראו וקמו שרים וישתחוו ויש להשיב כאשר ישמעו שם הנביא ואם איננו והמשכיל יבין׃

"Be comforted, be comforted, my people." This chapter has been placed here because in the preceding chapter, it is stated that all the treasures of the King, and even his sons, will be carried away to Babylon; thus, it is followed by these words of comfort. These first words of comfort, with which the second part of the book [of Isaiah] begins, refer to the construction of the Second Temple, according to Rabbi Moshe Hakohen; my opinion is that they refer to [the future redemption from] our current exile, only that there are references to the Babylonian exile [of between the two Temple eras] to record that Cyrus, who permitted the exiled Jews to return [text defective; either a misprint or an omission]. However, the statements at the end of the book [definitely] refer to [our] future, as I will explain. [Translation until this point adapted from M. Friedländer's 1873 The Commentary of Ibn Ezra on Isaiah, which I happily found in the JCC library, much to my astonishment. He notes the textual problem that I mention.]

Know that the recorders of the commandments [presumably meaning either the amoraim in general or the redactors of the Gemara specifically] said that Samuel wrote the book of Samuel, and this is [only] true until ''And Samuel died'' [I Samuel 25:1].

[Note: in my Mikraos Gedolos text of Ibn Ezra, the word וימת does not appear. I think that even without it, the meaning of the statement is clearly the same. The website I am using presents וימת as part of the original text. While I do not know the website's source, the existence of many inaccuracies in the texts of medieval commentaries is well-known, and since I do not believe that it alters the meaning of the passage anyway, I have accepted this emendation.]

[This approach to authorship I am hinting at] is proven by the book of Chronicles, where there are [listed] generation after generation of the descendants of Zerubbabel [I Chronicles 3:19–24; 10 generations are listed after Zerubbabel, in all].

[Note: here again, I have emended the text as it appears in my edition. My book says לפני זרובבל, "before Zerubbabel." I am substituting the website's version, לבני זרובבל, "of the descendants of Zerubbabel." I feel justified in doing so because (a) the physical difference between the two words is so slight (פ vs. ב) that an error in transcription can easily have occurred; and (b) I can't make heads or tails of the sentence as it reads according to my edition, whereas according to the website's version, it makes a lot of sense.]

And the evidence [for using this approach here in the book of Isaiah] is ''Kings shall see and arise, princes shall bow" [Isaiah 49:7]. One can reply [that this verse means to say that the kings and princes will do this] when they hear the name of the prophet; and if that interpretation is not correct, he who is enlightened will understand.

I'll spoil the surprise by telling you right now that Ibn Ezra is going to argue that this part of Isaiah (i.e., Chap. 40 until the end) was not written by Isaiah (ben Amotz), because Isaiah lived too early. First Ibn Ezra notes that Samuel didn't write all of the book of Samuel, since he obviously could not have written "And Samuel died'' and the material after it. Then he draws our attention to an extensive genealogy in Chronicles that seems to be a later interpolation, for the following reason: the Gemara (Bava Batra 15a) says that Ezra wrote Chronicles up to (and including) that point at which he own genealogy is recorded (I Chronicles 7:1-5). It says Nehemiah wrote the rest. Now, Ezra, Nehemiah and Zerubbabel were all contemporaries of each other (see, for example, Ezra 2:2 and Nehemiah 8:9; for more proofs, ask me). Thus it is highly unlikely that either of the two authors of Chronicles established by the Talmud could have written down the names of the descendants of Zerubbabel to the tenth generation. Thus he has demonstrated that the fact that the Talmud says X wrote a book of Nach does not mean that X wrote all of it.

After providing us with this background, Ibn Ezra proceeds to explain why he believes this part of Isaiah was not written by Isaiah, by quoting part of Isaiah 49:7: ''מלכים יראו וקמו שרים וישתחוו''.

What is bothering him about these words? Look at that verse and the one immediately following it:

כה אמר־ה׳ גאל ישראל קדושו לבזה־נפש למתעב גוי לעבד משלים מלכים יראו וקמו שרים וישתחוו למען ה׳ אשר נאמן קדש ישראל ויבחרך׃ כה אמר ה׳ בעת רצון עניתיך וביום ישועה עזרתיך ואצרך ואתנך לברית עם להקים ארץ להנחיל נחלות שממות ׃

So says God, the redeemer of Israel, his Holy One, to him whom man despises, to him whom the nation abhors, to a servant of rulers: kings shall see and arise, princes shall bow, because of God who is faithful, the Holy One of Israel, who has chosen you. So says God: in a time of favor I have answered you, and in a day of salvation I have helped you, and I will preserve you and give you for a covenant of the nation, to restore the land and to assign desolate inheritances to their owners [Isaiah 49:7-8].

This is what Ibn Ezra says ad locum about these verses:

ז) מלכים יראו וקמו. הנה כבר רמזתי לך זה הסוד בחצי הספר ועל דעת רבים כי המלכים כמו כורש כאשר ישמע דברי הנביא יקום וישתחוה׃
למען ה׳. כי נאמן בדברו. והנה כ״ף ויבחרך לעד על יושר זה הפירוש׃
ח) בעת רצון עניתיך. גם זה עד על הרמז ורבים אמרו כי כ״ף עניתיך שב אל כורש והנה אין הפרשה דבקה׃

7) "Kings shall see and arise." I have already hinted at this secret halfway through the book [i.e., his comments to 40:1]. According to many, [the interpretation is] that when the kings, like Cyrus, hear the words of the prophet, they will rise and bow. [Emphasis on "the words" added.]
"Because of God." For he is faithful to his word. The [letter] כ״ף of ויבחרך is evidence of the correctness of this explanaton.
8) At a time of favor I have answered you: This [wording] is also evidence for what I have been hinting at. Many say that the [letter] כ״ף of עניתיך refers back to Cyrus, but then the passage doesn't fit.

Ibn Ezra emphasizes the fact that in these two verses, God addresses the prophet in the singular, with the suffix כ״ף. He thus faces a problem: God is not addressing all of Israel (Radak, for example, disagrees). God seems to be promising that when the prophet's prophesies finally come true, kings and princes will show their respect to the prophet, who had been despised and treated badly up until then. But if Isaiah is the prophet here, how will Cyrus and all the other kings and princes be able to bow to him and show him their respect? He will have been dead for 200 years by the time they are alive and have the chance!

Ibn Ezra quotes a simple answer that he claims "many" give: all the verse is saying is that when the vindicated words of Isaiah are mentioned to those kings in the future, they will bow and acknowledge how great a prophet Isaiah was. This does not seem to be the "secret" he suggests will explain this verse. Indeed, recall that back on 40:1 he mentioned this answer of the "many," and said, "if that is not so, he who is enlightened will understand." He does not seem to reject the "many"'s explanation outright, but he has his own secret, one that he feels at least as adequate.

So returning to 40:1, we find that Ibn Ezra points out that the Talmud's ascription of a particular book to a particular person does not always mean that that person wrote the whole book; and that he relates that principle to the book of Isaiah by quoting a verse which, from an historical perspective, is problematic, if understood to have been said by Isaiah. He quotes an interpretation of that verse that reconciles Isaiah's authorship with the historical facts, and then says, "But if that's not the answer, then there is a secret." If the secret is not that someone else wrote the balance of Isaiah, then why did he bother to prove that Talmudically unascribed authorship is possible? Sounds like he means that the part of the book beginning with Chapter 40 was written by a different, presumably later, author.

By the way, I read that Isaiah 1-39 is noticeably different from Isaiah 40-66. I have not investigated this in detail, so I cannot guarantee that it is true. If it is, though, that would help explain why Ibn Ezra chooses Chap. 40 as the point at which "Old Isaiah" and "New Isaiah" meet.

I'm tired, and I think I've presented enough information to make the general outline of the "Ibn Ezra and Isaiah authorship" discussion clear. What follows is most of the rest of the above-cited website, unedited. It contains some added information about Ibn Ezra's theory that God speaks personally to the prophet (periodically) in the latter part of Isaiah, as well as a somewhat more detailed summary of the argument that Ibn Ezra believed in two authors of Isaiah (though not all backed up by presented evidence). I've italicized the whole thing.

Ibn Ezra refers to this ''secret'' again at the end of his commentary on the famous ''Suffering Servant'' section of Sefer Yeshayah, the pesukim between 52:13 to 53:12. Controversy has raged over these pesukim for many centuries, since the Christians claim that they refer to none other than their own messiah. Many of our meforshim do battle with this interpretation, bringing proof after proof that these pesukim couldn't possibly refer to Yoshke.** Ibn Ezra explains the entire section, word by word, according to one of the mainstream Jewish interpretations, which is that the ''servant'' is a symbol for all of Klal Yisroel. But then, suddenly on the last posuk, Ibn Ezra lets us know that he himself doesn't agree with this derech. He tells us his own opinion is that the ''servant'' of the section is one and the same as the servant mentioned in earlier passages. Here are his words:

...והנה פרשתי לך כל הפרשה ולפי דעתי כי הנה ישכיל עבדי הוא שאמר הנביא עליו הן עבדי אתמך בו ויאמר לי עבדי אתה וכן כתוב בדעתו יצדיק צדיק עבדי לרבים וכתוב גוי נתתי למכים והסוד כאשר רמזתי בחצי הספר והנה כל הפרשיות דבקות זאת עם זאת
(פירוש ראב״ע, ישעיה נג׃יב)
…I have thus explained to you the entire section [i.e. according to the majority view, that the ''עבד'' of this section refers to the Jewish people, and not to the prophet himself]. But in my own opinion [the servant here, the one in] ''הנה ישכיל עבדי'' [posuk 53:12] is the very same [servant] about whom the prophet said ''הן עבדי אתמך בו'' [posuk 42:1], as well as ''ויאמר לי עבדי אתה'' [posuk 49:3]. And it is written [here] ''בדעתו יצדיק צדיק עבדי לרבים'' [posuk 53:11], [just as] it is written [above] ''גוי נתתי למכים'' [posuk 50:6]. And the secret is as I hinted halfway through the sefer. Now all the sections fit together well.
(R. Avrohom ibn Ezra to Yeshayah 53:12)

So what exactly is the "secret"? Throughout his explanations of all these nevuos Ibn Ezra systematically and consistently emphasizes the Bablylonian setting. Throughout his explanations of all these nevuos, he also emphasizes their autobiographical nature. He leaves it to us to connect the two and draw the obvious—and shocking—conclusion: A different novi, living two hundred years after the Yeshayah for whom the whole sefer is named, wrote all of these prophecies. According to Ibn Ezra, even the famous ''Suffering Servant'' narrative was written by this anonymous novi.

Note that Ibn Ezra wasn't motivated to come to his conclusion for any of the heretical reasons of the Modern Bible critics. Ibn Ezra obviously has no problem with a novi seeing into the future, which is why he doesn't mention his ''secret'' in his peirush either of the two places where Koresh's name is mentioned, which were the favorite proofs of the kofrim. Ibn Ezra came to his conclusions not because of any doubts as to the powers of nevuoh, but rather as result of his sophisticated literary and grammatical sensibilities, his acute sensitivity to all the dimensions of what we call poshut pshat.